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Abstract 
 The history of cattle ranching on the Great Plains combines climate, grasslands, water, 
people and animals. Unfortunately, it also includes environmental missteps and catastrophes 
which has led to numerous negative histories that end on an environmental low-point. The 
resulting studies tend to blame rancher’s greed for damaging their environment, as opposed to 
finding an alternative explanation for their actions. Ranching histories, therefore, often follow a 
decline framework. The overarching message for these types of histories is that human 
interaction with the natural world is inherently negative. In short, historians have not been overly 
kind to cattle ranchers. This study complicates that history by examining why ranchers made the 
mistakes that they did and how they tried to correct them. It does not end on the environmental 
low point for the cattle industry but looks past it to consider what, if anything, was done to 
improve ranching methods.  The discussion considers how ranching in Alberta and Montana 
started and why ranchers operated the way that they did. It argues that ranchers in both places 
started their operations with a fundamentally flawed understanding of the environment because 
the climate, grasslands and economic potential of the area had been a favorite topic for boosters 
during the 1870-1880s. What resulted was the importation of thousands of cattle and 
inappropriate ranching methods. After several years of temporary equilibrium in 1886/1887 a 
drought and hard winter occurred. By spring it was realized that thousands of cattle had frozen or 
starved to death where they stood. However, the disaster was not the end of the cattle industry in 
either Montana or Alberta. Ranchers on both sides of the border tried (often successfully) to 
adapt to their environment in order to continue in their industry. It is the recognition of a flawed 
understanding of the environment and then trying to adapt to it that forms the backbone of this 
work.  This study is also a bioregional history of the nineteenth century Montana and Alberta 
borderlands. As such, it examines how people and governments responded to an environment 
and climate misrepresented by booster literature and government policy. The work itself is 
bioregional, yet also deals with broader ideas of nation building, borderland economics, the 
concept of natural disaster, and indigenous displacement.    
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Chapter 1: Historiography of Ranching, Borderlands and Environment  
The Montana/Alberta Borderlands Geography and Climate 
 The history of cattle ranching on the Great Plains is a combination of climate, grasslands, 
water, people, and animals. It also includes environmental misinterpretation, flawed land-use, 
and catastrophes which has led to numerous negative histories that end on an environmental low-
point. The resulting studies tend to blame rancher’s greed for damaging their environment, as 
opposed to finding an alternative explanation for their actions. Ranching histories, therefore, 
often follow a decline framework. The overarching message for these types of histories is that 
human interaction with the natural world is inherently negative. In short, historians have not been 
overly kind to cattle ranchers. This study complicates that history by examining why ranchers 
made the mistakes that they did and how they tried to correct them. It does not end on the 
environmental low point for the cattle industry but looks past it to consider what, if anything, 
was done to improve ranching methods.  The discussion considers how ranching in Alberta and 
Montana started and why ranchers operated the way that they did. It argues that ranchers in both 
places started their operations with a fundamentally flawed understanding of the environment 
because the climate, grasslands and economic potential of the area had been a favorite topic for 
boosters during the 1870-1880s. What resulted was the importation of thousands of cattle and 
inappropriate ranching methods. After several years of temporary equilibrium in 1886/1887 a 
drought and hard winter occurred. By spring it was realized that thousands of cattle had frozen or 
starved to death where they stood. However, the disaster was not the end of the cattle industry in 
either Montana or Alberta. Ranchers on both sides of the border tried (often successfully) to 
adapt to their environment in order to continue in their industry. It is the recognition of a flawed 
understanding of the environment and then trying to adapt to it that forms the backbone of this 
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work.  This study is also a bioregional history of the nineteenth century Montana and Alberta 
borderlands. As such, it examines how people and governments responded to an environment 
and climate misrepresented by booster literature and government policy. The work is also 
connected to broader environmental and political topics. For example, ideas of nation building, 
borderland economics, the concept of natural disaster, and indigenous displacement are all 
explored, or touched on in this study.    
  University of Montana historian Dan Flores made the case for drawing boundaries around 
research projects “in ways that make real sense ecologically and topographically.” Flores’ 
reasoning was, for environmental historians the bioregion matters.1 The geographical focus of 
this study includes both Montana and Alberta because the 49th parallel bisects the bioregion 
within the Great Plains that is the focus of this study: the north-western plains.2 The high plains 
in Alberta and Montana presented similar opportunities and difficulties for ranchers during the 
19th and early 20th centuries. In a sense, the geography, plant species and climate of the north-
western plains have all shaped human history, especially ranching. Organizing this study 
bioregionally along a borderlands, as opposed to nationally, allowed the primary evidence from 
ranchers to show that the same perception of the environment, methods of ranching, and 
environmental difficulties existed on both sides of the border.        
 The study area is predominantly semiarid due to the rain shadow effect caused by the 
Rocky Mountains, but the valleys, rivers and streams that flow through the north-western-plains, 
fed by mountain glaciers and snowpack, provide additional water. Valleys provided a welcome 
                                                            
1 Dan Flores, “Place: An Argument for Bioregional History,” Environmental History Review 18 (1994): 6. 
2 Theodore Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History: The Northwestern Plains as 
Bioregion,” in The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests: Essays on Regional History of the Forty-ninth 
Parallel, ed. Sterling Evans (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 18. 
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respite for humans and animals in a region prone to high-winds, rain, snow, heat, and rapid 
weather changes. The riparian areas along rivers are home to stands of cottonwood (Populus 
deltoids) and tall grasses that are ideal feed for grazers. In addition, valleys provided much 
needed thermal cover throughout the long, dark, and cold winters.3 Along with valleys are 
numerous highlands, like the Cypress Hills, Judith Mountains, and Deer Lodge. While not as 
imposing as the Rocky Mountains, these highlands rise a few hundred, to a few thousand feet 
above the lowlands. Even the lower highlands are often elevated enough to have an increase in 
rainfall. Historian Theodore Binnema notes that “in most years the Cypress Hills receive two or 
three more inches of precipitation during the growing season than do the surrounding plains” and 
as a result they support an abundance of vegetation, including rough fescue (Festuca campestris) 
prized by bison and cattle. The highlands are some of the only sources of wood on the plains as 
species like “lodgepole pine (Pinus contorta), jack pine (Pinus banksiana), white spruce (Picea 
glauca), and Douglas fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii)” are present.4 The food, shelter, and building 
materials found in the valleys and highlands made them crucial to the survival of the Indigenous 
population, bison, cattle and ranchers. 
 The climate and vegetation of the north western-plains vary with its geography, soils, and 
precipitation. The dominant soil types in the study area are Mollisols and Aridisols. Mollisols are 
well developed, dark brown to black soils that are high in organic matter and bases. Aridisols are 
drier and lower in organic matter, but still productive.5  The vegetation along the 
Montana/Alberta borderlands is classified as northern mixed prairie which has both warm and 
                                                            
3 Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 20. 
4 Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 20. 
5 J.S. Singh et al., “Structural and Functional Attributes of the Vegetation of Northern Mixed Prairie of North 
America,” Botanical Review 49, no. 1 (1983): 121.  
4 
 
cool season grasses. In addition, there are two sub-regions, the xeric (dry) mixed grasslands in 
Montana and the mesic (moist) grasslands in Alberta. The exact location and limits of these 
regions are determined by precipitation and therefore geography.6 The dominant grass species 
are the warm-season blue grama (Bouteloua gracilis) and buffalo grass (Buchloë dactyloides) 
with cool weather needle-and-thread (Stipa comata) mixed throughout, although the latter is 
more common in drier areas. Blue grama and buffalo grass are exceptional fodder that is both 
nutritious and recovers well from late season grazing. Other grass species were common and 
important to grazers as well. In the mesic region porcupine grass (Stipa curtiseta), western 
wheatgrass (Agropyron smithii), and June grass (Koeleria cristata) are all sources of fodder for 
grazers. Warren Elofson identified wheatgrass in particular as an important early summer food 
source for modern ranchers employing a rotational feeding strategy.7  While the two sub-regions 
are separated by rainfall, the grass species common in the xeric region are found in the mesic, as 
a result, the mesic sub-region is more productive than its southern counterpart.8  
 Both the mesic and xeric sub-regions abut fescue grasslands. Fescue grasslands are 
productive sources of plant life and the areas where bison gathered to graze, especially during the 
winter. Fescue grasses thrive in cooler summer temperatures and require more precipitation than 
can be found in either sub-region at low elevations. They tend to sprout later than lowland 
grasses and the rolling foothills, prized by ranchers as grazing locations, are where they are most 
common. In 1881 Duncan McEachran, a noted veterinarian, cattleman, and booster for the west 
described southern Alberta as “the land is rolling, consisting of numerous grassy hills, plateau 
                                                            
6 Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 22. 
7 Warren Elofson, “Grassland Management in Southern Alberta: A Frontier Legacy,” Agricultural History 86, no. 4 
(2012): 146. 
8 Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 25. 
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and bottom lands, intersecting here and there by streams of considerable size issuing from never-
failing springs.”9 McEachran saw these grasslands after the bison had been extirpated and before 
cattle had been moved onto the range in significant numbers; it is possible his description was 
not wholly accurate. However, the description does indicate that the grass cover, especially 
fescue on the foothills, was extensive. 
 The fescue grasslands were not the only productive space in the north-western plains, the 
flat, valley bottoms supported abundant grasses as well, especially wheatgrass. Wheatgrass, as 
opposed to fescue, has a high protein level in the spring that decreases as the plant matures 
making it ideal for animals coming through winter.10 As a result, the valley bottoms were an 
integral area for bison and cattle during the spring and early summer when fescue grasses were 
                                                            
9 Edward Brado, Cattle Kingdom: Early Ranching in Alberta (Surrey BC: Heritage House Publishing Co, 2004), 60. 
10 Susan R. Winslow, “Western Wheatgrass Pascopyrum Smithii,” USDA Plant Guide, 1.  
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still growing or curing.  
 
Figure 1. The mixed grass prairie exists on both sides of the Montana/Alberta border.  
 
Climate 
 The climate of the north-western plains varies in north-south and, due to the Rocky 
Mountains, east-west directions. From east to west precipitation and relative humidity decrease 
due to the rain shadow cast by the Rocky Mountains, while solar radiation, variability in 
precipitation and potential evaporation increase.11 In short, the weather is warmer further west. 
For example, in the present day city of Lethbridge, Alberta, there are thirty-five days where the 
temperature exceeds 5̊ Celsius during the coldest three months of the year, while Winnipeg, at a 
                                                            
11 J.S. Singh et al., “Structural and Functional Attributes of the Vegetation,” 121. 
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similar latitude, has fewer than two days. Precipitation in the north comes from both snow and 
rain. On average, 60mm of precipitation comes from snow and 380mm from rain. From north to 
south there is an increase in air temperature, solar radiation, frost-free days, and evaporation. In 
the southern, north-western plains precipitation from snow averages 60mm, while 230mm comes 
from rain. 12 The increase in air temperature, solar radiation, and evaporation are what define the 
xeric and mesic sub-regions and their dominant plant life.   
 The most distinct climate phenomenon of the north-western plains is the chinook. The 
rain shadow cast by the Rocky Mountains is caused by their blocking the flow of moist Pacific 
air, at the same time they generate “…foehn winds known as…chinooks.”13 The chinook wind 
was well known to the Indigenous population of the north-western plains long before the arrival 
of Europeans. While visiting the Peigan in the winter of 1787/1788, David Thomson wrote that 
“Our guide also told us that as we approached the [Rocky] mountains of snow we should find the 
weather become milder. This we could not believe, but it was so and the month of November 
was fully as mild as the month of October…For the cold in these countries decreased as much by 
going westward as going south.”14 A century later George M. Dawson wrote, “…the Chinook is 
a strong westerly wind…which blows from the direction of the mountains out across the adjacent 
plains…When the ground is covered with snow, the effect of the winds in its removal is 
marvelous…the snow may be said to vanish rather than to melt…15  
 The causes of a chinook wind are well understood. When a low pressure system, common 
in winter, draws warm, moist air from the Pacific over the Rocky Mountains condensation occurs 
                                                            
12 Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 35. 
13 Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 30. 
14 Richard Glover, ed., David Thompson’s Narrative, 1784-1812 (Toronton: Champlain Society, 1962), 47, quoted in, 
Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 31. 
15 George M. Dawson, “Chinook Winds,” Science 7, no. 153 (January, 1886): 33. 
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creating water droplets. The release of heat from this process forces the air east and as it moves 
down the mountain it warms through compression, creating temperatures that far exceed the 
average.16 The effect of the warm, dry winds are most apparent close to the mountains in Alberta 
and Montana. For grazers, first bison and then cattle, chinooks had two important effects. In 
most years the dry wind helped to cure grasses, especially fescue, and exposed snow covered 
forage, making winter grazing easier. However, in other years a chinook will not have sufficient 
heat to melt all of the snow and is followed by a cold snap. When this occurs a crust will form 
over the grasses making grazing all but impossible for cattle and horses, and very difficult for 
bison. This scenario can lead to disaster for ranchers. 
 Montana and Alberta share a bioregion and therefore a history. When doing traditional 
cross-national studies there is a tendency to emphasize the effects of political, economic, and 
social difference. This study, as it uses a bioregion as its framework, focuses on the similarities 
of experience, economics and perception, and also difficulties faced by ranchers who operated 
within the north-western plains bioregion. Theodore Binnema noted that the benefit of 
bioregional history, especially when it is also cross-national, was it allows the historian to 
compare “…apples and apples—McIntosh and Delicious perhaps…by comparing phenomena in 
two countries we will arrive at a richer understandings of the international trends and 
environmental factors that influenced developments on both sides of the border. We can also be 
so bold as to predict that comparative studies will almost certainly help us understand 
contemporary problems better and perhaps help us avoid repeating the mistakes already made 
                                                            
16 Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 31. 
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elsewhere.”17 Examining ranching history with a focus on the north-western plains environment 
and not just at the provincial and state level are an important contribution of this dissertation.  
First Nations and Metis Land Use 
 The north-western plains were occupied by Indigenous and metis people long before 
cattlemen. Bison were central to the Indigenous people who occupied this bioregion, they 
provided food, shelter, and tools. The largest Indigenous group on the plains of Alberta was the 
Blackfoot nation, which consisted of three groups, the Blackfoot, Peigan, and Blood. Their allies 
were the Sarcee and the Gros Venture. The arrival of horses in the early eighteenth century 
revolutionized life for Indigenous people, especially those who lived on the plains. By the 1730s 
the Blackfoot nation had traded for horses from the Spanish, two decades prior to Europeans 
making their way to the territory, which revolutionized travel and hunting.18 Despite the 
technological revolution of horses and the overall success of Indigenous people in their bioregion 
up to the 1840s, James Daschuk has demonstrated that Indigenous people living on the prairies 
had a very difficult existence by the 1870s and were often on a knife-edge for survival. It is 
important to note, however, that Daschuk also found that the Indigenous population was healthy 
when not suffering from smallox.19 
 The arrival of Europeans in the mid-eighteenth century was another revolution for 
Indigenous people living on the north-western plains. Europeans were an additional trading 
partner who brought products not previously available, like metal tools and firearms. However, 
they also brought disease. This was the paradox of contact between Indigenous peoples and 
                                                            
17 Binnema, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History”, 38-39. 
18 Howard Palmer and Tamara Palmer, Alberta: A New History (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990), 6-8. 
19 James Daschuk, Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Aboriginal Life (Regina: 
University of Regina Press, 2013), chapters 1-5. 
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Europeans. On the one hand contact was beneficial as it extended trade networks and brought 
new products, and on the other it was demographically devastating due to disease. Daschuk’s 
Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Aboriginal Life outlines the 
process of death by disease in detail and for those interested in the subject is an excellent read. 
For the argument here, what is essential is understanding the context of Indigenous lives just 
prior to cattlemen setting up along the Montana/Alberta borderlands and large scale removal of 
Indigenous people to reserves. A small-pox epidemic that devastated Indigenous communities on 
both sides of the border began in the summer of 1869. The epidemic started when American 
traders, who had contracted smallpox and were quarantined on the Missouri River, had an 
infected blanket stolen off of their boat by a Peigan. Historian D.J. Hall described the 
devastation, “By the time the epidemic had spread from Montana to Canada and run its course, 
over 1,000 Piikani and over 600 each of the Kainai and Siksika had perished, and the Tsuu T’ina 
were reduced from fifty to twelve lodges.”20  
 The 1869 epidemic was different from the previous outbreaks of smallpox on both sides 
of the border. In Montana the smallpox outbreak came during of a decade of formal and informal 
warfare resulting from clashes between miners, settlers, and Indigenous people, and two decades 
of successive Treaties shrinking Indigenous lands. The Blackfoot, Gros Venture, Crow, and 
Assiniboine had had their land slowly whittled down by treaty, starting in 1851 with the Treaty 
of Fort Laramie. In 1855 the Flathead and other prairie groups signed the Hell Gate Treaty where 
they agreed to accept goods, education, and hospital facilities in exchange for decreasing their 
hunting territory.21 In the same treaty the Blackfoot were reserved a massive block of land north 
                                                            
20 D.J. Hall, From Treaties to Reserves: The Federal Government and Native Peoples in Territorial Alberta, 1870-1905 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013), 25-26. 
21 Clark C. Spence, Montana: A Bicentennial History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company ltd., 1978), 54. 
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of the Missouri River, with adjacent common hunting ground around the Yellowstone. At the 
outset this arrangement seemed practical; however, the discovery of gold would change things. 
First a trickle and then a flood of Whites came to work the mines and make their fortune, 
although officials assured the Blackfoot, Crow, and Assiniboine that these were not permanent 
settlers in many cases they were, resulting in a decade of conflict.  
 Raids by the Peigan near Fort Benton and Helena in 1868 put pressure on Montana 
governor, James Ashely, to establish a regiment of volunteer soldiers to fight back. Ashley was 
reluctant to do so feeling that he would not get reelected if his administration brought war. 
However, as the raids continued through 1869 the attitude of White settlers, already tainted by a 
racist perception of the Indigenous population, turned away from peace and toward violence. For 
early cattle ranchers, raids were problematic because a common target were horses and cattle. 
The Montana Post wrote “Last night cattle were stolen again and run off by Indians; one of the 
scouts…heard firing and yelling that seemed to come from a large body of Indians…”22 In a 
response to the raids General Phillip Sheridan stated, “If the lives and property of citizens of 
Montana can best be protected by striking the Indians, I want them struck.” Sheridan would get 
his wish and a series of wars ensued, ending with the surrender of Chief Joseph in 1877.23 The 
1869 epidemic occurred at perhaps the worst time for Montana’s Indigenous people. Their lands 
had been shrunk, their food sources depleted, and their way of life had been attacked by 
European settlers since 1851; the epidemic made defending what was left all the more difficult.  
 Federal policy that sought to settle Indigenous people on ever shrinking tracts of land 
created an abundance of public land for Montana ranchers to exploit. During the 1860s and 
                                                            
22 Montana Post, April 23, 1869. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/ 
23 Spence, Montana, 63. 
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1870s boosters extolled the virtues of Montana’s climate for ranching and federal programs that 
supplied beef for Indigenous people made ranching there increasingly attractive. Local 
entrepreneurs, like T.C. Power and I.G. Baker, supported the creation of military headquarters 
and forts as they could supply hay to the army and beef for Indigenous people. Furthermore, an 
increased perception of stability due to having a “settled” Indigenous population and military 
forts was good for business. A series of treaties that slowly, but surely, decreased Indigenous 
lands coupled with the outbreak of a smallpox epidemic and the aggressive stance of politicians 
did much to clear the way for Montana ranchers on the north-western plains. 
 In Canada the 1869 epidemic occurred when the region that would become Alberta in 
1905 became less isolated due to the expanding fur trade, therefore government control was 
imperative. By the 1870s, the demand for bison hides had increased dramatically accelerating the 
slaughter with tens of thousands of animals shot annually.24 Participation in the bison hunt was 
common for Whites, Metis and Indigenous people, who all earned short-term profits at the 
expense of nearly killing off a keystone species that was the main source of food, shelter, 
clothing and tools for the Indigenous population. At the same time, whisky traders in Montana 
were working hard to debase the Indigenous population as best they could, further impoverishing 
them. In a similar situation as Montana, the 1869 smallpox epidemic came at the worst possible 
time and led to a mass starvation among the Cree in 1870.25 Within a few decades the Indigenous 
people went from occupiers of their traditional lands with vast herds of bison for resources, to an 
uncertain future where sustenance was shored up by government beef contracts.  
                                                            
24 Hall, From Treaties to Reserves, 26-27. 
25 Hall, From Treaties to Reserves, 26.  
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 The control over Rupert’s Land was assumed by Canada in 1870 and, much like the 
decline of the bison, had serious consequences for Indigenous people. In 1869 the Canadian 
government passed an act establishing the temporary governance of Rupert’s Land in 
anticipation of the land transfer from the Hudson’s Bay Company. The act was renewed in 1871 
to further govern the territory, and a local, federally appointed lieutenant governor with a 
federally appointed local council was established to pass laws directed from Ottawa.26 The top 
down approach of governance meant that Canadian law applied to the entire territory, without 
any negotiation with the Indigenous people living there. For example, an early act was to ban the 
sale of liquor throughout the territory, despite having no means of enforcing the law or having 
made any sort of treaty. This was a symbolic act of authority over a region Ottawa could not 
hope to control in 1870, yet Canada assumed authority over the region and its people despite 
having limited knowledge of both.27 
 The whisky trade was carried out between Fort Benton and the North-West Territories 
along the “Whoop-Up Trail.” The deadly concoction sold from shacks could contain soap, 
tobacco, red ink, pain killers and molasses to give it body and colour.28 The physical and cultural 
devastation brought by the whisky trade was known to Canadian officials, yet due to their desire 
to avoid costly Indian wars like those in the United States, they did not act on controlling whisky 
traders until 1873 when American wolf hunters massacred a group of Assiniboine. Wolf hunters 
were not hunters in the traditional sense, they used poisoned bison carcasses to kill wolves and 
then harvest their fur. The problem with this method was the poison also killed dogs belonging to 
Indigenous people, which made them justifiably angry. In an act of retribution a group of, likely 
                                                            
26 Hall, From Treaties to Reserves, 27. 
27 Hall, From Treaties to Reserves, 29. 
28 Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 35. 
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Blackfoot, stole a horse from a whisky trader camp leading to retaliation. The whisky traders, 
“drunk and spoiling for a fight”, attacked a group of Assiniboine killing numerous men, women, 
and children, an event referred to as the Cypress Hills Massacre.29 When John A. Macdonald 
learned of the massacre he sent a mounted police force west to stem the trade and exert Canadian 
authority over the Indigenous people and the region. The establishment of a permanent police 
force in the north-western plains was significant for both its symbolism, and that it created a 
market for early cattle ranchers in Montana and Alberta. Much like the forts in Montana, white 
entrepreneurs saw the North West Mounted Police as a financial opportunity.  
 In the wake of the Cypress Hills Massacre the need for treaties became even more 
apparent, although the Canadian government and the Indigenous people wanted them for 
different reasons. It was a common view among settlers that as the Indigenous people had not 
farmed their land they had no right to it, yet the British assumed that the Indigenous occupants 
had certain rights and must agree to surrender their land. As a consequence, land had to be 
purchased with the consent of the Indigenous people who occupied it.30 The probable hope of the 
government was that treaties would avoid war and pave the way for settlement, railway, and for 
the assimilation of the Indigenous population. Here the decreasing bison population and the 
smallpox epidemic played a role, as many Indigenous people who lived on the prairies were in 
need of help. Under the treaties, in return for the surrender of land, there was a clause 
guaranteeing peace with the duty of providing reserve land, hunting and fishing rights, along 
with annuities. Treaty number 7, the land on which this study takes place, was signed in 1877. It 
                                                            
29 Bill Waiser, Saskatchewan: A New History (Calgary: Fifth House, 2005), 46.  
30 Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 41. 
15 
 
covered the nearly ten thousand Blackfoot, Blood, Peigan, Sarcee, and Stoney Indians in 
southern Alberta.31  
 After the establishment of reserves, the Canadian government began the process of 
assimilation. Under the Indian Act, the Indian agent had a great deal of authority over the 
reserve, while the Christian church had a similar control over schools. The state and church 
worked together to eliminate the traditional way of life of Indigenous people by replacing it with 
agriculture and stock raising. However, as reserves were often on marginal land these attempts 
rarely succeeded, necessitating the procurement of supplies from farmers and ranchers. By the 
1880s, the Canadian government was purchasing beef from the Territory’s large ranches that had 
been set up using a leased land system. These contracts helped to keep money out of the pockets 
of Montana ranchers, but were often inadequately filled for the Indigenous population who, 
through treaty, were owed annuities. Between 1870 and 1885 the Indigenous majority on the 
north-western prairies became a dominated minority. In many ways the loss of Indigenous 
control over their land began with the 1869 smallpox outbreak, and much like in Montana led to 
their relegation to reserves leaving the grasslands open to ranchers, farmers, and settlers. 
Bison and Cattle 
 Prior to European settlement bison were the dominant grazer on the Great Plains, 
including the north-western plains of Montana and Alberta. The habits of these animals altered 
the plant and animal life through their grazing, physical disturbance, nutrient cycling and seed 
dispersal.32  Following their near extinction they were replaced with cattle in the latter half of the 
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nineteenth century. This was ecologically significant as bison and cattle demonstrate 
fundamental differences in their ecology and interaction with the grasslands. Several studies 
have shown that cattle spend more time grazing than bison. A 2013 comparative study 
demonstrated that cattle spend twice as much time grazing as bison. Importantly, “Cattle at both 
sites demonstrated a strong selection for water resources and low elevations…Cattle…avoided 
steep slopes…”33 Cattle diet is more varied than bison because they browse and select forbs as 
well as grasses. Bison, however, prefer grasses and sedges and were more prone to feed in open 
spaces than cattle.34 Bison diet is less varied than cattle, which results in an increase in 
biodiversity. By over-selecting the dominant grass species and avoiding forbs bison can direct 
additional resources to forbs.35 As bison spend less time grazing and standing near water sources 
their impact zone is less significant than cattle, even in similar numbers. In these ways, bison 
were beneficial as grazers to a mixed-grass environment. 
 Considering the scope of this study, one of the most important distinctions between the 
two species is cold tolerance and winter grazing. Bison are far more cold tolerant than cattle due 
to their low metabolic rate, better insulation, and very low critical temperature. Despite having 
cloven hooves and short legs bison are also well adapted to winter grazing. Using their large 
heads and strong neck muscles they are able to clear snow off of pasture in order to graze during 
winter months. Cattle do not have either adaptation and are forced to try and move snow away 
with their mouth, a process often referred to as “muzzling.”36 While “muzzling” is somewhat 
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effective in good years, when there is deep or crusted over snow they struggle to find sufficient 
feed. As a result, bison are far better adapted to winter than cattle.  
 The Texas Ranching System 
 Terry Jordan’s Trails to Texas: Southern Roots of Western Cattle Ranching, “The Origin 
of Anglo-American Cattle Ranching in Texas: A Documentation of Diffusion from the Lower 
South”, and North American Cattle Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiation 
argue that ranching began in the American southeast and transitioned into Texas and further 
north.37 Despite moving into new bioregions the diffusion process included the continued 
application of established ranching methods, technology and strategies for land use. As these 
methods, strategies and technologies were developed in the southeastern United States, by the 
mid-1880s it was determined they were not compatible with the semi-arid Great Plains and 
ranchers were forced to adapt. In Montana and Alberta the importation of ranching methods that 
were not suitable for the north-western plains, coupled with misleading booster information, 
made disasters all but guaranteed. Therefore, the purpose here is to establish a framework that 
includes the use of inappropriate ranching methods in Montana and Alberta, often referred to as 
the “Texas system”, in order to fully explain decline and adaptation processes. 
 The origin of open range stock raising, the Texas ranching system, has been a subject of 
debate by historians and historical geographers. It has been argued that cattle ranching and its 
concomitant methods were adopted intact from Hispanic cultures in the early nineteenth 
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century.38 Terry Jordan however, following in the footsteps of Frederick Jackson Turner, regards 
the Texas ranching system as a logical adaptation to the frontier economy and environment.39 
Considering that interaction with the Great Plains environment was an ongoing series of 
adaptations Jordan’s argument makes the best sense. However, for this study the question of how 
the Texas system came to the north-western prairies is less important than what is was, and why 
it was employed by Montana and Alberta cattlemen.  
 Open range cattle ranching existed in Texas as early as the 1830s and had several specific 
characteristics. In “Origin and Distribution of Open-Range Cattle Ranching” Terry Jordan 
succinctly sums up the Texas system stating, “There was much besides the absence of fenced 
pastures that made open-range ranching distinctive, including round-ups, branding, large-scale of 
operation, overland drives to market, careless treatment of livestock, and uncontrolled 
breeding.”40 While the absence of fencing is clear enough the other aspects of the Texas system 
require additional explanation. The practice of rounding-up cattle and then branding them was 
common in Texas by the 1840s. The process was straight forward, which suited the early 
industry. Cattle were rounded up on horseback and driven into pens where, using a hot-iron, a 
symbol of ownership was burned into their hide. Initially, Anglo ranchers chose upper case 
letters for their brand, the letter usually coincided with the rancher’s surname. This was to 
differentiate their cattle from Hispanic ranchers who relied on numbers or symbols.41 Brands and 
other marks denoting ownership were registered and published in the local newspaper to prevent 
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theft. However, it was not uncommon for unscrupulous ranchers to alter a brand so that it could 
not be recognized. Legendary Texas ranch, the XIT, was said to have designed their brand so 
that it could not be altered, thereby protecting their cattle spread across three million acres.42 
This was not true, yet the fact that the legend persisted indicates how important branding was to 
ranchers using the Texas system. 
 Before widespread railway penetration into the west, ranchers drove their cattle overland 
to distant markets.   The cattle drive was an iconic feature of the Texas system, yet initially it 
hampered the growth of the range cattle industry. Many ranchers who drove their cattle faced the 
dual challenges of predators and raids from Indigenous people. As a result, local markets were 
extremely important. For most ranchers in Alberta the primary market was the government, who 
purchased cattle to feed Indigenous people forced onto reservations.43 In boom states like 
Montana, the most important markets were government contracts and mining towns that grew 
around gold strikes. The cattle drive was a relatively simple process, albeit very difficult. Herds 
were driven by men on horseback overland to their destination. The trip was long and dusty and 
cattle often arrived at their new pastures, or point of embarkation, footsore and weak. As a result, 
a crucial aspect of the cattle drive was timing. If a drive started too late in the summer cattle did 
not have the time or energy to acclimate to their new surroundings and regain their strength 
before winter. An egregious example of a poorly timed cattle drive was Texas to Tongue River 
by the Matador Land and Cattle Company in 1881. The company drove 5,000 cattle late in the 
summer, all of which died that winter.44 Despite its iconic status the cattle drive was not an 
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ancillary feature of the Texas system. Ranchers in Montana and Alberta were using the Texas 
system to manage their animals long after railways were accessible. 
  Careless treatment of livestock and uncontrolled breeding are interconnected and best 
explained together. The Texas system evolved on the warm coastal prairies of Louisiana where it 
inherited Hispanic traditions while moving to the open grasslands of Texas. A result of the 
geography and Hispanic influences was leaving animals alone to care for themselves. The 
practice originated in a sub-tropical region where the climate was amiable and herds could thrive 
left to their own devices.45 As ranchers moved onto the open grasslands of Texas, and eventually 
Montana and Alberta, they continued to let cattle roam free, as they had always done. The 
treatment of cattle was not necessarily careless, but a certain amount of neglect was inherent in 
the Texas system.  An unavoidable aspect of letting cattle loose to fend for themselves was 
uncontrolled breeding. However, for early ranchers breed control was not important. The reason 
was, early ranchers were not breeding for meat quality, cold tolerance, or docility, as these were 
unnecessary for what was essentially wild stock. Furthermore, controlled breeding would have 
been impractical in a fenceless operation. The lack of fences and uncontrolled breeding are two 
definitive characteristics of the Texas system. For ranchers in Montana and Alberta both of these 
features proved especially problematic as they adapted to the north-western plains.  
 The Great Plains looked attractive to Anglo-Texas ranchers despite being very different 
from the southern lands they had previously known. The vast plains of Texas were far drier and 
cooler than the humid, sub-tropical region where the Texas system was engendered. Despite 
these ecological differences, very few adaptations to the Texas system were made as cattle 
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ranching moved north. By the 1860s the Texas system had moved beyond the North Platte into 
the Saskatchewan bioregion where wheat and needle grasses were common, along with grama 
and buffalo grass. However, ranchers remained ignorant of the region’s semi-aridity due to a 
period of prolonged wetness and the rapid proliferation of booster material for cattle ranching.46 
As the Texas system extended into Montana and Alberta during the 1870s and 1880s climate 
factors would force ranchers to challenge their misperception of the environment and adapt the 
Texas system to a drier and cooler bioregion.  
Historiography    
Cattle ranching in Canada and the United States has a long history of scholarship at the 
highest level. Frederick Jackson Turner wrote “The effect of these great ranches on the 
subsequent agrarian history of the localities in which they existed should be studied”47. This 
endorsement of the range cattle industry’s importance spurred many historians to look at the 
economic and social importance of ranching on the Great Plains. For example, Earnest Staples 
Osgood, Terry Jordan, Max Foran, Warren Elofson, Simon Evans, and Edward Brado have all 
written excellent histories of the industry generally.48 However, popularity for this topic has 
dramatically declined over the last 30 years. As a consequence, few scholars have approached 
this topic from an environmental perspective.   
Environmental historiography is an important component to this study. Historians such as 
Geoff Cunfer, Brian Donahue, and Jim Sherow have all challenged environmental history’s 
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tendency toward decline narratives by arguing that human interaction with the environment is 
not inherently negative.49 This study will contribute to that historiography by arguing ranchers in 
Alberta and Montana fundamentally misunderstood their environment. Their misperception led 
to their importation of ranching methods that were inappropriate for their bioregion causing 
ranges to be overstocked and underequipped. When a drought and especially difficult winter 
struck in 1886/1887, ranchers on both sides of the border lost thousands of animals. However, 
many ranchers, especially those who lost stock, started to grasp the limitations of their 
environment and made changes to their ranching methods.  Where this study fits within 
environmental historiography is its discussion of misperception leading to adaptation. What this 
challenges is the overall decline narrative and hostility to ranchers as rapacious capitalists who 
cared little for their environment. 
This study examines five ranches, two in Montana and three in Alberta, within their 
environmental and political context.50 All of these ranches were capitalized in a period of 
expansion and overwhelming optimism for the cattle industry. For Canada, optimism was 
coupled with the emergence of both British and local markets for beef.51 In Montana local 
markets were comprised of miners, small settlements and Indigenous people. These markets, 
coupled with encroaching railways to Chicago and other shipping hubs, contributed to the rapid 
growth of Montana ranches.52 For both areas, availability of markets was essential.  
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Ranching historiography, and environmental history generally, tends to follow a decline 
narrative. The most common historical framework for cattle ranchers during the boom period 
argues that they moved into an unspoiled area in the 1870s and 1880s and, due to their greed, 
overstocked the grasslands causing economic and environmental damage.53 Essentially, ranchers 
depleted their ranges until an environmental disaster was unavoidable. This study, however, 
deviates from that historiography. The argument here is that the disaster was a natural one 
enabled by a misunderstood environment. In the wake of the 1886/1887 disaster, ranchers 
adapted their methods to avoid further loss of stock and capital. Ranchers did not solve their 
environment as several other disasters plagued the industry through the 1890s and early 1900s. 
However, primary source evidence indicates that ranchers did learn, and were engaged in, 
changing their methods in order to fit within the confines of their environment. As a 
consequence, the narrative here does not follow a decline framework. This study includes the 
argument that ranchers were adapting to an environment about which they had been misled. 
Examining the motivation of ranchers and their adaptations to the environment constitutes a 
major historiographical contribution of this study. 
The geographic focus for this study is the north-western plains borderlands of Montana 
and Alberta.  The logic for this scope is that ranchers in this area were exposed to the same 
plethora of misleading booster information regarding their environment. The region also has a 
similar climate and grasslands on both sides of the border.54 The result of the regional similarities 
was a shared culture of misperception and inadequate ranching methods followed by adaptation. 
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This study is a Northern Great Plains environmental history of the Montana and Alberta 
borderlands as well as a ranching history. A close examination of the challenges faced by 
operations in Alberta and Montana will shed light on historical interaction with the 
environmental limitations on both sides of the 49th parallel.    
Historian Jim Sherow noted that understanding environmental perception and adaptation 
to the environment are important lessons environmental historians can teach. The north-western 
plains was subject to severe fluctuation in both precipitation and temperature. As a consequence, 
this bioregion was a non-equilibrium area that required adaptation for successful interaction. 55  
This study discusses adaptation through a decline and progress framework based on interaction 
with the environment.  This method for analysis relies on clear evidence that ranchers, and those 
who were allied with the industry, were learning from their missteps and gaining a more nuanced 
understanding of their environment. Primary evidence that directly challenges booster material is 
of particular importance.   Strategies employed by the ranching industry, including the 
diversification of investments, followed the so-called hard winter of 1886/1887. These strategies 
indicated adaptation to the bioregion. However, understanding an environment was a slow 
process and ranchers would continue to adapt as new, and unexpected, environmental obstacles 
occurred.    
Decline and Progressive Narrative Historiography 
North American environmental history tends to fall into two dominant frameworks. 
William Cronon’s 1993 article “A Place for Stories: Nature, History and Narrative” describes 
these as either “progressive” or “declensionist.”56 The frameworks are descriptors of how human 
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interaction with the environment is interpreted. Therefore, each requires both political and 
theoretical structure which tie them to environmental historiography in general. The irony of 
these frameworks is that they have very little to do with the environment in and of itself. What 
they tend to represent are broader trends of environmental interpretation and discourse and are, 
therefore, categories that indicate culture. Anxieties over global warming, pollution, resource 
access and scarcity have made the decline framework far more common. While it is important to 
recognize humanity’s missteps with the environment, focusing on an environmental low-point is 
problematic. By not recognizing that adaptation often follows decline the impression is that 
humans are an inherently destructive force. Such an interpretation does not tell the story in its 
entirety.   
 A declensionist environmental history begins with the important question: when does 
interaction become degradation?  As a consequence, the temporal framework begins with a 
pristine environment and ends with a degraded one. The lesson is that humanity, through greed, 
degraded the natural world in order to make a profit.  The majority of ranching historiography in 
Alberta and Montana follows this framework. Ranches were started in an ideal environment, 
overstocked to maximize profits during a boom and degraded as a result. The problems faced by 
the ranching industry are often blamed on ranchers for degrading their environment. In 
combination these two factors make the decline narrative seem obvious. However, by 
considering that boosters were inaccurately representing the environment and ranchers tried to 
adapt after their failures, the framework starts to break down. 
Donald Worster’s Dust Bowl popularized the decline framework for North American 
environmental history. Worster argues that the Great Plains ecosystem was a stable, albeit 
fragile, arrangement between its low rainfall and short grasses. When White settlers moved to the 
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region they ploughed up the grass and planted wheat at a “rapacious” rate in order to exploit a 
booming market. The result of White settler’s mismanagement was keenly felt during the 1930s. 
The over-ploughing meant that the soil was no longer anchored by the grass. During concurrent 
years of long drought, great black blizzards formed causing economic and environmental 
hardship. The iconic black blizzards were a powerful rebuke of capitalism and a symbol of 
humanity’s mismanagement of the natural world. It was only through government intervention, 
education and reform that the Great Plains could be saved from further ecological disaster. 57  
According to Worster “The Dust Bowl…was the inevitable outcome of a culture that 
deliberately, self-consciously, set itself that task of dominating and exploiting the land for all its 
worth.”58  The Great Plains, to Worster, were doomed. Worster’s influence is evident in Richard 
White’s Land Use, Environment and Social Change in that capitalist interaction with the 
environment inevitably lead to degradation.59 White used Island County, Washington as a case 
study to argue that while Indigenous people altered their environment through fire they did not 
inherently damage it. White then argues that the introduction of European peoples, plants, 
animals and methods led to large scale environmental degradation.60 Both White and Worster are 
important environmental historians. However, by focusing on mistakes and ending their analysis 
at an environmental low point, they have not told the entire story. What makes this study 
historiographically unique is the focus on improvement after the decline.  
Three important studies for understanding the interrelationship between humans, 
grasslands, and economics have been written by William Dobak, Andrew Isenberg, and George 
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Colpitts. William Dobak’s article61 and Andrew Isenberg’s book62 both outline how 
environmental exploitation by Amerindians on both sides of the Canada/U.S. border led to the 
near destruction of a species. In Pemmican Empire: Food, Trade, and the Last Bison Hunts in 
the North American Plains 1780-1882 Colpitts’ argues how Indigenous and Metis peoples and 
fur traders responded to the pemmican trade in Canada. 63 It must be noted that in all cases 
Amerindians were responding to an economic opportunity provided by European settlers. While 
this study does not examine the bison it relies upon a similar historiography, especially Colpitts. 
A goal for this study is to demonstrate a strong connection between environment and 19th century 
economics.    
 A declensionist argument, especially as it relates to rapacious greed being the reason for 
environmental degradation, is problematic for this study. Much of the evidence presented here, 
for example, boosters, imported ranching methods, and the recovery period, directly challenge a 
decline framework.  It will be demonstrated, cattle ranchers made numerous improvements, and 
attempts at improvement, in the wake of several environmentally driven disasters. Furthermore, 
the decline framework, especially as employed by Worster, asserts that the only real 
interpretation of environment can come from knowledgeable outsiders. Local farmers (in Dust 
Bowl) were rapacious capitalists who could not see the damage they had caused. As a 
consequence, it was only outsiders who could interpret, and then solve, the actual problems with 
the environment.  Due to this study’s reliance on misinformation from outsiders, and problems 
with absentee management, the idea that outsiders were more knowledgeable than locals is 
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demonstrably false. The popularity of the decline narrative has made North American 
environmental discourse unsympathetic to ranchers. This study challenges that historiography by 
arguing that they were not rapacious capitalists and were engaged in adapting, even when those 
adaptations hurt their bottom line or were unsuccessful.  
On the other side of the historiographical spectrum is the progressive framework. This 
narrative, according to Cronon, begins with either a “waste-land” or a “wasted land” depending 
the presence or absence of Indigenous people. The story then moves on to the settlement of 
farmers who, through ingenuity and adaptation, turn land that was wasted into productive 
agricultural space. The process of turning waste-land into productive agricultural space is the 
basis of the progressive narrative.64 Historiographically, this narrative traces its roots to 
Frederick Jackson Turner’s seminal lecture “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History.”65 Turner argued that the frontier had been closed through progressive American 
settlement beginning with ranchers and ending with cities. Turner’s frontier thesis revolutionized 
American history. However, he has been legitimately criticized for being determinist and overtly 
racist. These criticisms were then linked to the progressive narrative in general. Turner would 
never really be resurrected but later scholars, like James Sherow, Warren Elofson, Brian 
Donahue, and Geoff Cunfer would successfully argue that human interaction with the land is not 
inherently destructive. 
James Sherow’s 1992 article “Workings of the Geodialectic: High Plains Indians and 
their Horses in the Region of the Arkansas River Valley, 1800-1870” made the argument for a 
holistic interpretation of man’s interaction with nature.66 The term geodialectic describes the 
                                                            
64 Cronon, “A Place for Stories.” 
65 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: H. Holt, 1923).  
66 Sherow, “Workings of the Geodialectic.” 
29 
 
interaction between living and non-living forces. He suggests that the natural world plays a role 
in both adaptation and culture; therefore, man can adapt to nature and operate within its limits. 
However, this also means that man cannot go beyond the constraints of nature. Success within a 
geodialectical framework, therefore, is based on long term continuity of culture, activity and 
adaptive strategies.67 For cattle ranchers on the north-western plains the constraints of nature 
were evident almost immediately. However, as those same constraints had been completely 
ignored by boosters ranchers had not prepared and their stock suffered the consequences. The 
analysis in this study of how ranchers negotiated between what they thought of their environment 
and what it actually was owes a debt to Sherow’s framework.  
Sherow’s geodialectical framework drew on James Malin’s History and Ecology.68  
James Malin was trained as both an historian and biologist and has been published in both 
disciplines. Malin advocated a melding of history and science and was an outspoken critic of the 
“ecosystem equilibrium/climax” theory. This theory argues that ecosystems, if left alone, will 
seek an internal balance. Malin countered this by arguing that ecosystems were always in flux 
and therefore were never in balance.  This idea challenged the dominant narrative for the New 
Deal and the teleological narrative for environmental progression. What Sherow adopted from 
Malin was the idea that nature interacts with humans as much as the other way around. Cattle 
ranchers who lived through the drought of 1886 and the winter of 1886/1887 on the north-
western plains would likely agree. Both Malin and Sherow’s frameworks suggest that human 
interaction was not inherently negative, although not benign. Furthermore, a framework for 
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understanding a positive interaction with the environment could be based on a learned 
understanding of environmental limits followed by adaptation.   
Brian Donahue, like Sherow, argues that human interaction with the natural world is not 
inherently negative. In his study The Great Meadow: Farmers and the Land in Colonial Concord 
he examines the history of mixed husbandry in colonial New England. Donahue argues that New 
England farmers developed a mosaic farming method that was both productive and sustainable.69 
This method relied on a common grazing area, mixed crops, forest fringe gathering, some animal 
husbandry and mixed cottage industries. Mixed farming was ecologically stable, but New 
England farmers were still protected by an ecological safety net created through diversification. 
Furthermore, population levels were sustainable as a mixed farm leads to later marriages and 
fewer children. The final chapter of Donahue’s study, however, argues that 19th century capitalist 
farming methods undermined this system making it unsustainable. One of the adaptive strategies 
for ranchers was to create a safety net through diversification. Ranchers invested in allied 
industries, ran sheep in areas where cattle were not profitable, cut hay for feed and maintained 
ranges in several different locations. This study adds to the overall environmental historiography 
by expanding the idea of the ecological safety net to Alberta and Montana ranchers.   
In particular, this study owes a historiographical debt to Geoff Cunfer’s On The Great 
Plains.70 Cunfer’s work, as a direct challenge to Donald Worster, defends the idea that ranchers 
on the Great Plains could achieve a “temporary equilibrium” with their environment.71 A 
“temporary equilibrium” was attained when, for a time, ranchers adapted their methods to fit 
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within the constraints of their environment. What constitutes the temporary aspect was that the 
northern Great Plains was always changing making continuous adaptation a necessity. Simply 
put, adjustments are made and then more adjustments are made. If a balance, or near balance, is 
struck then the enterprise is successful. It is the continuous negotiation between rancher and 
environment that substantiates two important arguments in this study. First, ranchers were 
ignorant of their environment due to misleading, although believable, booster information.  
Second, while imported methods of range management could lead to a temporary equilibrium 
they were inappropriate for the north-western plains.   
During the 1880s land in Alberta was parceled into large ranges and leased to wealthy 
investors while in Montana the vast majority of stock-growers relied on the open, and free, 
range. Despite this difference, both regions would initially import the Texas system where cattle 
were allowed to range free. The concept of ranching methods diffusing from south to north is 
based on Terry Jordan’s “Early Northeast Texas and the Evolution of Western Ranching.” Jordan 
traces how cattle ranching methods in the south were characterized by cattle being able to graze 
on their own for the entire year and despite that winter did see some cattle becoming “poor”, 
there were apparently no major die-offs.72 Cattle ranchers who were looking north for new 
pastures after the Civil War brought this ranching method with them. A significant reason for 
this was booster representations of the Montana grasslands in pamphlets, newspapers and two 
influential books; James Brisbin’s The Beef Bonanaza; or How to Get Rich on the Plains and 
Robert Strahorn’s Montana and Yellowstone National Park. Brisbin’s booster representations 
were numerous and enthusiastic. He noted that “It is, however, as a stock-growing region 
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Montana surpasses all other sections of our great west. Its grasses cure naturally on the ground, 
and even in winter cattle and sheep, which run out all the year round, are found fat and fit and 
ready for the butcher’s block.”73 The profits to be made were enticing to investors as well. The 
Breeders Gazette wrote that a steer purchased for $5 could be sold after two years of eating free 
grass for $45-$60, while Brisbin placed the value of all 160,647 cattle in Montana at 
$1,812,920.74 While these representations of climate and profits sound beyond belief, it is 
important to note that for most people of the period they seemed realistic. 
In the absence of long term interaction with the land, recent migrant’s perception of their 
new environment came from what information was available. For the north-western plains in the 
19th century that information was provided by government, booster pamphlets and newspapers. 
During the 19th century the west was depicted to Canadians, Americans and Europeans as a 
ranching Eden. This inaccurate perception of the environment had several interrelated effects. 
Western migrants were unprepared for the actual environment. This engendered disasters and 
drove adaptation. For this study, disaster followed by adaptation, even when unsuccessful, 
required a framework that includes both decline and progress. The decline period is where 
ranching was not compatible with the environment. The use of the Texas system coupled with 
the drought and hard winter of 1886/1887 being the most prominent example. The progress 
period is where rancher’s methods were changed based on a better understanding of 
environmental limits.              
The decline framework is dominant in contemporary ranching historiography. Historians 
tend to look at the failures of the industry and the fact that it was backed by capital from eastern 
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Canada, America, or Europe and come to the same conclusion as Worster. This study’s reliance 
on Sherow, Elofson, Donahue, and Cunfer’s frameworks to describe how culture and adaptation 
can allow for an “accidental equilibrium” adds value to ranching and environmental 
historiography. This is not done by absolving ranchers, but, by looking at how they tried to 
operate in an environment they fundamentally did not understand.   
Borderlands and Boosters Historiography 
 Borderlands historiography is usually equated with the Spanish borderlands, particularly 
those located in what later became the Southwestern United States. The focus for these studies is 
often cultural conflict and violence.75 Considering the focus and geography, an important aspect 
of borderlands historiography deals with expansion. Expansion is often portrayed as a belligerent 
land grab prompted by concerns over land access, commerce and security. In southern 
borderlands historiography expansion offered more than material gains; it offered opportunity, 
identity, liberty, democracy and fulfilled the republican vision. The northern borderlands 
between Alberta and Montana, however, has been neglected despite fitting much of this criteria. 
The overall academic neglect of this region adds to the historiographical value of this study.  
  An early and important borderlands study of Montana and Alberta was Paul F. Sharp’s, 
Whoop-Up Country: The Canadian-American West, 1865-1885. Central to Sharp’s argument 
was a shared regional history. Sharp notes that merchants from Fort Benton, Montana were 
significant to the early years of the cattle industry in both Montana and Alberta. The scope of 
Sharp’s study runs north from Fort Benton, across the 49th parallel, and ends near Fort McLeod, 
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Alberta making it historiographically significant for this study.76 However, scope is where the 
similarities end. Sharp’s history is firmly rooted in the historiography of the 1950s, and despite 
being well researched and written, is lacking in environmental analysis. Furthermore, what Sharp 
was ultimately arguing for is a nascent regional identity that, sixty-two years since publication, 
has not emerged. Nevertheless, this study will build on the geographic region established by 
Sharp and add to the growing number of sophisticated borderlands histories of the region. 
 In “Montana Business and Canadian Regionalism in the 1870s and 1880s” James M. 
Francis challenges the idea that it was the Canadian Pacific Railroad that “Canadianized” the 
west. He argues that other scholars, like Breen, Sharp and Harold Innis, over-stated the effect the 
railroad had “forming the social bond between the Canadian Prairies and eastern Canada.”77 
Francis argues that the T.C. Power and I.G. Baker firms, through their business and political 
activity, had already brought Canadian goods to the west. It was their presence in helping to 
establish a borderlands economic region that forged the first links between eastern and western 
Canada. Historiographically, this was an invaluable source for the borderlands component of this 
study. However, there are distinct differences between this study and the one by Francis that 
warrant attention. First, this study argues that both Power and Baker were boosters for the west. 
In all probability, their boosterism was tied to their economic interest. However, it was important 
because Power and Baker’s success reinforced booster representations of western economic 
potential. Second, they supported Canadian institutions, like the North West Mounted Police, 
because they were a market for their mercantile business to exploit. Last, with respect to the 
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cattle industry, it was the borderlands economic region that allowed for the rapid stocking of 
Alberta ranches starting in 1881. Had the Power, Baker and other firms not been operating in 
Montana, ranchers in Alberta could not have stocked their ranges with thousands of cattle 
overnight. It was the rapidity with which Alberta ranchers stocked their ranges that reflected both 
their faith in booster representations of the environment and their faith in the Texas system. 
While Francis makes a solid case for their role in Canadianizing the west prior to the railroad, he 
does not spend much time on the environmental repercussions of a vibrant cross-border cattle 
trade. In that sense, this study adds to the borderlands economic and environmental 
historiography of Alberta and Montana.   
 The overarching historiography of the Montana/Alberta borderlands were examined in 
“Regional Ideas and the Montana-Alberta Borderlands in the 1870s and 1880s” by geographer 
Peter S. Morris. In his abstract he noted that the borderlands concept had not often been applied 
to the northwestern Great Plains except for Sharp and a few others.78 However, he also notes that 
the study of the region has gained some ground “despite a late start…”79 Morris argues that 
borderlands, as an academic exercise, seeks to erase political borders and emphasize a shared 
culture that exists on both sides of the line.80 David Breen and Robert Fletcher, in cultural studies 
of ranching in Alberta and Montana respectively, emphasized differences between the two 
cultures. Alberta ranching culture was conservative, British and connected to government. 
Montana ranchers are portrayed as rugged individualists who resisted any and all government 
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regulation.81 This study, however, will discuss the cultural similarities resulting from 
misperception and the importation of ranching methods that were inappropriate.   
 Morris is skeptical when describing the possibility of extending a borderlands analysis to 
the entire Great Plains; however, he does acknowledge that the Alberta/Montana borderlands is 
promising in this respect. He argues that the environment of the entire Great Plains is too varied 
to generate a regional identity. This is apt, the Great Plains varies in elevation by more than 
3,000 feet and includes flat prairie, badlands, rolling hills and desert. Such a wide variation 
engenders regional industries as opposed to a broad culture.82 What Morris does advocate for in 
Great Plains borderlands scholarship are small scale, regional studies like Whoop-Up County. 
The scope of this study is focused on the environmentally and economically homogenous 
borderlands extending from the Fort Benton, Montana to Calgary, Alberta.  The role of 
misinformation and environmental ignorance examined here will add valuable environmental 
context to the emerging historiography described by Morris.  
 One of the most prominent recent borderlands scholars is Sterling Evans. He is the author 
or editor for two studies that are of particular importance to this work. The 2006 collection The 
Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests: Essays on Regional History of the Forty-
Ninth Parallel is an invaluable historiographic resource. In particular the discussion by Theodore 
Binnema provided further justification for the scope of this study. In Binnema’s chapter he 
argues that it is not just complex social and economic ties that bind the Alberta and Montana 
borderlands, but a shared bioregion as well. This study adds to Binnema’s argument by noting 
                                                            
81 Breen, The Canadian Prairie West and the Ranching Frontier, 1874-1924 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1983). 
82 Morris, “Regional Ideas,” 471. 
37 
 
that not only is there a shared bioregion but it was misunderstood for similar reasons on both 
sides of the 49th parallel. The argument in this study, therefore, adds to Binnema’s insights. 
 Sterling Evans’ Bound in Twine: The History and Ecology of the Henequen-Wheat 
Complex for Mexico and the American and Canadian Plains, 1880-1950 fleshed out the 
interconnectivity of agricultural products in a broadly conceived borderlands framework.83 While 
this study does not have the geographical scope of Bound in Twine, the interplay of environment, 
borderlands, and economics argued by Evans was invaluable for connecting those strands for 
cattle ranching in Alberta and Montana. Evans’ geographic framework for a different, yet 
similar, industry helps to situate this study within borderlands historiography generally. 
During the latter half of the 19th century booster literature was as much a part of the west 
as bison. Promotional literature has been produced for most places at most points in time, in that 
way booster literature was not unique to the west in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
However, western booster literature at this time was particularly persuasive because of its 
ubiquity and it was produced during a period of optimism. In the midst of the shift from agrarian 
to industrial economies, western promoters saw an unrealistic future and announced its presence 
long before it arrived. Promoters of the cattle industry, like James Brisbin, did their utmost to 
imagine the west into existence through embellished descriptions of easy money and an ideal 
climate. In doing so, promoters influenced the perception of western places for residents and the 
perceptions that eastern residents had of western places.84  
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Max Foran noted of boosters that, “The rhetoric of progress was proclaimed the loudest 
in publications produced by business organizations or political bodies.” 85 Producers of booster 
materials were local newspapers, commercial clubs, local and state-level chambers of commerce, 
immigration societies, boards of agriculture, real estate speculators, writers for railroads (cattle 
ranching promoter Robert Strahorn wrote for the Union Pacific), and colonization societies.86 
Business and political organizations who were local had an emotional attachment to the place 
they were promoting, along with an economic aim. This type of booster is referred to as an 
“inside” promoter. In a sense, inside promoters were lauding their hometown in order to ensure 
its survival. T.C. Power and I.G. Baker, working as promoters for Fort Benton, Montana are a 
good example of inside boosters. Meanwhile, “outside” boosters did not have an emotional 
attachment and were selling the west as a commodity. Federally produced promotional material 
predominantly falls into the “outside” category.87      
Booster literature, often booklets and pamphlets, cost only postage and were often 
shipped at the cost of the author. The majority were printed in English, however literature 
destined for Europe was printed in the language of those countries from which immigrants or 
money was being solicited. State, province, or country level promotional literature was financed 
by government, railroads, and chambers of commerce. The volume of booster literature produced 
was truly staggering; “they were printed in lots of 10,000, 15,000, or even 20,000 or 30,000 per 
year…These materials were generally updated every year or two.”88 As a result, for most of the 
latter half of the nineteenth century there would have been millions of western promotional 
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materials in circulation. Historian David Wroble notes that booster literature was so common in 
people’s homes and in public spaces that it can be assumed most literate Americans had some 
exposure to promoter’s unrealistic vision of the west.89       
Boosters contributed to both the gold rush and the rush of cattlemen onto the Great 
Plains.  Natures Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West by William Cronon is a sprawling 
environmental history of the west. Cronon notes that booster information focused on the 
economic relationship between cities and the country side.90  For the ranching industry this was 
certainly the case. Perhaps the most well-known booster for the ranching industry was James 
Brisbin who wrote, The Beef Bonanza: or, How to Get Rich on the Plains, Being a Description of 
Cattle-Growing, Sheep-Farming, Horse-Raising, and Dairying in the West. Brisbin was an army 
officer who decided to promote the west after seeing cattlemen making their fortune. The 
economic opportunity stressed by Brisbin fits into Cronon’s booster framework. Brisbin 
projected profits of 26 to 48 percent based on how much capital was invested and that “…I do 
not think it too high for realization.”91 What is important is that Brisbin’s and other booster 
representations of the cattle industry and the environment seemed realistic based on the overall 
perception of western opportunity.  
Booster theories for rural prosperity emphasized two so-called “natural advantages” that 
fell into broad categories. The first category emphasized the natural resources of the area. For 
cattle ranching this included grasses, water, and climate. In his chapter about Montana, Brisbin 
wrote that the winters are cold yet in the in the following paragraph notes that, “The grazing 
cannot be excelled in any country in the world, and much of the stock runs out all the winter…In 
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the springtime the stock is fat…”92 This sentence is an especially strong endorsement for the 
Texas system. The second category is transportation.93 While Brisbin and other authors note that 
Montana had no railways as of 1881, they had “many fine wagon roads” and “…boats can make 
two trips from St. Louis to Fort Benton and back again during the season”94  In Nature’s 
Metropolis Cronon examined the role of boosters in urban development. For that reason the 
damage caused by misinformation was more economic than environmental. This study draws on 
Cronon’s booster framework but applies it to the development of cattle ranching and 
misrepresentations of the north-western plains environment.   
Booster literature was incredibly formulaic, despite being applied to very different 
bioregions. The Billings Herald description of Montana, “The vast superiority of Montana’s 
climate and grasses over those of all other regions are demonstrated by the wonderful 
improvement of southern cattle after grazing,”95 is strikingly similar to descriptions of Colorado, 
Oklahoma, Texas, Nebraska, Alberta, Manitoba, and California. The problem with general 
promotion was, after a time all regions must have seemed interchangeable. According to 
boosters, all regions where cattle raising was possible were also ideal. As a result, perception of 
Montana and Alberta’s climate to outsiders lacked nuance. Ranchers began their operation in a 
bioregion they fundamentally did not understand because there was very little accurate 
information regarding the actual climate, grasses, and water. The problem of general descriptions 
by boosters was twofold. First, ranchers imported the Texas system without hesitation because 
their bioregion had been described as being well suited to Texas style ranching. Second, ranchers 
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would not come to a more nuanced understanding of their bioregion; that is, understanding their 
stock’s needs in winter, the dangers of uncontrolled breeding, and the often hostile climate, until 
they had lived and worked there for several years. An important contribution of this study is 
demonstrating that ranchers learned the nuances of their climate through experience. It was not 
the temporary equilibrium that taught ranchers the true nature of their environment, but the 
catastrophic failures. 96 A nuanced perception of the environment is one that challenged the 
general, simplistic, and misleading booster description. Nuance therefore, included all of the 
negative climate events that demonstrated the lack of suitability of the Texas system for the 
north-western plains, along with the positive.     
Ranching Historiography 
Alberta ranching historiography emphasizes overstocking as the central explanation for 
numerous large scale stock-losses and therefore fits into a decline framework. This is 
problematic as it fails to address two important questions. First, it places the blame for 
overstocked ranges squarely on the avarice of cattlemen without considering any other possible 
explanation. These were experienced cattlemen and such a basic mistake seems unlikely (and is 
directly challenged by the primary literature). Second, if avarice was the only motivator for 
cattlemen why try to adapt to a bioregion that was less than ideal?  
  Ranching history was relatively popular until the 1970s when it tapered off due to 
changing historical methodologies.97 The few recent studies that span the 1880s are declensionist 
and lack an argument describing how ranchers came to better understand their environment. 
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Historians such as Warren Elofson, Simon Evans, Edward Brado, L.V. Kelly, and David Breen98 
have been among the primary contributors for nearly forty years. This study will address a 
historiographical gap in the existing Alberta ranching literature by employing an environmental 
and borderlands framework to a topic where that analysis is underrepresented.  The 
historiography for ranching in Alberta has especially lacked an environmental framework until 
recently. The absence of environmental analyses are what situate this study within Alberta 
ranching historiography.  
David Breen’s The Canadian Prairie West and the Ranching Frontier, 1874-1924 argues 
there was an important difference between the evolution and resulting culture of the Canadian 
and American cattle industries. While his book deals with several sub-themes, he was mostly 
concerned with the cultural difference between Alberta and American ranching. Essentially, 
Canadian cattlemen tended to be well-connected and moneyed easterners giving the Canadian 
cattle industry a character distinct from their American counterparts. Breen’s work is insightful 
but lacking in areas that are fully explored in this study. Breen does not dig into the history of 
Montana cattle ranching culture, instead he relies on generalizations. The primary evidence for 
ranching in Montana indicate a number of significant similarities between Alberta and Montana 
ranching culture. Most importantly for this study is the shared bioregion, environmental 
problems, political participation, economics, ranching methods and requirement to adapt. The 
discussion of these similarities are unique to this study.  
Edward Brado’s Cattle Kingdom is written in a similar vein as Breen. Brado’s study has a 
strong narrative character and is based on the rich collection of primary sources available. Where 
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Brado excels is telling the story of ranching in Alberta during the 19th century. Where this study 
deviates from Cattle Kingdom is through the careful analysis of those same primary documents 
with environmental and borderlands frameworks. For example, Brado’s analysis of the winter of 
1886/1887, a disaster that is considered a demarcation point in Great Plains ranching 
historiography, is glossed over. This study looks at the years surrounding that disastrous winter 
to better understand why ranchers were operating and stocking their ranges using the Texas 
system. It also carefully examines the years following 1886/1887 to shed light on how ranchers 
better understood their environment. 
Simon Evans is another excellent ranching historian to which this study owes a 
historiographical debt. In his book The Bar U: Canadian Ranching History he discusses, in 
depth, the history of that ranch from its inception.99 Evan’s study is rare in ranching 
historiography in that it is focused on the history of a single operation from start to finish. 
However, significantly, Evans uses the Bar U as a case study for the history of ranching in 
Alberta generally. The study is divided up chronologically as a way to better explain the ongoing 
development of this ranch and the industry. The Bar U covers a great deal of ground and was 
especially helpful, in a similar fashion as Sterling Evans’ work, in identifying economic 
connections between Alberta and the rest of the world.  Along with his numerous articles on the 
origin of the ranching industry, The Bar U provided excellent insights for a single ranch 
operating in a much wider context. The Bar U was a contemporary of the Cochrane, A7, and 
Walrond operations situating this study within the same historiography as Simon Evans.         
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Warren Elofson, a prolific publisher on Canadian ranching, holds a place of particular 
influence in Alberta ranching historiography. In 2009 Warren Elofson published Somebody 
Else’s Money: The Walrond Ranche Story, 1883-1907 where he argues for an economic 
explanation for the poor decision making of ranch manager Duncan McEachran.100 The crux of 
his argument is “Most of the great ranches failed because they had neither the ability nor the 
inclination to employ the strategies of the family farm…What follows is not an exhaustive 
history of the Walrond cattle ranch. It is instead the thorough discussion of the economics of the 
large scale grazing industry centering on that outfit.”101 Elofson’s argument has a great deal of 
merit and is a great read; however, this study adds an environmental and borderlands element to 
the discussion. Furthermore, the inclusion of the Cochrane and the A7 Ranches enrich overall 
ranching historiography of Alberta. Lastly, Elofson’s argument that the family farm was the ideal 
agricultural strategy of the northern plains is challenged by the struggle of the A7, a family farm 
of only a few hundred cattle, prior to and just after, 1886/87. In short, Elofson’s argument in 
Somebody Else’s Money lacks the environmental component provided by this study. 
 An additional contribution from Elofson is So Far and Yet So Close: Frontier Cattle 
Ranching in Western Prairie Canada and the Northern Territory of Australia published in 2015. 
This study, far more than any of the previously published ranching histories, looks at the role of 
a misunderstood environment as a motivator for both failure and change.102 In that respect, this 
study is in a similar historiographical space; however, there are several significant differences 
that warrant attention. As opposed to this study, which focuses on the role of the environment, 
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booster representations and adaptation after failure, Elofson’s argument centered on the role of 
the family in keeping the ranch going. As such, he emphasized social capital in ranching 
historiography. Elfoson’s argument is comparative but does not have an economic nor a 
borderlands component. An important aspect to this study is the role played by the pre-existing 
borderlands economic region that allowed Alberta ranchers to rapidly stock their ranges with 
Montana cattle. Had thousands of cattle not been available for purchase in Montana, Alberta 
ranchers would have moved much slower and likely not faced the same level of adversity. 
Furthermore, this study takes a much closer look at the role of misunderstanding the environment 
in driving ranching adaptation within the Alberta/Montana borderlands. So Far and Yet So Close 
makes a similar historiographical contribution as this study. However, the different geographic 
scope, focus on misinformation and borderlands economic region are what make this study 
unique to northern Great Plains ranching historiography. 
 The final contribution by professor Elofson, and one that this study engages with closely, 
is Cowboys, Gentlemen and Cattle Thieves: Ranching on the Western Frontier, published in 
2000.103 An important aspect of Elofson’s thesis notes of open range ranching, “In retrospect it 
seems amazing that the big ranchers should have thought it appropriate to operate in this way,” a 
few paragraphs later he states that Senator Matthew Cochrane, founder of the Cochrane Ranche, 
“seems to have been subject to the same sort of frontier virus.”104 The idea that the frontier in 
and of itself was an ailment causing foolish optimism was also used by Breen who wrote, 
“Ranching fever developed simultaneously in Canada as Canadian capitalists, particularly those 
already involved in the new eastern-based cattle export trade, discovered that a comparable 
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grazing area, already proven by small stockmen, existed in their own west.”105 This dissertation 
both adds to, and challenges Elofson’s premise. First, by arguing for the ubiquity of booster 
literature this study identifies the mysterious frontier virus as one of optimistic misinformation. 
The notion that cattle ranching was a very profitable business was common by the early 1880s 
and prospective ranchers were well aware due to booster information. Furthermore, booster 
literature did not work with subtleties, everywhere boosters said cattle ranching was possible, the 
climate, grasses, and water were also ideal. As a result, with respect to Elofson’s assertion that 
ranchers should have known better than to try free range ranching, an important aspect of this 
study is to argue that they should not, and could not, have known better because of a lack of 
usable information. While Elofson put the onus on ranchers to, somehow, understand their 
environment with no information or experience, this study argues that ranchers were ignorant of 
their region and simply operated based on the information available. For both Montana and 
Alberta that involved importing the Texas system, as that was what the available information 
suggested. 
 An additional aspect of this study neglected in Cowboys, Gentlemen and Cattle Thieves: 
Ranching on the Western Frontier is the importance of the cross border regional economy 
between Montana and Alberta. Most of the large ranches in Alberta purchased entire herds of 
cattle, often several thousand animals, from Montana and trailed them north. These cattle 
purchases were considered important enough to the Alberta industry that duty on cattle was 
suspended for Alberta lease holders in 1882.106 While rapidly stocking a range seemed like a 
simple way of jump-starting their industry it also came with numerous environmental and 
                                                            
105 Breen, The Canadian Prairie West, 25. 
106 Breen, The Canadian Prairie West, 18. 
47 
 
logistical problems, all of which Alberta ranchers were unaware due to misleading booster 
information. Elofson’s argument that ranchers were capitalists with no respect for their 
environment falls short. They were capitalists, but rapidly overstocking was more related to 
environmental ignorance suggesting it was a good idea, made possible by the preexisting 
borderlands economic region. This study argues that because ranchers did not, and could not, 
have known better they operated within the confines of the information they had. The available 
information included the belief that free range ranching was suitable for Alberta, therefore, 
importing thousands of cattle at a time was wise. 
 The geographic scope of this study also helps to differentiate it from Cowboys, 
Gentlemen and Cattle Thieves: Ranching on the Western Frontier. Elofson’s work is 
concentrated on Alberta and the experience ranchers had within those political borders. This 
study is a bioregional examination of ranching that includes Montana because the same 
environment straddled the border. It demonstrates that ranchers in Montana, just as in Alberta, 
were exposed to the same misleading information leading to the importation of the same 
inappropriate ranching methods. After a series of successes ranchers on the north-western plains 
faced the same environmental difficulties and were forced to adapt their ranching practices. 
While Elofson acknowledges the role of the environment in ranching, his discussion of how it 
shaped ranching methods lacks the context provided by the discussions of boosters, the cross 
border economic region, and bioregionalism provided by this study. To paraphrase Elofson from 
his discussion of L.G. Thomas and David Breen, my intention is not to cast doubt on the 
immense value of Warren Elofson’s work. He has been a foundational scholar in ranching 
history and is someone I respect. The goal here is to add to the excellent body of existing 
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ranching historiography and challenge some old ideas to elucidate a small part of ranching and 
environmental history that has been neglected.            
Ranching in Canada was not confined to Alberta; Saskatchewan also has a rich ranching 
history. In Saskatchewan: A New History, historian Bill Waiser dedicated a chapter to ranching 
history in that province. The discussion inserts Saskatchewan ranching into the broader context 
of western Canadian history by including whisky traders, the NWMP, and the railroad. Ranching 
in Saskatchewan has its own unique and important story. For example, in Saskatchewan there 
was very little British investment in large scale ranches, the exception being the 76 Ranch.107 In 
Alberta many of the largest ranches, the Walrond for example, were established with British 
capital.108 Waiser’s discussion of the 1906 hard winter where thousands of cattle, upwards of 
sixty percent of stock, were killed in a series of snow storms is of particular historiographical 
interest for this study.109 The 1906/1907 winter in Alberta was also harsh and, according to 
Warren Elofson, was the death knell of the industry.110 The reason that Alberta was so ill 
prepared in 1906 was due to the relatively small number of cattle grazing overall in 1886. Cattle 
numbers in Alberta were significantly lower than in Montana as the industry had only been 
expanding for a few years; as a consequence, the Alberta ranges were less crowded in 1886 than 
they were in 1906.  Furthermore, some of the larger operations had a varied topography that 
allowed for natural shelter. What this meant was that the Alberta losses in the 1886/1887 hard 
winter were unevenly distributed, especially when in comparison with Montana, Texas, Kansas, 
Oklahoma and Colorado. For those ranches that suffered greatly, like the A7, Cochrane Ranche 
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and Walrond, adaptations were undertaken. Those that suffered less so, not at all, or started up 
after 1887 continued to believe booster literature until the next drought, prairie fire or snow 
storm indicated otherwise.  
An additional Saskatchewan ranching study conducted by Don C. McGowan looks at the 
Swift Current region during the 1870s-1900s. McGowan makes compelling arguments for water 
access and shipping routes being an early advantage for cattle ranchers over farmers. With 
respect to the climate, he categorizes it as semi-arid. Like other historians McGowan credits the 
C.P.R. with the existence of Swift Current generally; however, he also argues that the region was 
too dry for agriculture prior to the advent of dry land farming methods. As a consequence, he 
notes that “…the railway, therefore, created and justified the district, many years were to pass 
before the district was to justify a railway.”111 McGowan’s work is an excellent local history 
from which broader trends can be extrapolated. His short discussion of short term weather trends 
masking climate was of particular interest to this study.112 Considering the focus of McGowan’s 
work this study and Grassland Settlers occupy a similar historiographical space as contributions 
to ranching and environmental history. 
Alberta ranching historiography has predominantly focused on economics or culture, 
employed a decline narrative when discussing the environment, and been relatively 
unsympathetic to ranchers generally. It has neglected considering booster misrepresentations of 
the environment and the environment itself as essential context. Furthermore, most ranching 
histories tend to discuss the ranching industry as a whole and not focus on specific case studies. 
This study fills a historiographical gap by arguing that booster material oversold the northern 
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Great Plains environment resulting in a fundamental misunderstood environment. It will use 
three Alberta ranches as specific case studies to get a unique perspective on how these ranchers 
gained a nuanced perspective of the environment through a series of disasters. When Matthew 
Cochrane, Duncan McEachran and Alfred Cross came west they had a flawed perception of the 
environment. As a result, they imported thousands of cattle and used the Texas system to manage 
them. The resulting disaster in 1886/1887 was therefore environmentally driven, made possible 
by ignorance of the environment. In the wake of this disaster all three of these ranches attempted 
to adapt. Some were successful and others much less so. However, based on the primary 
evidence, ranchers in this study recognized that they did not understand their environment and 
made some strides to operate within its limits.                  
While American ranching historiography is richer than its Canadian counterpart it also 
has significant gaps. Furthermore, even more so than in Canadian ranching history, American 
studies are hostile toward ranchers. The argument is, more often than not, ranchers responded to 
a booming market by overstocking their pastures due to greed and suffered for their 
environmental mismanagement. The free range period was then brought to a close with the onset 
of farmers and small scale ranching operations.  The belief that ranchers had overstocked in 
Montana, Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas and Wyoming appeared within months of the winter die-off 
in 1887. For example, that spring several newspapers, and even Granville Stuart of the DHS 
ranch in Montana, blamed ranchers for the disaster. However, this analysis, like Canadian 
ranching historiography, fails to account for an explanation other than greed.  
In The Day of the Cattleman Ernest Staples Osgood described the cattle ranges in 
Montana, Wyoming and Oklahoma, “Herd was crowded in on herd till every square mile of 
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pasturage was utilized.”113 By the summer of 1886 the ranges of Montana had been depleted 
because ranchers who wanted to maximize profits had overstocked and a disaster was imminent. 
Osgoode’s work is one of the first comprehensive academic histories of ranching on the Great 
Plains and, despite his economically focused analysis, remains one of the best. Osgood argues 
that the origin of the great cattle herds were draft oxen abandoned during the 1840s. From there 
he traces the rise and fall of the industry until the end of the free range period in 1900.114 The 
industry grew when herds were expanded by cattlemen trailing cattle north from Texas 
immediately following the end of the American Civil War. As the industry expanded throughout 
the 1880s the grasslands in Montana would become home to large herds of free roaming cattle. 
The story extends to where, due to large losses from overstocking, drought and winter kill, the 
industry ended as both cattlemen and investors lost faith. The vacated ranges were repopulated 
by farmers and small scale ranchers ending the open range. Osgood gleaned extensive primary 
material from the Wyoming Stock Growers Association and newspapers from the period. The 
Day of the Cattleman, however, is rooted in early 20th century historiography. As such, it, like 
Elofson in Somebody Else’s Money, relies on economic motivations as opposed to environmental 
conditions. Furthermore, Osgood plays down the significant misinformation from boosters in 
favor of blaming rancher’s greed for overstocking their ranges. The Day of the Cattleman 
remains one of the most important studies of the range cattle industry; however, it has left room 
for an environmental interpretation of events.     
In 1931 Walter Prescott Webb wrote a canonical history of the west called The Great 
Plains. The bulk of this study deals with the changes associated with westward progress 
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generally as American’s pushed out of the adequately watered east into the semi-arid west. 
Where Webb, along with Donahue, Cunfer and Sherow, were valuable for this study is how 
settlers reacted to a new and unfamiliar environment. Imported agrarian techniques required 
almost constant adjustment in order to reach a temporary equilibrium.115 In a similar vein, cattle 
ranchers in the north-western plains imported the Texas system because booster literature had 
described an environment where that system could work. However, this ranching method was 
completely inadequate for both Alberta and Montana. Much like eastern farmers, in Webb cattle 
ranchers were forced to face the reality that the Texas system was not suitable and tried to adjust. 
A historiographical contribution of this study is to apply a well know methodological approach 
that has been used for farming to ranching. The historiography of farmers trying to operate 
within their bioregion is quite venerated while the same argument for cattle ranchers remains 
underdeveloped.    
Webb’s discussion of fences, additionally, was valuable. The move away from the Texas 
system for ranchers in Montana and Alberta required infrastructure like fences and corrals. While 
this topic is not the most exciting, fencing the western grasslands was an important innovation 
that demonstrates ranchers had learned about their environment.  Webb’s discussion of cattle 
ranching is historiographically similar to Osgood and most subsequent historians. For example, 
he wrote: “But by 1885 the time of reckoning had come. Overstocking had so reduced the grass 
that either drought or hard winter would bring disaster.”116 Here, it is evident that he is following 
the narrative of Osgoode. While other parts of his argument are excellent, with respect to cattle 
                                                            
115 Cunfer, On The Great Plains.  
116 Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1931), 215. 
53 
 
ranching he was content to blame ranchers without digging deeper into the question of 
misperception.       
From Free Grass to Fences published in 1961 by Robert Fletcher, who also wrote the 
song Don’t Fence Me In, is a study of the history of Montana until the 1960s. However, as the 
title suggests, this history is viewed through the lens of the livestock industry. The overarching 
argument put forward by Fletcher considered the role played by Montana stock growers in 
protecting public land.117 The Montana cattleman as a rugged individualist is an important theme 
to Fletcher’s work. He details the fight of the ranchman against government that sought to 
control Montana through regulation. Fletcher’s research was extensive as he, like this study, 
made good use of the Montana Stock Growers Association files along with the resources of the 
Montana Historical Society. Fletcher’s study was informative for how Montana ranchers viewed 
and used public land. In particular, Conrad Kohrs relied on public lands for grazing his stock. 
Fletcher’s argument that cattlemen were not exploiters of the land but actively worked to protect 
it is one of the earliest attempts to complicate the decline narrative made popular by Osgood and 
Webb. This study will add greatly Montana ranching historiography by demonstrating that 
ranchers were more than happy to apply local regulations that helped protect their grazing land. 
What this suggests is an evolving perception of their environment and its limitations.  
Within American ranching historiography this study engages closely with cultural 
geographer Terry Jordan. Jordan’s North American Cattle Ranching Frontiers: Origins, 
Diffusion and Differentiation118 plays down the role of the Texas system in the Midwest and 
Canada. Jordan argues that it was the ranching techniques perfected in Iowa and Missouri that 
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were imported into the northwest. This study emphasizes that the Texas system was imported 
into Montana and Alberta and honed, although not perfected, through trial and error. The 
introduction of the Texas system resulted from an overarching misperception of the north-
western plains based in booster representations of the environment and prevailing economic 
possibilities for ranching. This study will provided a valuable historiographical challenge to 
Jordan’s by using a regional, case-study based argument.     
   The story of overstocking is common in western American historiography. Studies such 
as It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West by Richard 
White, The American West A New Interpretive History by Robert Hine and John Mack Faragher 
all make the same argument as Osgood and Webb. The fact that the narrative academically 
originating with Osgood was furthered in general history texts speaks to the contemporary power 
of the decline narrative and the unsympathetic view of ranching. A broad goal of this study is to 
challenge the decline framework and add nuance to a historically maligned industry.    
The historiography of cattle ranching in the Great Plains generally and the north-western 
plains specifically all follow a similar declensionist narrative structure. The grasslands of 
northern Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Kansas, Wyoming, the Dakotas, Alberta, Saskatchewan 
and Montana were ideal for ranching. Ranchers came west with dollar signs in their eyes and, as 
a consequence, overstocked their ranges. The height of overstocking came in 1886 and coincided 
with both a drought and severe winter resulting in a massive loss of stock and capital. Ranchers 
and investors then abandoned their enterprises; small farmers and small stock raisers took over, 
ending one of the most romantic periods in western history. On the surface this story and 
framework are logical. Ranchers did come to make money and the ranges were overstocked. 
However, this is a very simple explanation for events that, when booster literature and primary 
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sources are consulted, are far more complicated. It is not my intention to criticize these authors. 
On the surface this disaster appeared to be economically driven, even to newspapers of the time. 
For example, in 1887 the Rocky Mountain Husbandman wrote, “Range husbandry is over, is 
ruined, destroyed, and it may have been from the insatiable greed of its followers.”119 
Considering the focus of previous scholarship there is a large gap in the existing historiography 
for this study to fill.   
Primary Sources 
Between the 1790s and 1880s bison were hunted to near extinction from the Great 
Plains120 and it was these “vacated” grasslands that were inherited by Alberta and Montana 
ranchers.  The number of ranches capitalized during this period presents a logistical difficulty for 
doing significant analysis. In order to mitigate that problem five ranches were selected as case 
studies for how the environment was misunderstood and how ranching methods were adapted. 
The Alberta case studies are the A7 Ranche started by Alfred Ernest Cross, the Walrond Ranch 
started by Sir John Walrond and the Cochrane Ranche started by Mathew Cochrane. The 
Montana operations of Conrad Kohrs and Granville Stuart served as case studies for ranching 
south of the forty-ninth parallel.  The size and, in some cases longevity, of these operations 
allowed for a wealth of documentary evidence to be preserved in several archives in both Alberta 
and Montana. It is these primary sources that form the backbone of the dissertation.      
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Figure 2: This map shows relative size and location of all the ranches in this study including all of the public land on which 
Conrad Kohrs relied. Ranchers in Canada leased their land which is why they have a well-defined cattle region.  It also shows the 
location of Fort Benton, the economic hub of the Montana/Alberta borderlands economic region. 
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The primary documents for the A7, Walrond, and Cochrane ranches were obtained from 
the comprehensive (and friendly) collections at the Glenbow Museum and Archive. The bulk of 
the references come from letters and financial documents that were created as ranchers struggled 
with a series of environmental and economic disasters. Furthermore, the documents also express 
an exasperation at the vagaries of the climate generally, especially the winter, indicating that the 
reality of the climate was not what was expected. A very interesting single source for Alfred 
Ernest Cross was an examination he wrote as a student in Montreal. The exam tasked him with 
laying out how he would establish a ranching operation in the west. From this document it was 
possible to see the influence of boosters, as his discussion of potential environment problems is 
almost non-existent.  
 The discussion of Conrad Kohrs’ massive operation and Granville Stuart’s DHS Ranch 
relied on the materials that they created over a lifetime spent in Montana. Granville Stuart 
published his journal titled Forty Years on the Frontier where he outlined his entire life, 
including his time spent involved in the cattle industry.121 Conrad Kohrs, who led a long and 
successful life, dictated his autobiography. This source was relied upon heavily for 
understanding both the man and his business.122  However, as it was an Autobiography his 
motives, in particular as they related to public land, were scrutinized. As both of these men were 
important to early Montana history (Granville Stuart was often referred to as Mr. Montana and 
Kohrs was “the Cattle King of Montana”) they are often referenced in local newspapers. For 
example, The River Press and the Helena Weekly Herald often reported on the cattle industry 
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which included both Stuart and Kohrs.  Through these primary documents it was possible to 
understand how these ranches were founded, how they understood their environment prior to 
1886/1887, and how they adapted in the wake of such a massive loss of stock.   
How ranchers perceived their environment has been neglected in ranching and 
environmental historiography. As a consequence, this is both a ranching history and an 
environmental/borderlands history that uses cattle ranching methods and a significant disaster to 
better understand how environments were understood and misunderstood. By focusing attention 
on the misinformation provided by boosters, it is possible to extrapolate William Cronon’s 
favorite use for environmental history, the parable.123 The intention of boosters was never to 
cause the near collapse of the cattle ranching industry. Similarly, ranchers themselves did not 
intend to overstock their herds and not plan for the possibility of a hard winter. Yet, when it did 
happen, many Alberta and Montana ranchers learned how to better adapt to their environment. 
With respect to current environmental anxieties around climate change, looking at the past for 
evidence not just of failure, but success after failure, make this study significant to challenging 
the overwhelmingly popular declensionist historiography.   
Chapter Outline 
 This study examines early cattle ranching on the Montana/Alberta borderlands from its 
humble beginnings in the 1860s to the early twentieth century. Throughout these roughly fifty 
years ranchers responded to various environmental and economic challenges that forced them to 
adapt the Texas system to cool and dry climate. The chronological framework allows for a full 
examination of the founding of five ranches, the effect of booster literature on rancher’s 
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perception of their environment, responses to environmental adversity, and whether or not they 
were successful. The decline narrative common to environmental history often employs a narrow 
chronological framework, allowing the study to conclude on an environmental low point. The 
purpose of extending the scope in this study is to demonstrate that recovery after an 
environmental low point is an important aspect of human interaction with the natural world.    
 Chapter Two: Precursor to Northwestern Plains Ranching: Creation of a Borderlands 
Economy, examines the borderlands economic and environmental context into which the 
Montana and Alberta cattle industries emerged in the 1870s and 1880s. The core of the 
borderlands argument focuses on the T.C. Power and I.G. Baker firm’s contributions to 
engendering a cross-border regional economy. The Baker and Power firms benefitted immensely 
from markets on both sides of the 49th parallel. One of the most important contributions of Power 
and Baker was their promotion of regional stability being vital to economic success. The 
borderlands economy was important to Alberta ranchers like Matthew Cochrane and Duncan 
McEachran who would buy entire herds of Montana cattle. Coinciding with the regional 
economy was an explosion of booster representations of the Montana and Alberta grasslands and 
a further development of markets at home and abroad. By the 1870s the representations of the 
Montana and Alberta borderlands economy was overwhelmingly positive, something that would 
then be generally extended to the environment. During the 1870s through the 1880s both 
American and Canadian governments would endorse the positive environmental representation 
by encouraging ranching in both Alberta and Montana. This period was a golden age for 
boosterism. Newspapers printed, almost exclusively, material intended to challenge any negative 
representations of the environment, especially locally. Their authors emphasized the economic 
opportunity for cattle ranching due to abundant grasses, water, and an amiable climate. For 
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ranchers the return on an investment in cattle seemed a sure thing and the result was an 
unprecedented level of investment into the west generally. This period was a “Beef Bonanza,” a 
term inspired by James Brisbin’s The Beef Bonanza; or, How to Get Rich on the Plains an 
immensely popular booster book written in 1881.124 In a realistic sense the “Beef Bonanza” 
period saw hundreds of cattle operations running millions of cattle all over the Great Plains, from 
Texas to Alberta. It is important to note that neither the positive nor negative perception of the 
environment was accurate. Cattle ranchers, who were among the first Whites to settle the plains, 
bought into the booster ideal that presented a unique set of challenges requiring a varying set of 
responses.  
The third and fourth chapters examine the early methods of the case study ranches 
leading up to the losses experienced during the 1886/1887 winter. For all five ranches the idea of 
a massive loss of stock over the general Great Plains was thought to be impossible. As a 
consequence, these cattle operations focused on increasing herd size over winter feed and shelter. 
The prevailing argument that ranchers overstocked due to greed is challenged here. What these 
chapters argue is a more nuanced interpretation stressing both misinformation and general 
ignorance of the environment as drivers of the 1886/1887 cattle disaster.  The major points of 
investigation are the varied responses to predation, droughts, declining grasslands and severe 
winters. All four are environmental phenomenon absent from booster literature and were 
particularly costly to ranchers. Central to the argument in these chapters is how and why ranchers 
responded the way that they did.   
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The fourth and fifth chapters examine the reaction of all four ranches to the winter 
1886/1887. Before this point the idea that weather might kill up to 85% of stock was thought to 
be impossible, so planning for it was unnecessary. 125  However, after the massive loss of stock 
ranchers started to adjust their ranching methods accordingly. The steps taken to adapt form the 
core of this chapter. The significance of this event therefore was not the disaster itself but in how 
ranchers responded to it. Based on the Kohrs, DHS, Cochrane, Walrond and Cross ranches there 
was not one, right way to adapt to the plains; however, there were a myriad of ways to do it 
wrong. As a consequence, what was important was that ranchers recognized that booster 
representations were misleading and took steps to alter their ranching practices. The argument is 
not that ranchers were successful in adapting to their environment. Arguably, this not true of 
contemporary ranchers. What is important is to challenge the overwhelmingly declensionist 
argument that cattle ranchers were rapacious.  
The history of cattle ranching in Alberta and Montana is a cautionary one, but not one 
that is necessarily declentionist in nature. The final chapters look at changes made by ranchers, 
although slow and often not enough, in order to better operate within the confines of their 
environment. Ranching historiography, despite having a lengthy pedigree, has not always been 
kind to ranching and ranchers on either side of the border. Like all other settlers in the west they 
were trying to do the best they could. However, ranchers had the added burden of over a decade 
of fundamentally misleading information to put behind them before they could begin to 
understand the limits of their environment. As a consequence, inappropriate ranching methods 
were adopted and during one particularly bad winter thousands of cattle died. Ranching took a 
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serious blow from that winter but it did not end.  It is the adaptation after a disaster that 
differentiates this history from others. 
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Chapter Two: Precursor to Northwestern Plains Ranching: Creation of a Borderlands 
Economy 
  Traditional borderlands historiographies follow one of two frameworks. Early 
borderlands historiography focused on the borders created by the Spanish Empire and so 
emphasized cultural and economic differences. In addition, borderlands historiography focused 
on American expansion. With respect to the Canada/U.S. borderlands the idea that the Canadian 
frontier was subject to American expansionist tendencies has been tied to frontier economies. 
Paul Sharp argues that merchants in Fort Benton, Montana controlled the extensive and 
profitable commerce of the Montana/Alberta borderlands.1 Modern borderlands studies have 
deviated from that argument by making the case that culture can transcend national boundaries 
creating regional cultures and economies. It is in the more modern framework that borderlands 
regionalism has taken on an environmental component. Historian Theodore Binnema discussed 
the importance of considering a similar bioregion when examining both culture and economics 
for Montana and Alberta.2 This chapter uses T.C. Power and I.G. Baker to demonstrate that, 
when large scale cattle ranching emerged onto the Montana/Alberta borderlands, a preexisting 
regional economy was already in place.3 The actions of both firms, in particular ending the 
whisky trade, filling government contracts and participating in the cattle industry, contributed to 
the economic context of booster representations of the Montana/Alberta borderlands. Last, the 
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region, despite the border, was subject to the same type of booster representations. As a result, 
the same flawed ranching methods were imported to Montana and Alberta.    
The 19th century was the apex of boosterism for the west. In Nature’s Metropolis William 
Cronon noted that booster information contained numerous elements; a natural advantage such as 
grasslands, amiable climate, or transportation routes and the significant potential for large 
financial returns.4 T.C. Power and Brother and I.G. Baker and Co. fit within these elements. 
Booster information, in whatever form, was adopted almost immediately by newspaper editors, 
pamphleteers, and merchants who went on to give the information a life of its own. This study 
will add a third component of booster literature forwarded by the Power and Baker firms: 
stability. For the Power and Baker firms stability was the presence of government institutions, 
like the North West Mounted Police, railroads and other markets. What they did not want was an 
unsettled Indigenous population, unscrupulous whisky traders, and the resulting chaos from that 
sad industry.        
During the 1870s and 1880s both Power and Baker were actively involved in the 
economic development of the Montana and Alberta borderland cattle industry. As their primary 
role was economic and not political they endorsed the assertion of Canadian authority north of 
the 49th parallel. Being some of the only merchants in the area, the presence of the North West 
Mounted Police (NWMP), an Indigenous population confined to reserves, cattle ranchers and, 
later, railway crews provided markets for their products. In short, Power and Baker companies 
were interested in selling products, which required stability. This was a drastic departure from 
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other borderlands along the 49th parallel, Minnesota in particular, where land ownership was 
paramount.5  
The Early Years 
 The rapid growth and slow decline of the T.C. Power and I.G. Baker firms during the 
1860s-1890s was, in many ways, similar to the rise and fall of the open range cattle industry 
during the same period. Both these firms and ranchers came to Montana and Alberta during a 
period of unbridled optimism and initially a great deal of money was earned. However, the 
optimism was based on boosterism and was, therefore, unreliable. For both Montana and 
Alberta, booster information carried additional weight because the glowing representations of 
healthy grasslands, transportation routes, and available markets were reinforced by the success of 
Power and Baker. The markets included miners who had moved west in order to strike it rich in 
the Montana gold fields and whose wealth had captured popular imagination, Indigenous 
populations who were being forced onto reservations, railway work gangs and cattle ranchers. 
The Fort Benton embarkation point on the Missouri River pre-dated both miners and merchants 
and satisfied the need for reliable transportation of goods. The booster context for Alberta and 
Montana was, in short, believable. Much like ranchers in the following decade, T.C. Power and 
I.G. Baker bought into a region that was promising.   
I.G. Baker came to Montana in 1865 as a fur trader but within a year had moved into the 
whisky trade. He then changed into a mercantile trader in the 1870s to supply miners with goods 
that were not readily made on the Montana frontier. In 1873 Baker sold his interests in his 
Montana operation to the Conrad brothers, William, Charles, and John, and then moved his 
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office to St. Louis.6 The move to St. Louis made the I.G. Baker company a powerhouse on the 
Montana frontier. From that city Baker was able to organize the shipment of goods along the 
Missouri River to Fort Benton where they were sold to local markets.  While it is common to 
think of eastern operations, such as Standard Oil, as the largest business empires during the 19th 
century I.G. Baker was no slouch as they moved 2.5 million dollars of merchandise through Fort 
Benton.7 The success of the Baker firm was not overnight; understanding how and why they 
went from whisky traders to mercantilist businessmen is important to understanding the role of 
booster literature and the drive for a stable business environment in the Montana/Alberta 
borderlands in the years leading up to the cattle boom.   
T.C. Power and his brother John arrived in Fort Benton during the 1860s at the height of 
the Montana Gold Rush. The Cleveland Morning Leader wrote “It is predicted that when 
developed the country will prove one of the wealthiest and most productive of districts. From all 
accounts it really appears as if the dream of De Soto is at last to be realized in the gold fields of 
the far West, and the Missouri Democrat thus revels in the anticipated riches.”8 It is not 
surprising that the Power brothers came to sell goods to the miners, Indigenous population, and 
military garrisons extending American authority into the region. The Power brothers initially 
sold whisky and other goods to traders and the Indigenous population.9 However, by the 1870s 
they had altered their business into a wholesale mercantile operation with the establishment of a 
steamboat shipping line on the Missouri River, connecting them to manufacturing hubs in the 
eastern United States. By 1881, when ranchers were starting to arrive in Alberta, the Power 
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brothers had become the largest company in Montana. Their financial records for that year show 
a profit of over $400,000.10 Within the context of boosterism the success of Power and Baker 
were important because it reinforced the fantastic representations of newspapers. Furthermore, 
during the 1880s T.C. Power operated a successful cattle ranch. It is likely that the Power firm’s 
success, which reinforced booster information, played a role in making representations, both 
economic and environmental, more plausible.  
 For boosters, Fort Benton was a quintessential boomtown. By the late 1860s the small 
city on the Missouri River had all of the booster qualities described by William Cronon in 
Nature’s Metropolis.11 However, a Canadian city, Winnipeg, was also advantageously placed on 
the edge of the northwestern frontier. Between the two settlements there were differences that 
made Fort Benton a more attractive choice for both merchants and markets. The most important 
difference was the transportation route that had brought Lewis and Clark to Montana, the 
Missouri River. The principal trade during the 1860s was bison robes, a product that had its 
shipping cost determined by weight. For the traders looking to make the largest returns possible, 
Fort Benton and Missouri River was the obvious choice because freight could be moved easily 
and often.12 However, the lack of government authority and the prevalence of the whisky trade 
meant one important quality was absent, stability. The lack of stability and its causes was 
confronted by the T.C. Power and I.G. Baker firms.  
 The territorial politics of the time reflected the importance of the Missouri River as a 
valuable transportation route.  In 1867 thirteen steamers travelling toward Fort Benton were 
stopped because of low water resulting in a $500,000 request to Congress as a means to clear the 
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route.  The request was not successful but was reiterated in 1873 at the behest of the Montana 
legislature. A sum of $30,000 was allocated in 1878 to clear the Missouri River above Fort 
Union. The amount allocated was insufficient for the entire task, yet it was the start of a series of 
subsidies that would help build Forts, railroads and roads, all of which contributed to increasing 
the stability of Montana and grew its markets for goods. For suppliers like Power and Baker 
these markets were invaluable both as sources for their products and as institutions engendering 
market stability.13     
The Whisky Trade 
Prior to 1869 goods were brought up the Missouri River, unloaded at Fort Benton, and 
then hauled by wagon to various mining operations. The construction of the Union Pacific 
Railroad into Montana diverted much of this shipping south of Fort Benton. In 1873 the 
Diamond R Freighting Company and the Northern Pacific Railroad cooperated to establish an 
offloading point for goods below Fort Benton where they would then haul goods to Helena 
where Diamond R was located.14 The increase in rail traffic isolated Fort Benton and relegated 
the Power and Baker firms to operating within the whisky trade. Power and Baker’s distaste for 
the whisky trade was both human and business related. In 1873 the Baker firm set up a post north 
of Fort Benton near the St. Mary’s river, but the trading environment was so chaotic that they 
were forced to abandon it the following year. In a letter explaining the decision Baker wrote: 
“The whisky traders so annoyed them and demoralized the Indians that they were obliged to 
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remove in 1874.”15 With respect to the chaos of this sad trade, whisky drove the Indigenous 
population to steal horses and the traders to retaliate, often lethally.16 It is likely, especially 
considering the later business practices of both firms, that they saw a more secure future in 
dealing with ranchers, settlers, and government contracts than whisky traders. As a consequence, 
the desire for stability in the region turned I.G. Baker into a booster. In 1872 he sent a letter to 
the government of the Dominion of Canada where he noted that the region had both good 
grazing land and was promising for agriculture.17 As neither grazing nor farming could profitably 
occur in a location that lacked stability, regardless of its natural advantages, it is not surprising to 
find that both firms encouraged the establishment government institutions on both sides of the 
border.  
One of the largest obstacles to tackling the whisky trade in the early 1870s was the ease 
with which American traders could cross the 49th parallel. Baker identified this issue to the 
Dominion government in a letter where he noted that “The U.S. Marshal has been active in 
trying to stop the whisky traffic; but is unable to suppress it above [north of the 49th parallel], 
owing to the [ease of the traders in] crossing the border.”18 What Baker and Power felt was an 
essential aspect of a successful business region was the presence of government institutions, 
especially in Canada. As a consequence, it is hardly surprising to find that both firms were 
supportive of the Canadian government sending the NWMP to Alberta. Furthermore, from a 
business perspective the availability of government contracts would have been far more 
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attractive than trading whisky. From 1873 onward both of these firms distanced themselves from 
the unscrupulous whisky traders in northern Montana.  
In 1874 the Dominion government received solid evidence that both firms were 
proponents of stability through order and were not involved in the whisky trade. Lieutenant 
Governor Alexander Morris, after an interview with an American in Winnipeg, reported that 
“Two American firms from Fort Benton who trade there do not use liquor in their dealings with 
the Indians…American traders would like to see Law and Order enforced.”19 It is more than 
likely that the American was talking about the Power and Baker firms because they were by far 
the largest in the area and Baker had already voiced his opposition to the whisky trade in an 
earlier letter to the Dominion Government. The disassociation from the whisky trade was 
important for Baker and Power because boosterism relied on promoting their region as a stable 
place that was good for ranching and agriculture. The inclusion of Canada indicated that they 
wanted to create a borderlands economy as opposed to a land grab that was common in other 
areas along the Canada/USA border. 
During the 1870s tariffs imposed on non-Canadian goods were not a deterrent for either 
firm selling in Canada. In 1874 Power instructed his agents in southern Alberta to “show the 
police your invoices if necessary and tell them we stand ready to pay any duties the law 
demands.”20  Power also experimented with purchasing buffalo robes and selling them in eastern 
Canada but this was a disaster. While Power did eventually sell some goods in eastern Canada, 
focusing on the regional borderlands economy became more important. In 1875 he used his 
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prominent position and shipping line to sell goods made in eastern Canada in the west, thereby 
avoiding the tariff. In a letter to Martin Mcginnis, Power asked him to “…accomplish the 
shipping in bond arrangement…”21 A bond allowed for Power to move large quantities of goods 
without fear of losing his entire business should a shipment be stolen or lost. The bond was 
accepted and from 1875 forward the Power and Baker firms’ filled contracts for Canadian 
government workers and Indigenous people with Canadian made goods as often as possible. The 
fact that these steps were taken is a strong indicator that the border did indeed matter in an 
economic sense and it was not an impediment to a regional economy. Furthermore, any 
subsequent tariffs, on cattle for example, would fit within a preexisting borderlands economic 
framework and would not hamper cross-border economics. 
   At the same time as Power and Baker were moving Canadian goods west, agents of the 
American government were actively trying to end the whisky trade in Montana. In 1873 William 
Ensign, the Indian agent for northern Montana, noted that many Bloods, Peigan and Blackfoot 
had died from the health problems associated with alcohol. The Indian agent for Milk River, A.J. 
Simmons, noted that while action had been taken in Montana to stem the whisky traders 
including “…seizure and burning of trading houses, liquors, goods etc…” any success was 
undermined because “This traffic is still being extensively engaged in north of the line, in British 
Territory, by our own citizens and half-breeds from the Red River of the North.”22 For the Power 
and Baker firms the order that they required to engage in a borderlands regional economy was 
being undermined by the 49th parallel.  
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The American government put some pressure on John A. Macdonald’s conservatives to 
extend Canadian authority in the west. But, the NWMP were supposed to be an aspect of 
settlement and settlement had not begun by the early 1870s. When this was combined with the 
Pacific Scandal and the Liberals being opposed to the idea of a national police force the whole 
scheme could have fallen apart and the Montana/Alberta borderlands would have remained 
chaotic. In a twist of fate for Power and Baker in 1873 American whisky traders massacred 
Assiniboine Indigenous people underlining the lack of stability in the region.23 For Power and 
Baker, who had been agitating against the whisky trade, the event suited their goal of stability by 
encouraging government intervention north of the 49th parallel.  
In the wake of the massacre Abel Farwell, the principal witness and employee of the 
Power firm, spoke to T.C. Power before the authorities. In Whoop-Up Country Paul Sharp 
reasoned that Power wanted the incident to look as bad as possible in order to put additional 
pressure on the Canadian government to send a police force west, which suited both Baker and 
Power’s interests. Sharp suggests that Power influenced Farwell to characterize the incident as a 
massacre.24 While it is impossible to know what, if any, words were exchanged between Farwell 
and Power, what is clear from Montana newspapers is that the pressure for Farwell to exonerate 
his fellow countrymen was immense, yet he did not. During the trial The Benton Record noted 
that Farwell had received a threating letter and went on to state that violence against Farwell was 
not justified. The same article stated “…However indignant our people may feel towards Farwell 
they have no thought of treating him otherwise than with silent contemp.”25 Other publications, 
notably The River Press, wrote with disdain for Farwell who ultimately was forced to leave 
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Montana.26 Whether the Power firm played a role in how the event was publicized is not clear; 
however, all aspects of the Cypress Hills Massacre, including how Farwell testified, were to 
Power and Baker’s advantage. 
 The Cypress Hills Massacre was a turning point for the end of the whisky trade on both 
sides of the border. In order to further this goal the Territorial Delegate for Montana, Martin 
Maginnis, started voicing his concerns about whisky traders and their violent, deleterious 
industry in Washington. One of Maginnis’ roles was to represent the interests of Montana 
business and for Baker and Power this meant creating a stable borderlands region. In this 
capacity Maginnis spoke out against the whisky trade, pushed for the apprehension of whisky 
traders, and advocated for funds from Washington for a prison and for creation of a garrison.27 In 
essence, Maginnis was agitating for exactly the kind of institutional changes that would benefit 
Power and Baker by making Montana, in both reality and perception, more attractive to settlers 
and ranchers.28  
Power and Baker instructed their business representatives to treat the authorities, on both 
sides of the border, with respect. The Power and Baker firms, as a result, made a profitable 
business selling goods to them. On the northern side of the border the NWMP were dispatched in 
1873 and present by 1874. Their presence, in combination with the efforts of authorities in 
Montana, led to the large scale collapse of the whisky trade.29 In an 1874 letter T.C. Power 
showed his respect for the law when he instructed that his employees “…keep whisky away from 
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their posts…”30 I.G. Baker seems to have followed Power’s lead with respect to avoiding the 
whisky trade. The role played by Power and Baker in the end of the whisky trade was important 
for their economic vison for the Montana/Alberta borderlands. Both firms were boosterish in 
their endorsement of stability by stamping out the whisky trade and its inherent chaos. The end 
of the whisky trade was the beginning of a regional borderlands economy that was dominated by 
these two firms. For the ranchers who responded to booster representations of the 
Montana/Alberta grasslands, the presence of an established and cross-border economic network 
made the area even more attractive.  
Government Contracts  
The effort expended by both firms in ending the whisky trade, and more importantly 
distancing themselves from it, was a significant step in creating a borderlands economic region. 
The result was that both the Power and Baker firms were in an advantageous position to land 
lucrative government contracts, further entrenching themselves as representatives of a booming 
west and exploiters of it. The NWMP police and the merchants of Fort Benton entered into a 
symbiotic relationship after 1874 because the police provided both security and a ready market. 
Prior to the completion of a national railroad the Hudson’s Bay Company could not compete 
with the established shipping routes into Fort Benton. And, as noted, much of the goods being 
brought in by Power and Baker were Canadian. From a borderlands perspective the presence of 
both security for transactions and a ready market made booster representations, some of which 
were coming from Power and Baker themselves, of Montana and Alberta more plausible.  
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 The actions of both firms were shrewd and rational. When the police or military set up a 
fort one of the firms would set up a shop next to them. For example, the I.G. Baker Company 
was contracted to build Fort Calgary and upon its completion they built a store to provide 
supplies. Power employee, D.W. Marsh, noted that “The Indian question is getting too mixed to 
risk goods where there are no police.”31 What this engendered was a positive borderlands 
relationship between Montana merchants and the Canadian police that lasted well into the 1880s. 
In fact, the presence of the Mounted Police and the increased importance of the border extended 
the economic influence of Fort Benton into Canada.    
 The police were not the only market existing on the northern Great Plains. Both the Baker 
and Power firms were successful in securing contracts to sell to Indigenous people on both sides 
of the border because of their access to preexisting shipping routes and therefore supplies. This 
was a privileged position and one they guarded vigorously. In an 1875 letter the Power and 
Baker firms discussed refusing to sell trading outfits to any, and all, competition who wanted to 
sell to Indigenous people.32 The work here paid off, in 1881 I.G. Baker was worth between 
$175,000 and $200,000, much of his wealth coming from contacts with the Canadian 
government.33 While this may seem as though American firms were getting rich selling to 
Canadian Indigenous peoples, many of the goods were purchased in Canada and shipped west to 
avoid the import tariff. 
 The success of Baker and Power in Canada was noticed by Canadian firms who began to 
resent the number and value of contracts awarded to American businesses. In particular, 
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Canadian firms resented the manner in which these firms collaborated to, according to many, 
siphon off wealth. In 1882 Assistant Commissioner Irvine wrote that “a large amount of money 
has been expended, of which there is little or nothing to show, our money is merely aiding to 
build up the town of Benton, U.S.A.”34 However, this suggests that the Baker and Power firms 
had become successful within their regional economy due to the presence of Canadian 
institutions indicating that the border did not hinder business. This free movement of goods and 
services would become increasingly important for the importation of livestock, cattle and sheep, 
during the 1880s cattle boom.   
 As a method to further position themselves in the borderlands economy and add to the 
booster message of available transportation and economic stability both Baker and Power set low 
rates for their steamships on the Missouri River. T.C. Power held the controlling interest in the 
Fort Benton Transportation Company. When he was dealing with the rates for Baker’s firm he 
wrote that “…no one is to have a less rate from our line than you and outside of ourselves…, no 
one else is to have as good a rate by ten per cent…”35 The control over shipping routes was short 
lived, however. The railroad companies moving into Montana were able to break Power and 
Baker’s monopoly on shipping. The response of both firms was to work together to make sure 
that they were the most reliable choice for filling government contracts. The way this was done 
was to use their position as large firms to keep other bidders from fulfilling their contracts. Their 
1881 agreement stated that, “neither party was in any way to assist in the freighting or helping 
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the outside party getting the contract to fill it in anyway whatever either directly or indirectly but 
to all they could to honorably defeat them.”36  
 North of the 49th parallel Power and Baker were working to position themselves 
advantageously by eliminating competition to increase revenues, something that likely upset 
Canadian firms as well. To this end Power sold his Fort Macleod store, stock and all to Baker 
who, in turn, sold his Fort Walsh operation to Power.37 The result of eliminating competition was 
an increase in prices. The people living near either location could not have been happy about his 
turn of events. In a letter to T.C. Power, Thomas Bogy wrote that “The people of the Macleod 
country got it bang in the nose on prices. They could not appreciate having two houses 
there…They probably understand matters a little better now.”38 Considering the actions of both 
firms it is possible that an additional motive for eliminating the whisky trade was to eliminate 
competition.  However, there is no documented evidence that indicates this directly. While this 
sounds like the worst form of unfettered capitalism, and in many ways it was, it is important to 
note that from a borderlands perspective what these firms had done was to create a regional 
economy. The Montana/Alberta borderlands regional economy spanned from Fort Benton to 
north of Calgary. It was characterized initially by Montana merchants selling goods to the 
Canadian market. However, when ranchers came to Alberta they would use the borderlands 
economy to rapidly stock their ranges through large scale cattle purchases. 
Baker, Power and the start of the Range Cattle Industry 
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 An additional market was added to the regional economy of the Montana and Alberta 
borderlands during the late 1870s and early 1880s. Cattle ranchers, much like miners, had been 
lured to the northwest with booster representations of free grass, abundant water, established 
lines of shipping and an amiable climate. What made the cattle industry particularly well suited 
to a borderlands economy was that a similar environment existed on both sides of the 49th 
parallel. For that reason Power and Baker, even more so than in previous years, were able to 
exploit a single industry. The Power and Baker firms were important to the development of the 
cattle industry on both sides of the border and would continue their importance in the regional 
economy that they, through their boosterism, opposition to the whisky trade and business 
acumen, had helped create. 
 During the early 1870s cattle ranchers pushed into the northern part of Montana where 
Power and Baker were most prominent. The Sun River valley was an important grassland for this 
transition. As early as 1869 Conrad Kohrs was grazing nearly 1,000 head here. By the early 
1880s cattle ranching had expanded from the Sun River to Fort Benton, the Judith Basin, and the 
Musselshell regions. The grass in Montana was mostly on public land and ranchers grazed their 
cattle for free.39 In Alberta there was a different approach. The Canadian government had 
devised a lease system whereby large tracts of land, up to 100,000 acres, were leased to 
individual ranchers.40 This system engendered what historian David Breen characterized as a 
“British-Canadian West” that had a political orientation directed firmly toward Ottawa.41 While 
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it is true that many ranchers in Alberta were well connected eastern transplants, they were a long 
way from home and therefore dependent on the regional borderlands economy.  
Both the Power and Baker firms were heavily involved with the range cattle industry on 
both sides of the border. During the late 1870s T.C.  Power established the Judith Cattle 
Company on recently opened lands in Montana.42 Due to the number of workers coming west 
with the railroad and both firms prominence within the region they looked to secure government 
contracts to feed workers. In 1882 Power landed a contract to supply beef to Canadian railway 
workers. A.P. Simmons suggested to Power that a beef contract would be lucrative and he should 
use his connections to arrange one.43 The contract began in 1884, but it proved difficult to fill. 
Employees of the Power firm, especially D.W. Marsh, were worried about running cattle north, 
especially where the terrain was rugged, and wrote Power to express his unease.44 This was a 
perfectly reasonable concern considering other disastrous cattle drives during the period.45 The 
solution was a made-in-Canada one, as it required slaughtering the cattle in January and shipping 
the meat frozen.46 In the end the contract lasted a year, was paid in full by the Canadian Pacific 
Railroad and the Power firm showed a profit of nearly $33,000.47 Considering that both firms 
had agitated for government stability roughly a decade prior to this in order to secure these types 
of contracts this profit must have felt like a vindication. Within a broader borderlands, 
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environmental and booster context this contract (and others) indicated the Montana/Alberta 
region was living up to its booster representations.   
For T.C. Power and I.G. Baker the increase in ranching activity in Alberta during the 
1880s was an opportunity to extend their reach into the economic region they had helped to 
create. In 1883 Power reached a deal with the Walrond Ranch for $100,000 worth of cattle and a 
stake in the Walrond Ranch itself.48 The sale to the Walrond Ranch was not a one-off event. As 
Alberta ranching became increasingly important firms like Baker and Power would be called 
upon to supply cattle and other ranching necessities. Reports filed by the Department of 
Agriculture show a continual increase of cattle shipments to Alberta coinciding with the 
establishment of numerous large ranching operations north of the border.49  
  The sale of cattle was not only from the Power and Baker firms to Canadian ranchers, 
both firms were large purchasers of stock as well. The government contracts secured by I.G. 
Baker to supply beef to Indigenous people needed to be filled and Canadian ranchers sold to 
Baker to meet this end. On July 2, 1884 The River Press reported that Matthew Cochrane 
“effected a sale of 12,000 head of 3 year-old steers last week to I.G. Baker and Co., at $65 a 
head. They are purchased by the firm to fill their Indian supply contract with the government. 
The sale is considered a very good one, and gives a good index of what the future of the trade is 
likely to become.”50  The booster element here is unmistakable and fits in with the broader 
context that the success of Baker and Power helped justify the booster information regarding 
stock raising on the northern plains. The fact that it was a Canadian ranch selling to an American 
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firm to fill a contract with the Canadian government reinforces the importance of the regional 
economy. 
Cattle were not the only grazers on the northern plains during the 1880s. Sheep were 
introduced at the same time as cattle in order to exploit a burgeoning wool market. In much the 
same vein as the Judith Cattle operation T.C. Power opened a sheep ranch in 1883. The Benton 
Weekly Record reported in 1883 that “X. Beidler and Henry J. O’Hanlon, with T.C. Power and 
Bro. intend starting a sheep ranch at the Big Sag in a few days…”51  The viability of selling 
sheep to Alberta stock raisers resulted from the 1883 winter on the Cochrane Ranche and 
Matthew Cochrane deciding to graze sheep on his northern range. The River Press reported the 
purchase in September of 1884 stating “Mr. Kerfoot, superintendent of the Cochrane sheep 
ranch, is homeward bound from Montana with 8,000 sheep.”52 The same newspaper followed up 
on the increase in sheep being sold to Alberta raisers in 1885 noting “…our market for sheep for 
the next five years will be the Northwest”53 and in a later edition The River Press described the 
economic scenario for wool as “Montana wool is in such high demand now that higher prices 
will be the rule this season, and the outlook for the sheep industry is more encouraging than ever 
before.”54 
I.G. Baker and T.C. Power, and other firms, played a valuable role in creating the 
economic context for the Montana/Alberta range cattle industry.  The success of the two firms in 
securing and then filling government contracts, often for beef, made the economic and 
environmental potential for ranching fit within the booster representations. As a consequence, 
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cattle ranchers would enter into the Montana/Alberta borderlands region with a wholly 
unrealistic understanding of the environment, especially its limits. By 1886 when the ranges in 
Montana were, according to rancher Granville Stuart, overstocked it was due to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the environment due to booster information made more plausible by the 
economic success of T.C. Power and I.G. Baker.    
By the 1870s representations of the environment for the Canadian and American west(s) 
were almost entirely positive. These booster representations were promulgated by promoters of 
settlement, ranching, agriculture and business. During the 1870s governments, especially in 
Canada, would enter the discussion and fully endorse ranching in Alberta. South of the border 
representations of the environment had already trended positive, possibly because of 
expansionist governments starting the 1840s or perhaps because the climate actually was better. 
Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that neither the positive nor the negative representations 
of the environment were accurate. Cattle ranchers, who were among the first Whites to settle the 
plains, bought into the booster ideal which presented a unique set of challenges requiring a 
varying set of responses. 
 During the American Civil War the vast cattle herds of Texas experienced an 
unprecedented period of natural increase. The Union army had created a blockade that prevented 
the shipping of cattle north and many of the men who would have been working on the range 
were off fighting. The result was the herds of cattle that once had their numbers controlled 
through slaughter and sale grew for five years. Ironically, due to their numbers, cattle had both 
decreased in value and were an environmental burden on the limited carrying capacity of the 
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Texas plains.55 As a consequence, following the end of the Civil War in 1865, cattle ranchers and 
traders were on the search for both new markets and grasslands for their herds.  
The solution was to move cattle north. The first move was into the Corn Belt to fatten the 
older animals prior to shipping, from most often Chicago.56 Cattle were later driven further north 
into Montana and, eventually, Alberta. This move made sense for numerous reasons but most 
significant were the emerging markets of miners, Indigenous people, and frontier settlers coupled 
with the overwhelmingly positive environmental representations of the grasslands that had been 
promulgated from the 1840s through the 1860s. For example, in an 1865 edition of The Montana 
Post a miner named Delver wrote “There was grass in the valley for thousands of cattle and there 
has been little snow here all winter. Scattered timber is to be found in the valley, and four miles 
off any quantity of good pine is obtainable.”57 Essentially, what Delver described was the perfect 
ranching territory adjacent to a market. These representations were then coupled with the success 
of the Power and Baker firms making them more enticing.  
The Power and Baker firms were not the only wholesalers in northern Montana but they 
were among the largest and most important.  The success of both firms demonstrated that a 
preexisting regional economy, complete with markets for beef, was in place at the onset of 
ranching. The actions of both firms, in particular agitating for stability, filling government 
contracts and selling beef, contributed to the economic context of the Montana/Alberta 
borderlands. The success of Power, Baker and other firms had a two pronged effect. First, 
because they were operating on both sides of the border their economic success fed into booster 
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representations for fantastic returns on cattle ranching in Montana and Alberta. As noted by 
Cronon, guaranteed economic success was an important aspect to boosterism.58 Second, the 
regional economy was essential to jump-starting the cattle business in Alberta. In the 1880s 
ranchers in Alberta, including Cochrane and McEachran, purchased entire herds of cattle and 
trailed them north to start their massive operations. In this way, the rapidity that Alberta was 
stocked owed a debt to the regional economy Power and Baker helped define.   
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Chapter Three: Creation of a Ranching Industry on the Northern Plains  
By the late 1870s the vanguard of Europeans bringing “civilization” was moving 
westward to inherit the open grasslands that had previously been home to the bison and 
Indigenous peoples.1 The change in land-use from Indigenous people to North American 
ranchers engendered ecological and economic effects that would become increasingly 
pronounced as more and more cattle were brought onto the plains. Significant to this discussion 
were changes in the representations and proposed land use for this recently “vacated” space. 
Proposed western settlement, therefore, was not simply to fill a recently empty space with people 
but to provide agricultural products for European and local markets.  
European markets were located primarily in Britain. Demand from Britain resulted from 
both an expanding population and an increase in the amount of meat consumed on a per capita 
basis.2 The increasing demand, in and of itself, was not enough to spur the hundreds of thousands 
of cattle raised on the Great Plains of both the United States and Canada. As demand for beef 
increased and became an expected part of the British diet, the ability for Britain to produce beef 
locally was decimated by a series of infectious diseases transported from mainland Europe. 
Historian Simon Evans noted: 
Pleuropneumonia had been imported in England in 1842 and had remained endemic. In 
the period between 1869 and 1876 losses were estimated to have been in excess of 5.5 
million head of cattle. In addition, foot-and-mouth disease was widespread, and was 
reported to have caused losses of more than $67 million in 1872 alone. Thus Britain 
became increasingly dependent on imported supplies of meat. During the 1840s almost 
all of the meat consumed in Britain was domestically produced; by 1914 about half was 
imported.3 
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The increase in demand and decrease in supply created an economic impetus for cattle ranching 
in Canada. At the same time, the regional borderlands economy had created a situation where 
cattle ranges could be quickly populated with Montana stock.  With the demand for cattle there 
was an opportunity for the other parts of Canada to secure and hold onto an important market if 
they could make it economically viable.  
  The first cattle shipped from Canada to Britain in 1872 came from the long-settled areas 
of Ontario and Quebec. These shipments started small but continued to grow through the 
following decade as transportation methods for live animals improved and financial returns on 
cattle steadily increased. The main advantage for shipping animals in Canada was that by starting 
their trans-Atlantic voyage on the St. Lawrence the animals were in calm waters and the 
temperature was cool during the crucial first few days of travel. Calm water and cool 
temperatures were important to prevent losses during the first few days at sea. The reason for the 
relatively good treatment of cattle occurred due to the effort of Dr. Duncan McEachran. 
McEachran became one of the most ardent boosters and believers in booster representations of 
the Alberta environment as a prominent rancher with the Cochrane Ranche and later the 
Walrond.  Under his leadership as the chief inspector of quarantines, conditions at the points of 
departure were vastly improved.  McEachran was the leading Canadian veterinary surgeon of his 
time and was the founder of the Montreal School of Comparative and Veterinary Medicine. 
Learning from a British disaster in 1842 McEachran was concerned with the importation of 
diseased animals which led to the establishment of quarantine stations at all major points of 
embarkation in 1876.4  The resulting regular inspection of both animals and holding pens 
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resulted in fewer losses along the Allan and Dominion shipping lines.5 The comparably few 
losses also benefitted shippers with low insurance rates and therefore higher returns.  Cattle were 
light, could be shipped in the open, and required little infrastructure that would take up valuable 
cargo space on the return voyage.  
 Shipping live cattle to Britain had proved to be economically viable based purely on 
logistics. However, was shipping cattle across the ocean hard on the animals, thereby resulting in 
an inferior product for British consumers? The answer, which succeeded in shoring up the image 
of the Canadian product and representations of the environment, came from an award-winning 
shipment of cattle sent by Matthew Cochrane of Quebec in 1877. Cochrane had experimental 
stock farms in Quebec and Ontario. According to the Department of Agriculture “Though the 
number of farmers who have ventured in the experiment of stock-breeding on a large scale is not 
great the test has been most thorough and complete in both Ontario and Quebec.”6 The overall 
quality of his animals, which included breeding bulls, suggested that shipping live cattle did not 
necessarily result in damaged or inferior animals.7 By the 1880s Cochrane was a leader in breed 
improvement in Alberta.  
 The success of this early trade, both financially and logistically, received another boost in 
1879 when Britain required U.S. live cattle to be slaughtered within 10 days of their arrival to 
prevent the spread of pleurapneumonia and foot-and-mouth disease. Canada, however, had 
avoided this regulation by shutting down the St. Lawrence River to American cattle. What this 
regulation established for Canada was a privileged position within the Atlantic live cattle trade. 
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The advantage granted to Canadian cattle would remain until 1892. It is important that this 
regulation did not extend to cattle purchased in Montana and raised in Alberta. 
All of these factors combined to grow the market for shipping live cattle at the very time 
booster literature was extolling the quality of the grasses and climate of the Canadian prairie, the 
logical new location for large cattle herds. For example, in an 1879 edition of the Globe:  
The country lying between Winnipeg and Fort Macleod, known as the “Great Lone 
Land” is not a very inviting one, though according to Col. Macleod it has been needlessly 
disparaged. Almost every part of it supplies natural pasturage for cattle, so that the police 
or travelers require to carry for their horses nothing but oats, grass being always 
obtainable. The greatest drawback is the scarcity of water, a guide being always 
necessary to ensure the safety of a tourist unacquainted with the route…This line (the 
Great Fertile Belt) it will be seen…in the longitude of Fort Macleod, and, though near the 
Rocky Mountains, the soil and climate are both good.8   
This endorsement is indicative of the booster representations for the environment generally and 
cattle ranching specifically. The numbers of cattle shipped annually had been increasing steadily 
since 1872 which created an economic impetus for increasing cattle numbers in western Canada 
to be shipped east or consumed locally. The years from 1879 to 1892 saw numerous policies 
passed that allowed for Alberta to enter the North American meat industry.9  
Markets, a New Narrative and Encouraging Legislation 
 For the Canadian government there was no a better group of individuals to lease stock-
land than those who had been intimately involved in the eastern cattle trade, and who already had 
valuable contacts in Britain. The Canadian government was also aware of the massive 
investments of British capital in the American cattle industry from the early 1870s forward, and 
they wanted to divert that capital north. The solution was to grant large leases of land to 
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investors. In 1881 leases of up to 100,000 were granted for a period that could not go beyond 21 
years.10 The connection between cattle ranchers and government ensured that the cattle industry 
would dominate in Alberta. For example, by the 1880s 4.4 million acres were under lease in the 
North-West Territories. Of those 4.4 million acres, sixteen individual leases were for one 
hundred thousand acres or more.11  
The valuable international markets for cattle were significant, however, they were not the 
only markets available. In 1874, two years after the first shipments of live cattle were sent to 
Britain, the first of four significant frontier markets, the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP), 
arrived in Southern Alberta. The second market was the Indigenous population who were being 
increasingly confined to reservations between 1871 and 1876. This created a local market for 
beef specifically due to the food provision written into Treaty 7 and the high cost of salt pork. 
The third market was coal mining communities in Sothern Alberta. The final market was 
supplied by the Canada Pacific Railroad in the form of the massive work gangs required to build 
the expanding rail system. Furthermore, Canadian ranchers selling to American companies had 
access to American forts and railroads as well. These markets were influential in the creation of a 
western cattle industry and were addressed directly by Matthew Cochrane in an 1880 letter to 
John A. Macdonald. Cochrane wrote “Without a beef industry in the west to supply the NWMP 
and an Indigenous supply for the police-force and for the Indians from Montana Territory the 
amount paid to foreigners for food supplies has been considerable.”12 Ironically, he is likely 
referring to the Power and Baker firms to whom he would sell his cattle in 1882 in order to fill 
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their government contract. Nevertheless, the benefit, even at a local level, was obvious. The 
federal government had control of these lands and a duty to the people on them. Therefore, the 
creation of an industry that would keep capital in the Dominion, encourage settlement, and allow 
the government to meet its obligations in a cost-effective manner was advantageous.    
 The existence of local and export markets were not enough to convince wealthy 
Canadians to invest millions into ranching. The Canadian government had been “selling” 
potential investors on the west since the 1850s but now it focused specifically on ranching.13 The 
means to do so were found in commercial reports that argued for the suitability of the northwest 
to cattle ranching. Both John Macoun and John Mercer Dawson noted that western Canada’s 
environment and grasslands were particularly amiable to cattle ranching in the mid-1870s. 
Dawson, in his 1873-74 report, referred to the Canadian plains as “…a great area well suited for 
pastoral occupation and stock-farming.”14 Two years later in 1876, Macoun informed the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Agriculture and Colonization that “the Canadian portion of 
the American desert had a better climate and was suited to stock raising.”15 With respect to 
repopulating the Canadian plains with cattle these positive assessments, accurate or not, are 
significant for two reasons. First, they shored up the idea that cattle ranching, among other uses, 
was possible. Second, that long term leases for cattle ranching, a land use system that was going 
to implemented 5 years later, was therefore logical.  
 An additional method used to further cement the positive environmental representations 
and convince investors to move west was public lectures. One such lecture entitled “Our Great 
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North-West As A Home For The Emigrant” was held on February 13, 1879 by Professor R. Bell, 
M.D., F.G.S., Senior Assistant Director of the Geological Survey of Canada. The Globe reported 
that the purpose of the lecture was to “…give them an account of the country from a personal 
acquaintance with it…16 The content of the lecture was decidedly boosterish. For example, Bell 
noted that “Unlimited quantities of wild hay could be cut by mowing-machines, and thus the 
wintering of cattle was rendered easy, whilst horses found their living out doors.”17 Bell’s 
quotation reinforced the utility of the Texas system and the overall ease of ranching, neither of 
which were true for the Alberta or Montana grasslands.     
 By 1880 the Canadian government had begun to officially reinforce the suitability of the 
west both generally and for cattle ranching. In 1880 the department of Agriculture published 
Reports of Tenant Farmers’ Delegates on the Dominion of Canada as a Field for Settlement. 
Settlement and cattle ranching in the west were described as “the hay is better adapted for cattle 
than horses; so that a man going in to settle generally commences using cattle for ploughing and 
hauling.”18 In the same year, 1880, the Canadian Department of Agriculture published Dominion 
of Canada: A Handy Book for Emigrants where they state “It is a fact established beyond all 
doubt that the famous short horns of England not only do well in Canada, but that the character 
of the stock actually improves in the new country.”19  
The privileged position Canada held in the Atlantic cattle trade helped not only to 
encourage expansion but also the creation of lease holdings on crown land in Alberta, which 
were made available specifically for ranchers.  The original Dominion Lands Act passed in 1872, 
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the first year live cattle were shipped to Britain, assumed that land development in the west 
would follow a similar process as it had in the east. This pattern was defined by small scale 
stock-raising primarily to supplement other agricultural products; pastureland under this system 
could only be leased to homesteaders. Furthermore, leases could be cancelled with six months’ 
notice making any large investment towards improvement unattractive.20 However, in 1876 large 
scale stock-raising in the west had become something that the government wanted to encourage 
and, as a consequence, the Act was amended.  
The amendment allowed for leasing of land to non-residents, companies, and individuals. 
This was significant because starting a large scale cattle operation required significant capital. 
Furthermore, the cancellation notice for a lease was extended to two years.21 Furthering the 
attractiveness of ranching on the plains was Section 35 of “The Dominion Land Act” of 1879 
which allowed the government to grant leases of unoccupied Dominion land specifically for 
grazing purposes. In October, 1880, an Order-in-Council was passed stating “It is hereby ordered 
that, notwithstanding the Order in Council of the 23rd of April 1880, called the ‘Health of 
Animals Order’, and while the said order otherwise remains in full force and effect, it is, 
nevertheless permitted to import cattle and swine from Duluth in the United States of America 
direct to the Prince Arthur Landing.”22 This legislation ordered that duty must be paid on 
imported stock. However, the concept of paying duties on products imported from the United 
States, especially Montana, was the norm. Therefore, the duty imposed in 1880 was something 
that the robust Montana/Alberta borderlands economy could easily work with. Furthermore, as 
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the Canadian cattle industry gathered momentum and drew the attention of well-connected 
Canadians, import taxes for ranching materials, including cattle, would be suspended for the 
greater good of rapidly stocking the Alberta ranges.    
Prior to these legislative changes grazing regulations in the territories were poorly 
defined. Therefore, it is probable that Canadian legislation, much like the booster literature 
extolling the virtues of the north-west plains, was designed to encourage the expansion of the 
cattle industry. The Department of Agriculture’s goal of expanding this industry was then 
formalized with the passing of an Order-in-Council in 1881. The OIC granted the lease of 
government land to corporations or individuals for twenty-one years in parcels that were not to 
exceed 100,000 acres. The rent was one cent per-acre, per year.  The lease required that within 
three years the lease holder put at least one head of cattle per ten acres.23 The system envisioned 
by this type of legislation clearly favored large ranches and reinforced that the government was 
keen to have investment in the west. The relatively small changes made to land tenure ushered in 
cattle ranching on a large scale. 
  Cattle ranchers were present on the Alberta plains during the 1870s but the number of 
cattle being raised was small and their presence was not used as an indicator for the 
environmental suitability of the industry. Warren Elofson notes that while the numbers of cattle 
were steadily increasing in order to help feed the Indigenous population in 1880 there were still 
only small herds, about 200, on the free grass between the United States border and Calgary.24  
In real terms, in 1880 the number of cattle brought into Alberta, mostly from Montana, was a 
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relatively low 171725 and most of these were small purchases of between 55 and 200.26 By 1881 
that number had increased to a still modest 5168 with the largest single purchase from D.H. 
Davis of 784 cattle.27 However, the result of amended legislation favoring large ranches, the 
presence of markets for beef, and unrelentingly positive environmental representations from 
boosters and government led to a massive increase in cattle imported to Alberta. 
 The evolving Dominion Land Act supported a federally organized period of cattle-raising 
by allowing for the leasing of large tracts of land. The government altered the process of land 
development in the Canadian Territories in several significant ways. The new agreement from 
Ottawa allowed for large corporations and absentee landlords to control large tracts of land, 
thereby encouraging the Texas system.    Furthermore, it made it increasingly difficult for small 
operations to establish themselves legally in several different, yet interconnected, ways. The new 
arrangement made obtaining a lease difficult, and without a lease a would-be rancher could not 
obtain sufficient land to graze his cattle. More importantly, the right to import cattle duty-free 
from the United States was a right afforded to lease holders in 1882, allowing for the rapid 
importation of stock from Montana.28 Stockmen of modest size who did not have a lease and 
those engaged in mixed farming were required to pay the full duty of 20%, a cost that was quite 
onerous.  Perhaps most important to the process of filling the plains with cattle was that Ottawa 
determined the location of lease lands. More often than not, the best lands went to wealthy 
eastern investors who had connections, like Matthew Cochrane. As a result, most of the best 
grazing land ended up in the hands of eastern-backed corporations who had the capital to invest 
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in large herds.  One option for the small, would-be agriculturalist was to apply for a 160 acre 
homestead; this too came with its own set of problems related to evolving land legislation. As the 
lease agreements given to large cattle ranches contained a “no settlement” clause before 1885 
and were on the best land, homesteaders were out of luck. Compounding this problem was that 
the lease cancellation notice had been increased to two years which meant that under the very 
best circumstances a prospective settler would have to wait upwards of three years to start their 
homestead. Land use legislation that privileged cattle pushed farmers further north and 
essentially ceded control of the southern half of the Territories to ranchers, thereby encouraging 
the Texas system in Alberta.29   
 Settlers who desired land resented the lease system immensely yet, due to the political 
clout of leaseholders, government tended to favor ranchers. In 1883 settlers near the Porcupine 
Hills learned, after plowing the land and building their homes, they were on leased land. The 
settlers wrote a letter to the Department of the Interior expressing their displeasure and requested 
that the land be freed from the lease. The Department of the Interior stood firmly with the 
leaseholders and told the settlers that those leases were in place before they settled, and the lease 
holder had the right to evict squatters.30 However, as there was no land office in Fort Macleod, 
an official map showing leased lands was not available, making an official examination into land 
open to settlement difficult and costly. In 1886 Mr. C.F. Denny complained in the Macleod 
Gazette that because the bulk of the land in the area was leased the land office should be moved 
from Lethbridge to Fort Macleod.31 The friction between ranchers and settlers came to a head in 
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1885 with a meeting of settlers on John Glenn’s farm, where farmers formed the Alberta Settlers’ 
Rights Association.  
 Alberta settlers sent a petition prompting John A. Macdonald to have the Minister of the 
Interior inspect all leased lands and cancel those leases where conditions, like a lack of stock, 
had been breached. Leasee’s who had given “…the assurance that they were both able and 
willing to stock them [leases]. It turns out they all lied and merely got their leases for the purpose 
of selling them” were targeted.32 According to the Lethbridge News by 1889 over 600,000 acres 
of lease land had been cancelled.33 The amount of land opened for settlement was significant but 
the Canadian government had not turned on Alberta ranchers. Nevertheless, Ottawa needed to 
alleviate the settler problem without antagonizing ranchers. The solution was a system that 
prevented squatters from blocking access to water where “The Minister recommends that such of 
these lands as are at the disposal of the Government be reserved from sale and settlement, and 
that they be reserved as approaches to the water and watering places for stock.”34 This was 
acceptable to stock raisers, but other concerns were mounting as well. Stock raisers wanted the 
stocking requirement for leaseholders reduced to one animal for every thirty acres, from one for 
every ten. They were also concerned about American cattle illegally grazing in Canada, putting 
additional pressure on the grasslands. The pressure that cattle ranchers put on the government 
regarding these concerns helped to develop policy that was favorable to their industry.  
The result of the pressure by ranchers was an 1886 order-in-council that created a system 
preventing settlers from blocking access to water. The government allowed for settlement on 
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leased land, but only for leases signed after 1885. The capitulation to settlers still protected the 
largest and most well connected ranchers in Alberta.35 The request to reduce the number of cattle 
per acre was granted in 1888, but at a slightly watered down twenty animals per-acre. The 
reduction in required stock made it easier for ranchers to reduce the size of their herd if desired, 
and more difficult for the government to cancel leases.36 Ranchers, even in the face of 
concessions granted to settlers, had every reason to be pleased with their government. It is 
important to note, almost every aspect of the legislation passed before 1888 encouraged the 
Texas system, an unsustainable ranching practice in Alberta. What resulted was, “For a time at 
least, and to further the purpose of the Dominion, the Canadian government set aside the image 
of the homestead settler and the family farm and created a ‘Big Man’s Frontier.’”37 
Evolving Canadian legislation regarding the ranching industry was related to 
overstocking the prairies with cattle in three ways. First, the legislation was clearly an attempt to 
keep British capital within the Dominion. During the 1870s hundreds of thousands of dollars had 
gone to American firms, like T.C. Power and I.G. Baker, to supply the police and Indigenous 
people. By enticing ranchers to set up massive leases and then forcing them to put one animal for 
every ten acres the government was encouraging the Texas system, which was inappropriate for 
the north-western plains. The reduction in stock per acre in 1888 came after the hard winter of 
1886/1887 and was beneficial to ranchers who needed to run fewer stock and use some of their 
lease to grow hay. Second, the legislation can be understood as a method to replace one 
representation of the environment with another. With this legislation encouraging large scale 
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cattle enterprises the government endorsed the west as suitable for more than just extracting furs, 
pemmican and leather. The changing, and unrealistic perception of the environment is directly 
related to large leases, overstocking, and the adoption of the Texas system. Last, the changes 
made to land-use legislation, coupled with lucrative beef contracts, provided a powerful 
motivation for cattle ranchers to operate in the west.  
The Herds in Montana 
  The lure of cattle ranching in Montana during the 1870s was similar to precious metals 
the previous decade. Both fit into the booster representation of a natural advantage and the 
abundant resource of free grass proved to be nearly as enticing as gold, silver and copper. The 
natural vegetation of Montana and Alberta, including grama and western wheatgrass, had 
supported millions of bison.38 When the bison were extirpated, cattle ranchers moved in quickly 
to put it to use. Prior to 1877 cattle numbers were relatively low, the Helena Weekly Herald 
reported only 35, 964 in total for 1870.39  This allowed for the majority of ranches to operate in 
the well grassed and watered, albeit small, western valleys while the bison still roamed in the 
eastern half of the Territory. The western valleys were the subject of some of the strongest 
booster language of the 1870s. For example, the Philadelphia Evening Telegraph published 
“…finer country can nowhere be found for grazing cattle than in Montana, and especially the 
Yellowstone region. The grasses cure themselves, and thus all winter the cattle can wander 
around these valleys and find plenty of food to live upon.”40 This type of language would prove 
to be a strong lure for stock-raisers during the latter half of the 1870s.   
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The cattle boom in Montana followed closely on the heels of the regional borderlands 
economy of the Power and Baker firms. The prospects for stock raising were met with 
enthusiasm from some locals, including long-time resident Granville Stuart, who wrote his 
brother stating “Just think of it. Why we would live about forty years longer by going into the 
cattle business in a place like that.”41 The cattle herds destined for Montana’s northern grasslands 
came from two different directions. The relatively small scale cattle industry that had grown-up 
around Montana’s mining camps began to move north. They needed to find more open land for 
their ever expanding herds. During the 1880s another wave of stockmen came from the south and 
brought with them Texas Longhorns along with other breeds purchased in Kansas, Oklahoma, 
and Wyoming. This entailed a rapid establishment of both imported and domestic stock in 
northern Montana by the 1880s.42 
The presence of local markets prior to large scale rail penetration were important to early 
Montana ranchers, much the same as in Alberta. During the 1860s the influx of thousands of 
gold seekers created the first large scale local market for beef. In 1865 a gold strike was named 
“Beef Straight” because miners in the area were subsisting on nothing but beef bought from local 
cattle raisers.43 By 1873, nearing the end of the mining boom, newspapers reported the success 
had by merchants selling beef in mining camps as a sign of the robust Montana economy.44 As 
the population of Montana grew, pressure on the Indigenous population increased resulting in the 
formation of several reservations. In addition to creating additional public land for ranchers to 
exploit, reservations were entitled to food annuities, which were essentially government beef 
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contracts. From 1873 through 1875 rancher Nelson Story was supplying beef and pork annuities 
destined for the newly formed Crow Reservation.45 In 1875, however, the Story contracts were 
under a fraud investigation. Accusations were made that contracts were not being awarded to the 
lowest bidder. For example, James Booge of Iowa underbid Story by three cents for the bacon 
contract but still lost out. On June 2, 1875 Edward P. Smith of the Indian Affairs Commission 
testified that Booge had not included the charge for freight in his bid. The additional cost of 
freight made Story’s price preferable.46 The fact that Story was still less expensive due to freight 
costs underlines the significance of local markets to Montana ranchers. As military forts were 
established and an increasing number of Indigenous people were forced onto reservations these 
markets would grow in size and importance. While not identical to markets in Alberta there was 
a high degree of similarity. Importantly, by the 1880s ranchers on both sides of the border were 
competing with each other for contracts, indicating that the significance of local markets did not 
disappear with the arrival of the railway. 
   Ranchers in Montana depended on the territorial government for the regulation of their 
industry. Regulation in Montana was drastically different than in Alberta as the land was 
primarily free range and land ownership was not common, at least initially. Starting in 1865 the 
Montana legislature forced stock owners to create and then record a distinctive brand, an 
important aspect of the Texas system. Further regulations covered summer and winter grazing, 
round-ups and the handling of stray cattle, a common problem in open range cattle ranching.47 
By the 1870s The Helena Weekly Herald reported additional regulation for breeding stock and 
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further requirements for reporting brands.48 Early legislation in Montana, like Alberta, was 
designed to encourage the Texas system by regulating it into existence.  
A lack of government leases and minimal land ownership made Montana ranchers reliant 
on public land, an additional factor that favored the Texas system over a fenced ranching 
operation. There were some clever methods by which ranchers acquired grazing land for a short 
period of time. Under the Desert Land Act of 1877 “farmers” were permitted to buy up to 640 
acres of land for $1.25 an acre provided they actively engaged in irrigation. The law was noble in 
its intention but was easily abused. Ranchers would buy the land and then make a token 
irrigation effort while grazing their cattle. When the three year period was up they would return 
the land to the government having grazed it nearly for free.49 The lack of ownership would 
become problematic during the 1880s when, as Granville Stuart wrote, “…the ranges were free 
to all, and no man could say, with authority, when a range was overstocked.”50 
The success of ranching and the decline of mining caused a glut of cattle and a depressed 
price during the 1870s. This pushed cattle raisers to seek new markets. For example, in 1868 
Montana cattle were used to fill a Union Pacific contract in Wyoming and by the early 1870s 
could be found in all over that state. At the same time other cattlemen and the Baker and Power 
firms, were looking to Canada and North Dakota for markets. John McDougall trailed cattle 
north into Canada in the 1870s and numerous ranchers sold meat to miners in the Black Hills. 51 
The long cattle drives were part of the pattern of stock raising at the time. The isolation from the 
agricultural frontier had the benefit of free grass and, according to boosters, ample water and an 
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50 Malone, Montana, 124. 
51 Malone, Montana, 110. 
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amiable climate but it was still relatively isolated. The cattle-drive, therefore, was a necessary 
aspect of the free range industry.  
While the drive was necessary it was also subjected to depredation by Indigenous people 
who had called the plains home for generations. The Blackfoot, Crow, Sioux, Gros Venture and 
Assiniboine were the most numerous groups. Through the use of treaties prior to 1871 and then 
by executive order, the federal policy regarding Indigenous people in Montana was to whittle 
down their land, an ongoing process that benefitted ranchers. A series of treaties, agreements 
(often broken) and atrocities from 1850 to the 1870s ended with the majority of Montana 
Indigenous people being confined to reservations.52 In 1871 the Flat Head, who were living in 
the Bitteroot Valley, were removed to the Jocko Agency at the urging of Governor Benjamin 
Potts. The most beneficial development for Montana ranchers was, in 1873-1874, the Crow were 
moved from the Yellowstone to the Judith Basin opening up vast grasslands in northern 
Montana.53 The writing was on the wall for the Indigenous people of northern Montana; their 
lands were going to continue to shrink in order to make room for White settlers and cattle. 
Governor Potts’ attitude toward the Indigenous population in Montana was typical for the time. 
His administration worked to open land occupied by Indigenous people to White settlers, 
especially ranchers.    
At the end of the 1870s beef prices were, once again, on the upswing further reinforcing 
booster representations of the grasslands, water, climate and opportunities inherent in cattle 
ranching. A further enticement for cattle ranching in Montana was that a large investment was 
not necessary, a significant difference than in Alberta. Under the Homestead Act of 1862 a man 
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could easily acquire 160 acres, which was enough to form the heart of a ranch. From there, as 
long as the rancher was not overburdened by scruples, public land could be grazed and water 
access fenced, for free. However, in the absence of land ownership and governance Montana 
ranchers were forced to come to an understanding of how land was going to be used. The system 
was the “law of customary range” which was codified in 1877. Essentially, the system 
established a priority right to public property; that right was then published in local newspapers. 
For example, after customary range was claimed it was misdemeanor for competitors to drive 
that stock away. Ranchers who broke these rules were ostracized both socially and 
economically.54 While this arrangement for the use of public land sounds civilized it was often 
problematic. When a dispute about range rights arose, civil courts were the only legal recourse 
available to enforce a rancher’s right to their pasture. Long delays in the legal process led to 
numerous incidents of vigilantism.    
Both the Power and Baker firms had grown rich in their relationship with the cattle 
industry. Within the cattle industry investment in other parts of the west, like Texas, were 
significant.55 With respect to the weather, 1880-1882 were relatively mild allowing cattle to 
come through the winter without requiring winter feed.56 In combination these factors reinforced 
the veracity of booster representations of the northern plains and led newcomers to 
wholeheartedly believe in them. The often referred to “Classical Period” of cattle ranching where 
the cattleman had almost uncontested control over the plains came relatively late to Montana. 
The main reasons were Montana’s geographic isolation and overall slow growth. However, when 
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the environmental and economic representations were subsumed by “boosters” ranchers, locally 
and from out of the Territory, bought into the grasslands as a viable location to raise thousands of 
cattle.      
In 1882, on the cusp of the cattle boom in Montana and Alberta, the Cincinnati Gazette 
wrote “In the region traversed by the Northern Pacific lie boundless, gateless and fenceless 
pastures of public domain, where cattle can be grown and fattened with little operating expense 
save that of a few cowboys, some corrals and a branding iron. There a poor man can grow rich 
while a rich man can double or treble his capital.”57 The great range boom for the 
Montana/Alberta borderlands mounted through the 1880s. The fact that the two locations had 
vastly different methods of land ownership did not mean that land-use was different. The 
grasslands of both Alberta and Montana were subject to the same booster representations and, as 
a consequence, ranchers on both sides of the border fundamentally misunderstood their 
environment.  The boom, therefore, was predicated on booster representations of the grasslands 
and facilitated by a pre-existing regional economy that allowed for the rapid importation of cattle 
into Alberta from Montana.
                                                            
57 Cincinnati Gazette, March 2, 1882. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/   
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Chapter Four: Ranching in a Misunderstood Alberta Environment 
 Broadly speaking, settling the west in Canada was tied to the goal of creating a cross-
continental nation. A west settled through immigration, from within Canada and abroad, was 
bipartisan as the result would provide natural products and a market for finished goods. During 
the 1870s the Macdonald government sent surveyors west to parcel up the land into townships, 
sections and quarter sections. The Dominion Land Act of 1872 allowed for men, aged 21 or older 
to apply for a homestead of 160 acres after they had paid a $10 registration fee.1 The basis of this 
system was that the west was to become prime agricultural land capable of supporting towns and 
cities that were sure to follow on the heels of the plow. However, the problem was that the 
climate of southern Alberta was considered too arid and therefore not suitable for a large 
agricultural base. The result was that ranching would come to dominate in southern Alberta.   
 The Walrond Ranch and Cochrane Ranch, two of the three case studies used here, were 
two of what David Breen called the “venerable giants” of the early cattle industry in Canada.2 
The Walrond was named for its principal backer Sir John Walrond Walrond, who owned large 
estates in the county of Devon, England. In a similar vein, the Cochrane Ranche was named after 
Senator Matthew Cochrane, who was a close friend of Sir John Pope, the Minister of 
Agriculture. What made these operations “giants” was their total acreage. Through clever leasing 
these ranches far exceeded the 100,000 acre limit imposed by the Dominion government. This 
meant in Alberta by 1884, two-thirds of all stocked land was controlled by ten companies and 
nearly 50 per cent was in the control of just four.3 While it would seem as though there was no 
room for smaller operations during the early 1880s Alfred Cross started his A7 ranch in 1885. 
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The A7, unlike the “venerable giants”, operated on a few thousand acres and was financed with 
Canadian money.   
 Ranching was present in southern Alberta during the early 1870s but it was not until after 
1877 that retired NWMP officers and the Baker and Power firms started to bring in large 
numbers of stock. Two years later the British government enacted an embargo on American 
cattle making ranching in Alberta economically viable, even without a railway. In 1881, the 
Canadian government amended the Dominion Land Act allowing the purchase of large ranches, 
like the Cochrane and Walrond, and made access for homesteaders increasingly difficult. Not 
surprisingly, the 1880s saw a boom in ranches on the Alberta prairies. Conservative Senator 
Matthew Cochrane, Duncan McEachran (with Sir Walrond) and Alfred Cross established 
ranches on the open plains of Alberta using a land-lease system that was unique in North 
America. What was not unique, however, was the type of booster representations describing the 
environment. This type of information was commonly applied to the entire Great Plains, from 
Alberta to Texas. As a consequence, the argument that “Their founders’ single intention was to 
reap the rewards of a bountiful frontier environment quickly and with as little effort as possible; 
and few of them understood the challenges that lay ahead” falls slightly short.4 The ubiquity of 
booster representations allowed for a fundamental misunderstanding of the environment, which 
led to the importation of inadequate ranching methods. 
 
 
                                                            
4 Elofson, Somebody Else’s Money. 2.  
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Figure 2: The leases for the Cochrane, Walrond and A7 Ranches. The map illustrates the distance cattle were "trailed" from 
Montana. 
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The Cochrane Ranche Company 
 By 1882, Senator Matthew Cochrane owned one of the largest cattle operations in 
western Canada and was instrumental in the development of the early cattle industry in Alberta. 
In a letter to John A. Macdonald, Cochrane outlined his plans: 
I have for some time past been making arrangements to establish a Stock Farm in the 
North West; with the view of affording emigrants settling in that part of the Dominion an 
opportunity of stocking their farms with improved breeds of cattle and horses, and also in 
the belief that a large foreign trade can be developed in the export of stock from the 
Canadian North West. At the present time settlers going into the new Territory are 
compelled either to transport their stock from Ontario, at an expense usually in excess of 
their means, or they are forced to purchase inferior animals at high prices from the United 
States. 5 
This quotation touches on two important points for the history of cattle-raising in Alberta. First, 
it illustrates the political and economic logic behind deviating from the eastern Canadian model 
of land use. In eastern Canada stock raising was done in conjunction with other farming 
practices. This is important for the environmental history of the Great Plains because large scale 
ranching was common in Southern Alberta. Furthermore, using land in this way requires 
extensive experience and knowledge of the interrelationship between climate, grass, animals and 
water which was not available at the time. Cochrane illustrates his experience raising cattle in the 
same letter when, after outlining his plan to purchase bulls from England, he also requires 
enough land beyond his lease to build “a farm on which to erect the necessary buildings for a 
certain amount of winter protection and forage—as I deem it prudent in testing what is largely an 
experiment to be provided with both food and stabling in case of an usually severe winter.”6 This 
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concern would become prophetic during the winter of 1883. His remark on American cattle 
being expensive and inferior alludes to the proposed changes provided to leaseholders where 
they could import cattle duty free.  
In March of 1882 the shipping of cattle duty-free was instituted as an exclusive right to 
leaseholders. Given the close relationship between the emerging Canadian cattle industry and the 
Canadian government this is hardly surprising. However, the tax exempt status for lease-holders 
also reinforced the positive perception of the environment from both ranchers and the 
government and the desire for the North-West grasslands to be repopulated with cattle as quickly 
as possible. The improved atmosphere for investment is clearly indicated in the lease agreement 
for Cochrane which stated “Cattle, Horses and other stock purchased…irrespective of age or sex 
to be limited during the present and following year, (1881 and 1882) free of duty if for the 
purpose of stocking said leased range. Farm implements, waggons [sic], Harness, Saddlery, 
Tents required for ranching business to be admitted duty free.”7 The terms of this lease, and the 
lease legislation in and of itself, indicate a strong desire from the Canadian government to 
establish a ranching presence in the Northwest. Furthermore, the tax exemption from cattle and 
farm implements underlines the regional economy engendered during the 1870s. The Power and 
Baker firms would be called upon to supply cattle, horses and general ranching supplies to many 
Alberta operations including the Cochane and Walrond. 
The range had to be filled with animals that were well suited for export to Britain. 
However, due to booster representations of the environment, what ranchers did not consider 
(why would they?) was if the animals were suited to the climate, grasses and water of the north-
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western plains. Imported cattle that were not well adapted to Alberta was a problem evident 
during the first drive of cattle to the Cochrane range, and in winter of 1883. In April, 1881 the 
Montreal Gazette wrote that the Dominion Line steamship had arrived in Canada carrying the 
largest shipment of purebred cattle ever. The shipment was comprised of Angus, Hereford and 
Shorthorn bulls all of which were destined for the Cochrane Ranche.8 The purchase of purebred 
cattle from England, as opposed to the United States, was likely for two reasons. First, Cochrane 
intended on selling to the international market and English consumers wanted English cattle. 
Second, within two years a quarantine on American breeding stock was put in place to protect 
from pleuro-pneumonia. By bringing cattle in Cochrane was ensuring that his export animals 
were suitable for England.   
Cochrane’s connections in Ottawa allowed him to negotiate for the best land available. In 
a letter to the Deputy Minister of the Interior he wrote: 
…I may, after personal inspection, decide to locate in quite a different part from that 
which you have assigned to me even approximately, and before I go into the country I 
want authority to select where I choose, irrespective of any applications made by others, 
provided I take it in a block.9 
The day after sending this letter Cochrane began his journey to the territories. He travelled first 
to Montreal and then to Montana by train. This was the same route that brought Canadian goods 
to Power and Baker.10 Cochrane arrived in Ft. Benton, Montana where he bought a buckboard 
and rode north into Canada’s fescue grasslands. For his home range he chose an area 20km west 
of Calgary, near to where the modern town of Cochrane stands today. Veterinarian and Canadian 
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Quarantine Inspector Duncan McEachran, an investor in the Cochrane Ranche, described the 
range to a Montreal newspaper like this 
The land is rolling, consisting of numerous grassy hills, plateau and bottom lands, 
intersecting here and there by streams of considerable size issuing from never-failing 
springs. The water is cool and clear…The site selected for the ranch building is a 
beautiful one, a level plateau covered with rich pasture, on the north bank of the Bow 
River, about forty feet above the level of the water…in a few years, probably, it will be 
fenced in and divided into beautiful fields with sheds and corrals necessary for the 
segregation of the different breeds of the male and female animals and otherwise assume 
the features of civilization.11   
This description reinforces how the north-western plains were populated with cattle, the positive 
representations of the land and the idea that cattle ranching and civilization were inextricably 
connected. Ironically enough, the ranching infrastructure described by McEachran was not built 
until several environmental disasters had made it absolutely necessary. This description was not 
for a government official, but for mass consumption. The message was clear, for the cattle 
business the west was ideal.   
The Cochrane range, with some additional land purchased later, would require both 
extensive and capital intensive improvements before Cochrane’s vision of a large cattle operation 
could emerge. In a letter to the department of the Interior in July, 1881 he wrote,  
I shall commence by placing on the range during the coming summer - a heard of say 
8,000 breeding cows – together with say 300 to 400 thoroughbred bulls – it is also 
intended to conduct the breeding of Horse and Sheep on our extensive scale, the object of 
breeding the best of the different classes of stock being kept steadily in view – the 
enclosing of large areas of ground with proper fencing will therefore be immediately 
required – the investment in the project will amount to about $500,000 within two 
years.12         
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Ultimately, with a combination of lease and purchased land Cochrane acquired 109,000 acres 
along the Bow River, a parcel stretching from Calgary to the Rocky Mountains. Furthermore, 
Cochrane had ensured that he was surrounded by sympathetic neighbors and family whose land 
would be available should he require additional grass. On the northeast boundary of the 
Cochrane lease was Senator A.W. Ogilvie, a flour-milling tycoon and business acquaintance of 
Cochrane’s, who leased 34,000 acres. Also, Edward A. Baynes, Ogilvie’s son-in-law, who leased 
50,000 adjoining acres13 All total, Cochrane had over 300,000 acres of grassland under his 
“control” for what he called “the successful inauguration of improved stock breeding on an 
extensive scale in the Territories.”14  
 The inaugural herd purchased by Cochrane in Montana to begin “improved stock-raising 
on an extensive scale” numbered about 7,000. The cost was disappointing to James Walker, the 
man in charge of purchasing cattle, as he was negotiating during an upswing in the American 
cattle boom. Walker acquired a large herd from four different sources in Montana and Idaho at 
16$ a head.15 The herd was delivered to representatives of the I.G. Baker Company at the border. 
From the border Cochrane had contracted the Baker firm to deliver the herd to his lands west of 
Calgary. For logistical purposes the herd was divided into two groups, one consisting of steers 
and the other of cows and calves. From the perspective of Cochrane and other large ranchers one 
of the early strengths of the Alberta cattle industry was its access to a borderlands regional 
economy. From Fort Benton ranchers could buy cattle, ranching supplies, and farming 
implements all of which were delivered to their lease. However, the rapidity with which 
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Canadian ranches were stocked was also detrimental. Starting a ranch with 7,000 cattle would 
have been difficult even if Alberta ranchers had accurate environmental information. The fact 
that they were only provided with misleading, although believable, booster representations made 
the forthcoming disasters all the more likely.   
In the months after the import duty was lifted the number of cattle purchased and 
imported skyrocketed to 23,103. The largest single purchase of 6634 cattle was made by the 
Cochrane Ranche Co. in April, 1882.16 The large single purchase by Cochrane was followed by 
additional purchases of 500 cattle in November and 2,400 on March 24, 1883 and 3732 on 
March 30, 1883.17 Within a few years the Cochrane Ranch had imported 14,648 head of cattle. 
While that number seems high, part of the legislation allowing for large leases stipulated that one 
head of cattle was required for every 10 acres. Considering that Cochrane was personally in 
control of 109,000 acres he was almost exactly within the confines of the legislation. The 
purpose of setting the limit on the number of cattle per acre was to prevent overstocking. 
However, most cattlemen, especially the larger operations, did not want to lose their lease and 
stocked the absolute maximum. Considering that environmental information at the time was 
inherently flawed, having the maximum number of cattle became problematic. The number of 
cattle and the size of Cochrane’s range would prove to be a hindrance during several years of 
hard winters, drought and prairie fires. However, from his perspective, within a decade 
Government reports and legislation encouraging the large scale importation of cattle had proved 
successful. 
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Senator Matthew Cochrane represents one facet of how Southern Alberta was filled with 
cattle. Cochrane’s political allegiances allowed him to claim 100,000 acres of the best lands 
available. He was also able to use family and business connections to control an additional 
200,000 acres. Through his and other rancher’s efforts it is also probable that the duties imposed 
on animals and ranching equipment were suspended, at least for a time. Cochrane was a well-
connected rancher who saw the grasslands as a business venture. He was a rancher who gave the 
Canadian plains its British feel in character and politics and one who was both willing and able 
to put 14,648 cattle, not to mention horses and sheep, onto the grasslands.   
Alfred Cross and the A7 Ranch  
Cochrane, however, was not the only type of rancher to see a future in the on the 
Southern Alberta grasslands. On November 12, 1883 a young Alfred Earnest Cross, after 
attending Bryant and Stratton Business College in Montreal and agricultural college in Guelph, 
wrote a term paper titled “Canadian Export of Beef with Special Reference to Veterinary 
Science.” The exam was part of the requirements for his veterinary science degree. Among his 
instructors was Dr. Duncan McEachran, the man responsible for improving Canadian shipping of 
live cattle and one of the investors in the Cochrane Ranch Cattle Company and later the Walrond 
Ranch. In his introduction Cross wrote  
…gentlemen the study which I bring before you tonight embraces such a large field, that 
it gives ample room for anyone who knows anything at all about it, to express their ideas.  
It is a very important one not only to the agriculturalist veterinarian, shipper but to the 
country in general as it brings a large revenue. It has developed into a large trade as I will 
presently show to you and the cattle have made no small name for themselves in the 
British market 
I have divided the subject up into the following headings— 
1. Trade, how it has increased so rapidly and to such an extent 
2. Climate and soil adapted to raising cattle 
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3. History of prominent breeds and ones best adapted 
4. Most profitable way of feeding and raising 
5. Most important diseases their precautions and treatment18  
 
Considering how Cross divided the subject it would seem that he was well-versed in eastern 
stock raising, especially with respect to the recent spread of disease in European live-stock and 
subsequent cull in both British and German cattle. Furthermore, it is probable that Cross was 
familiar with western ranching because information on the west was readily available in 
Montreal. Cross, as noted by historian Henry Klassen, had read about western ranching as a boy 
and so he believed that southwestern Alberta was an ideal bioregion for an emerging cattle 
industry. For Cross, the representations of the environment were of a moderate climate and 
abundant grasses. Furthermore, the area generally was virtually free of frontier violence and was 
situated to benefit from the Canada Pacific Railway and the borderlands economic region.19  
Cross, like Cochrane, saw a great deal of possibility in the open grasslands of the territories. The 
live cattle trade had increased exponentially over the previous years and there was no reason to 
believe that it would abate any time soon. On a voyage to Montreal from England, Cross rode 
with a man who had done a trial run of live cattle. In his 1883 term paper he recalled that man’s 
trip was successful and that he “has realized a handsome profit on his new enterprise.”20 From 
this anecdote Cross segued into the numbers for each year leading up to 1883 to illustrate that his 
idea for ranching in the territories (near Calgary) was economically feasible. The increases in 
shipping, as noted by Cross, were: 1877 – 6,940 cattle; 1878 – 18,655 cattle; 1879 – 25,009 
                                                            
18 Alfred Cross Exam, 1883, Cross Family Fonds 1836-1987, M339. 
19 Henry Klassen, “Entrepreneurship in the Canadian West: The Enterprises of A.E. Cross, 1886-1920,” The Western 
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cattle; 1880 – 50,905 cattle; 1881 – 45,535 cattle; 1882 – 35,735 cattle.21 While Cross was citing 
numbers of cattle being shipped to England there was no reason for him to think that cattle raised 
in Alberta could not also be exported.  
Cross explained that the decrease from 1880-1882 was caused by the successes of the 
previous years. He suggests that because the market was strong shippers bought all available 
cattle and suitable replacement cattle, ones that were “up to the standard of roast beef which the 
English stomach seems to yearn for”, required time to put on weight.22 A required weight, for 
both consumers and sellers, meant that the cattle business in the territories could bring animals 
around to the standard expected by British consumers in three years and that the cattle industry 
“of British America which will develop into one of the most important industries of Canada if 
not the Greatest.”23 Despite the small scale of Cross’s Alberta ranch, based on his primary 
documents he was as enthusiastic as any booster. 
The second section of Cross’s exam, “Climate and Soil adapted to raising cattle”, is, 
tellingly, the shortest and is lacking in critical analysis. This uninformative section indicates the 
lack of accurate information available at this time. Perhaps more importantly, it underlined the 
type of booster representations available.  He was satisfied to state that:   
Climate; it cannot be surpassed for its healthy and invigorating qualities and freedom 
from disease. The summer cattle are allowed to graze on the most luxurial [sic] pasture 
well supplied with pure water, large areas to run over where they can obtain the great 
varieties of herbs necessary for health and growing muscles and laying on fat. The winter 
season is somewhat a bully as I have heard Americans say but this does not prevent the 
animals from thriving as they are closed in comfortable houses where proper temperature 
is maintained.24 
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Time would prove Cross’ assessment incorrect. However, for the purpose of this discussion it is 
important to note that Cross was echoing both the government and media’s representations of 
inexhaustible land and tremendous profits. For example, an exchange in the Breeders Gazette in 
1883 reported that,  
a good sized steer when it is fit for the butcher market will bring from $45 to $60. The 
same animal at its birth was worth about $5.00. He has run on the plains and cropped the 
grass from the public domain for four or five years, and now, with scarcely any expense 
to his owner, is worth $40 more than when he started his pilgrimage. A thousand of these 
animals are kept nearly as cheaply as a single one, so with a thousand as a starter and 
with an investment of but $5,000 in the start, in four years the stock raiser has made from 
$40,000 to $45,000.25  
Cross had bought into the representations that the west was a land of limitless ranching potential 
that required cattle, land and little else. In William Cronon’s work on booster representations for 
Chicago he emphasized that a key to boosterism was the guarantee of large profits requiring very 
little effort.26 The Alberta cattle industry was certainly following that trend. 
 Before ever setting foot on a train heading west to the territories, let alone having seen a 
single blade of prairie grass, Cross argued that 
In my opinion the most profitable way of raising beef is on the western prairies of the 
U.S. and Canada. In raising and feeding on the prairies there is no long winter to house 
cattle and feed them inside with very great expense, cattle on the plains live out all winter 
and in the majority of the cases seldom seen all winter but have to forage for themselves 
on the dried prairie grass, which gets cured about the end of July27    
 
With respect to his exam, Cross no longer seems concerned that cattle needed to be housed 
during the winter, indicating that he had further bought into the booster message. Furthermore, 
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this quotation indicates Cross’ intention of using the Texas system for managing cattle, a method 
of ranching that would prove entirely inappropriate for the Alberta grasslands. However, based 
on booster representations of the climate and grasslands Cross, along with most other ranchers, 
believed it was suitable. In 1884, just one year after writing his veterinary exam, Cross was 
working on the Cochrane ranch as its assistant manager, bookkeeper, and veterinary surgeon. 
These positions were given to him by his former instructor Dr. Duncan McEachran.  
 For Cross, working on a ranch was a logical first step, but would hardly satisfy the 
entrepreneurial drive evident in his writing. By 1885 Cross, staying true to his plans, was 
venturing north of the Cochrane range looking for a lease of his own. In an 1885 letter to his 
father Cross wrote “I returned last Tuesday from a trip of eight days top of the country north of 
here, to see what sort of a ranching country it would make...”28 In the same lengthy letter Cross 
suggested to his father that he intended to start up his own operation using either polled Angus or 
shorthorn cattle. Cross was enough of a business man to mention to his father “I trust you will 
not mention anything of this plan of mine outside the family, or as anyone’s opinions that would 
likely mention the matter to any of the directors of this company as I expect they would not like 
me leaving or taking up a ranch up this creek…”29 In 1886, following on the heels of that letter, 
Alfred Cross was able to convince his brothers to leave Montreal and join a family-owned 
livestock business. 
 The brothers formed the Cross Bros. firm and established a herd of 428 shorthorn cattle, 
the breed that Alfred Cross referred to as “the most noble breed…which in my opinion stands at 
the top of the tree” on a range at the headwaters of Mosquito Creek, roughly fifty miles from the 
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city of Calgary. 30 The 160 acres near Mosquito Creek served as a homestead and headquarters of 
the firm while the bulk of the range set aside for cattle was located on 22,000 acres, leased at two 
cents an acre, near the Little Bow River.31 In a letter to his father written a year previously Cross 
identified this area as having “…the most luxurial [sic] grass, 800 to 1,000 tons of hay can be cut 
without moving the mower off the place”32 so it is not surprising that he chose to set up his 
operation in this area. The cattle to acres ratio for Cross was well within the limits recognized by 
the Canadian government to prevent overstocking. In fact, he was close to having too few in 
order to maintain his lease. From that perspective Cross should have been advantageously 
positioned to thrive, yet, as will be seen, he struggled with the same environmental problems as 
larger operations.  
The Walrond Ranche  
 The Walrond Ranch, much like the Cochrane, was the product of several years of 
political maneuvering coupled with environmental and economic boosterism. The legislation that 
resulted favored large ranchers over small farmers. Dr. Duncan McEachran, who was the 
Walrond vice president and managing director, got his start on the Cochrane Ranch in 1881. 
During the winter of 1882 McEachran was in contact with members of the Walrond family and 
convinced them of Alberta ranching’s economic potential. Warren Elofson describes McEachran 
as the “fantasy weaver” whose faith in the venture was both unrealistic and unchecked.33 
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However, it was not until after the winter of 1883 that he moved from the Cochrane with the 
intention of starting the Walrond.34  
The land that McEachran selected for the Walrond was some of the best in Alberta along 
the foothills of the Rocky Mountains. The lease itself consisted of two large blocks west and 
northwest of Fort Macleod.35 The first Order in Council from February 20, 1883 described the 
Walrond grazing property as “The west halves of Townships Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen in 
Range Three, and town Townships Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen in Range Four, all west of the 
Fifth Meridian, containing one hundred thousand acres more or less.”36 A second application 
awarded “Those portions north of the north fork of Old Man River of Townships numbers Ten in 
Ranges One, Two and Three, Townships numbered Eleven in Ranges Tow and Three, all west of 
the Fifth Principal Meridian, containing on hundred thousand acres more or less.”37 A final Order 
in Council was filed asking for adjacent lands, which was accepted on October 10, 1883.38  
When all the land was accounted for the total acreage acquired was, at 260,000, significant. Like 
many large ranches in the Canadian and American Great Plains the Walrond was heavily 
financed with British capital totaling $500,000.39 At the onset the ranch was backed by seven 
investors who each owned one share worth $12,500. Importantly, because the Walrond had 
numerous investors they were able to obtain more than the 100,000 acre maximum. This was 
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done by having several Walrond family members and others secure leases. Historian Warren 
Elofson described the investors as British gentlemen who wanted to increase their prestige 
though large landholding in the New World.40 It was the significant changes to the Dominion 
Land Act in 1881 that allowed for this. In May, 1883 the Walrond agreement was drawn-up and 
the ranch was registered. 
 Sir John Walrond thought that having Duncan McEachran as managing director was a 
shrewd decision, and on the surface it was. McEachran, even before working with Matthew 
Cochrane, was a renowned livestock expert. He was also well-connected politically and within 
the Montana/Alberta regional economy from his years on the Cochrane Ranch. However, as the 
Walrond built up its stock it began to run into problems. The problems were based on 
McEachran’s misunderstanding of the environment. Compounding these problems McEachran 
was slow to temper his optimism for large scale cattle ranching in Alberta to something more 
realistic. The first agreement between McEachran and the Walrond stipulated that he accept 
shares that were fully paid instead of a salary. The shares were worth £500 and were awarded to 
him at regular intervals, between 1883 and 1887. While it may seem like exchanging shares for 
salary was risky should the ranch prosper, as everyone involved believed it would, McEachran 
was entitled to dividends based on his shares. This prospect of earning dividends was enticing to 
McEachran. For other investors it was advantageous as well because it tied their manager’s 
financial well-being to the success of the operation.41 In Elofson’s work McEachran’s 
misunderstanding of the environment is less important than his desire to post strong dividends.42 
While McEachran’s financial interest was clear, many of the problems encountered by the 
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Walrond ranch were similar to other ranchers in the area indicating there was a widespread 
misperception of the Alberta environment.  McEachran was an unabashed optimist and booster 
for both the west and the cattle industry itself. When McEachran’s optimism was coupled with 
booster representations regarding ranching’s suitability to the environment generally, numerous 
environmental problems emerged.      
 The first major purchase of stock for the Walrond came in 1883 when McEachran 
traveled to Montana to purchase the Judith Cattle Company’s herd from T.C. Power. The sale 
was noted in the Benton Weekly Record, The River Press, and the Semi-Weekly Miner published 
in Butte. The Benton Weekly Record noted that “the present purchase will give them about 5,000 
head, counting calves…We understand that they have twenty-one Hereford bulls on the Helena 
coming up the river, and thirty high-grade Short-horn bulls have been purchased from Con Kohrs 
in addition to the bulls now in the herd…The drive is expected to start from Warm Spring ranche 
…and will be driven slowly so as to reach the ranche in as good condition as possible and before 
winter sets in.”43  With respect to the Montana/Alberta regional economy the article also noted 
that “It is evident that the grazing lands of the Dominion will soon be stocked with the best blood 
of Montana, improved by pure bred bulls from Scotland and England, and we predict a great 
fortune for cattle raising in that rich pasture land from the boundary line to Morleville.”44 
Ultimately, the herd only totaled 3,125 because in the Judith herd there were not 5,000 suitable 
cattle. In this sense, suitable meant young enough that they would not be sold in fewer than two 
years. Any older stock were subject to an import tax.45 Nevertheless, the first cattle purchase, and 
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several subsequent ones, indicate that McEachran’s optimism for the carrying capacity of his 
range was high.  
Alfred Cross, Duncan McEachran and Matthew Cochrane moved west with a 
fundamentally flawed understanding of the north-western plains.  The environment in Southern 
Alberta during this crucial decade was, and still is, variable with respect to rainfall and 
temperature. Trends in climate are often masked by short term weather events, which are part of 
the natural climate process. However, where weather records are rare, like in the Canadian west 
between the 1840s and 1890s, variability in weather can influence perception of climate. The 
confusion between weather and climate where records were lacking proved to be beneficial for 
politicians who were encouraging western expansion.  The disadvantage indicated by Cross’s 
discussion of climate was that ranchers were moving into a region with very little useable 
information.   
Montana 
 The often referred to “Classical Period” of cattle ranching, where the cattleman had 
almost uncontested control over the plains, began during the 1870s in Montana. The main 
reasons for Montana’s relatively late start for cattle ranching compared to neighboring territories 
were its isolation and overall slow growth. However, in the 1870s representations for Montana 
grasslands, water, economic stability and climate were taken up by “boosters.” Ranchers, both 
locally and from out of the Territory, bought into the grasslands as a viable location to raise 
thousands of cattle.  
 Prior to the 1870s cattle were brought to Montana as a food source for emigrants heading 
west, or fur traders living in the Territory. Richard Grant, a former fur trader, and his son John 
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Grant built their herd during the early 1860s by trading emigrants for their footsore cattle. Those 
cattle were then fattened up on grass and re-sold the following year to the next wave of migrants. 
Cattle ranching in Montana could have stayed a cottage industry if not for several well 
publicized gold strikes. It was the influx of gold seekers that expanded the market for beef and 
enterprising locals and newcomers seized the opportunity to make their fortune. For example, 
Missourian D.A.G. Floweree, after a short career running a gambling den, was buying cattle 
from his home state, Oregon and Texas. By the 1870s Floweree was located on the Sun River 
along with Conrad Kohrs and Granville Stuart. In the earliest years for Montana stock raising the 
markets for cattle were almost exclusively local. The markets were often mining camps, military 
garrisons or other places where there were enough people in need of protein. Prior to the arrival 
of the railroad the Baker and Power firms were instrumental in growing the beef industry locally. 
When cattlemen wanted to move their animals east or south, long drives to far-off railheads in 
Utah or Wyoming were a necessity. However, long drives were risky due to raids by Indigenous 
people. Through various actions, both political and military, the Indigenous population was 
confined to reservations allowing ranchers access to the grass.46 The lower quality land north of 
the Marias and the Missouri rivers and south of the Yellowstone River was set aside for the 
Indigenous population. Ranchers, like Conrad Kohrs and Granville Stuart, moved their herds into 
the excellent pastures along the Sun, Marias, and Smith rivers.  The 1860s and 1870s were the 
beginning of a major transition for ranching in Montana. A geographic shift had taken place 
where herds that once grazed in the far south of the Territory were being brought north as the 
Indigenous population was being forced to retreat.47      
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Conrad Kohrs Starts His Ranch 
Conrad Kohrs, who would become the “Cattle King of Montana”, did not move to the 
Territory with the intention to ranch. Like so many others he came believing in the booster 
promise of easy wealth through mining. However, he quickly came to the conclusion that more 
money could be had from selling meat to miners than pulling gold out of the gulches. In his 
journal Kohrs recorded his first impression of the Deer Lodge Valley writing “The valley was 
full of antelope and may herds of fat cattle belonging to the mountaineers who lived there.”48 
Considering the thriving wildlife, along with the ample supply of booster literature at the time, 
Kohrs change in vocation made sense. 
In 1862 Kohrs had a chance meeting in Bannack, Montana when the sheriff Hank 
Crawford hired him as his meat cutter and to manage the books for his meat-selling business. 
Crawford was impressed with Kohrs and soon made him a partner. However, within the year 
Crawford fled the city after running into some difficulty with Henry Plummer, a noted outlaw. 
The difficulties were described by the Montana Post in 1865 as a series of “…openly planned 
and persistent outrages…”49 Crawford, concerned for his life, fled Bannack and left his meat 
cutting and selling business to Kohrs.   
In 1864 Kohrs and Ben Peel formed a new business, Con and Peel. They were located on 
the main street of Virginia City where they sold steaks to miners, made candles from tallow, and 
ground the scraps into sausages. They gave the hides to miners to cover their dirt floors in a 
gesture of good will. The strike at Last Chance Gulch, according to the February 25 edition of 
the Montana Post, quelled “Whatever doubt may have lingered…concerning the future of 
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Montana…”50 The strike was a driving force for both boosters and emigrants. For Kohrs, it was 
an opportunity to expand his meat business. In 1864 he acquired 400 work cattle to supply 
butcher shops run by his brothers and started wintering cattle at Deer Lodge.51 In the spring of 
1865 cattle were becoming scarce due to the increase in population. Kohrs borrowed $12,000 in 
cash in order to purchase $85,000 worth of cattle. In his own words “In the spring of 65 I had all 
the beef in the country in my hands.”52  The significance of the early days Kohrs spent 
aggressively growing his business became more apparent as he reacted to environmental and 
market fluctuation during the 1880s. By owning his own beef business before becoming a 
rancher, Kohrs understood that having control over the source of beef in Montana was crucial to 
long term viability. In the years following 1886/1887 Kohrs was one of the few Montana 
ranchers to maintain full control over his cattle operation. By doing so he was able to adapt his 
operation in ways that were unavailable to ranchers who were beholden to stock commissioners 
in Chicago.    
The following year Kohrs aggressively grew his business properties, ranching acreage, 
and cattle numbers. The first purchase was the Johnny Grant ranch located near Deer Lodge City 
which he bought on August 23 “…lock, stock, and barrel.” Kohrs received the land and the 
cattle.  His purchase price was $19,200.”53 The next acquisition was the 160 acre Demers Ranch 
which, after the deed was signed, meant that Kohrs owned almost all of the cattle in the Deer 
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Lodge Valley. He also owned mining properties and was on the cusp of entering the business of 
selling water to miners and farmers through a series of ditches and storage facilities.54  
From the beginning Kohrs’ meat business was diverse as it included the raising, 
butchering and selling of beef. However, an additional revenue stream for Kohrs was water. In 
1867 Kohrs had secured water rights on the west side of Deer Lodge.  He and several partners 
formed the Rock Creek Ditch Company.55 During the 1860s mining in Montana had evolved to 
include hydraulics. Simply put, a jet of water was blasted at a hillside washing all the alluvial 
soil away exposing the minerals. The company began by digging a ditch to transport water to 
Lake Pioneer where miners needed it. The cost was significant at $165,000. Within months of 
completing the ditch the population of Lake Pioneer swelled to nearly 1,000 people and the ditch 
paid for itself in about two years. By 1870 Conrad Kohrs, unlike almost every other cattle 
rancher in the west, had diversified his business to the extent that should one business decline the 
others would provide overall stability. Even before Kohrs had become the “Cattle King of 
Montana” he had diversified and created the economic equivalent of, what historian Brian 
Donahue called, “an ecological safety net.”56  
Conrad Kohrs’ brother drove roughly 1,000 head of cattle north from Texas in 1871. This 
cattle drive was significant for how Kohrs would raise large numbers of animals in Montana. 
Most of Korhs’ stock was raised on the public domain and moving a large herd to a pasture was 
an effective method of making a claim. In later years, Kohrs would increase his herds 
exponentially and take advantage of free public land.  When either the environment, or the 
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market, or both were poor Kohrs acquired land, cattle, and ranching equipment at a depressed 
price from the operations that were not as well balanced as his.  
The DHS Ranch Opens  
In the spring of 1879 A.J. Davis, Samuel T. Hauser, and Granville Stuart joined the cattle 
boom in Montana. Collectively they were able to raise $150,000. Stuart borrowed his share from 
Hauser’s bank and Hauser borrowed his share from Davis’ brother.57 In 1880 all three principal 
investors of the DHS Ranch were named to the board of directors of the First National Bank of 
Helena.58  Granville Stuart was the least financially capable member of the group. However, his 
long years in Montana and experience with the environment made him the obvious choice for 
superintendent and general manager of the ranch. By April of the following year Stuart had 
purchased 9,400 head of cattle at the cost of $141,327.50 but the DHS was still without a home 
range.59  
The first possible location for a home range was the Teton area near present day Great 
Falls. The area had numerous advantages; however, Stuart objected for reasons that remain 
unclear. Their second thought was to scout out the Yellowstone area because, according to the 
Bozeman Avant Courier, “cattle are all reported to be in excellent condition”60 as of 1878. 
However, that range would have taken them into Wyoming and thereby beyond their sphere of 
political and economic influence.  The desire of the DHS Ranch to remain within the area where 
they had influence proved significant as they sought ways to grow their operation, increase the 
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influence of cattle ranching in Montana politics and improve their range after several severe 
winters.   
The location of the ranch was still a pressing question in 1880 when Stuart saw an 
opportunity to use the ranch’s political connections, namely Hauser, to secure both land and 
movement of cattle. Stuart wrote a letter to Martin Maginnis, his Territorial Delegate. A 
Territorial Delegate was a non-voting but elected position in Congress that represented a 
Territory, like Montana, during the 1880s. While Maginnis could not vote he was able to exert 
some influence on policy which suggests a significant political connection for Granville Stuart’s 
ranching interests.  Stuart wrote “…we want your influence directed towards securing two other 
things to wit: First. The right of way to drive cattle, horses, or trains of wagons across the [Crow] 
reservation and secondly take a slice of the eastern end of the reservation consisting of all that 
portion…east of the Big Horn River.”61 To Stuart’s mind the location of his home range and the 
right to drive cattle across the Crow reservation were now settled and he headed east from 
Helena. However, when the time came to actually leasing the land from the Crow the agent 
would not even bring it up for fear they would refuse to cede the upper end of their Reservation. 
As a consequence, Stuart was forced to return to the Flat Willow country near the Musselshell 
River where he came upon a “stream of cold clear water…a magnificent body of hay with cold 
springs all through it…The whole country clear to the Yellowstone is good grass country.”62 The 
range itself consisted of 800 acres which was secured with squatter’s rights. The size of the range 
at 800 acres was not sufficient for the 9,000 DHS cattle. Stuart’s likely intention was to use his 
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cattle to gain control over adjacent property using “the law of customary range.” By doing so he, 
like Kohrs, could access ample public land for free.   
By June the DHS cattle were being driven to their range and construction had begun in 
several strategic areas of the range. The reason this construction was strategic was it helped to 
establish the DHS’s range rights.  The movement of DHS cattle was significant enough that the 
Rocky Mountain Husbandman noted “Granville Stuart passed this week for his ranch near Fort 
Maginnis. A portion of his herds have already arrived on the range and the remainder are enroute 
[sic]. Three herds, numbering in all over 5,000 head passed Martinsdale this week. These herds 
were gathered in the Beaverhead valley.”63 The number of cattle reported far exceed the 9,000 
that the DHS actually owned. The exaggeration was likely a product of boosterism as there was 
no report of Stuart acquiring several thousand additional stock.  
The booster representations available made it seem as though the heavy lifting for 
running a ranch was completed when the lands had been secured. For example, in The Resources 
of Montana Territory and Attractions of Yellowstone National Park Robert A. Strahorn wrote 
“As a grazing region Montana has no superior, and I doubt if an equal. Her 38,000,000 acres of 
grazing land are covered with nutritious bunch, buffalo and other grasses, whose fattening and 
bone and muscle-producing qualities offer a theme for endless surprise.”64 In his section on 
Cattle Growing he wrote “In the “old west” and eastern states the stock grower is always obliged 
to work hard for six months of the year to raise food to keep his cattle through the severe wet 
winters, while here cattle are especially self-reliant, and if left to take care of themselves, winter 
and summer, will grow while their owner sleeps, and come off the range, even in the spring, in 
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good condition for market.” He then went on to note that  “The expense for caring for cattle in 
Montana, in herds of 1,000 or more, is about sixty cents per head per annum…The same animal 
in Illinois, be he scrub or thoroughbred, would cost his owner two-thirds of his selling price for 
feed alone.”65 Strahorn’s assessment of the Montana cattle industry was an excellent example of 
19th century boosterism that emphasized easy work leading to large profits. The problem was his 
description of wintering cattle was an endorsement of the Texas ranching system that was 
entirely inappropriate for Montana’s climate.    
For Granville Stuart, Conrad Kohrs, Matthew Cochrane, Duncan McEachran and Alfred 
Cross the ranching business would have seemed a fool-proof enterprise that was a sure thing. 
The reason was the booster material extolling the virtues of the climate, water, grasslands, and 
the industry. The booster material for cattle ranching was, however, inaccurate. Compounding 
the problem of environmental inaccuracy was the endorsement of ranching methods that were 
not suitable for either the Alberta or Montana climate.  The result of the inaccurate information 
was that all five ranches would, to varying degrees, import a flawed ranching system to the 
detriment of their operation. Ultimately, all five ranches were forced to adapt to a climate that 
was far different than the one described by boosters. The following chapter will examine how 
each of these ranches tackled the problems of a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
environment in a different way.
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Chapter 5: Cattle King(s) and Booster Grasslands in Montana 
In 1867, Conrad Kohrs owned one of the largest cattle herds in Montana and, along with 
his partner John Bielenberg, began branding his cattle with “CK”. The 1860s in Montana were 
relatively good to Kohrs. There were several consecutive mild winters, and he, along with 
Granville Stuart, were elected as Commissioners of Deer Lodge County1.  On the surface it 
would seem as though his path to “Cattle King” of Montana was established. However, business 
prospects were not as favorable as they seemed and these struggles influenced Kohrs to establish 
a ranching model that was diverse, focused on improvement, flexible, well capitalized and 
politically motivated.  As a result, his business would come out of the disastrous winter of 1886 
stable where many others lost millions. During the same period Granville Stuart, along with 
Samuel Hauser and Andrew and Erwin Davis, also entered the cattle business. While their ranch, 
the DHS, was successful it would not reach its true potential until it was absorbed under the 
“CK” brand. Stuart, as general manager, would be instrumental in shaping the ranching practices 
that would help make both brands viable after the winter of 1886/87. This chapter will look at 
how these ranches were set up parallel to each other using similar methods that allowed for 
adaptation to an environment that was not as amiable as booster literature had led investors to 
believe. 
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Figure 3: Control over public land was vital for Conrad Kohrs. It is hardly surprising that he would work within the Montana 
cattle industry and government to protect his "free grass." 
In 1866, during the second session of the Montana legislature, a law was passed which 
stipulated that winter grazing of cattle could not be done without title over the pasture.2 The law 
was repealed the following year but it was enough to justify a growing concern over access to 
public lands. For cattle ranchers in Montana access to public land was the backbone of their 
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ranching methods. A law that required title over winter pasture would dramatically increase costs 
and hamstring the industry. The legislation requiring title was likely responsible for pushing both 
Kohrs and Stuart into politics. In his autobiography Kohrs noted that “During these years (1865-
1869) the affairs of the county had been run…so poorly that the citizens decided to put up an 
independent ticket…In 1869 Granville Stuart and I were elected…”3 It should be noted that, 
despite what his Autobiography states, the Montana Legislature was not poorly run. From Kohrs’ 
perspective though, any legislation that would increase his costs, cut off his access to public land 
and make open range cattle ranching more difficult was certainly poor government. Despite 
Kohrs’ wealth, influence and uncanny ability to know good government from bad, Stuart was far 
more politically active. Their political activism reflected their industry as they championed, or 
wrote, legislation that directly benefitted stock raising in Montana. For example, evolving 
legislation starting in 1868 encouraged the importation of breeding stock, recording of brands, 
and how to handle strays.4 It is certain that for Kohrs laws that benefitted his industry were 
examples of a well-run legislature. 
In the fall of 1869 Kohrs moved roughly a thousand head of, mostly, breeding cattle from 
Deer Lodge to the Sun River area in Montana. According to Kohrs’ friend and foreman Tom 
Hooban, the herd had grown too large to winter in the Deer Lodge Valley without hay set aside 
for supplemental feeding.5 There was adequate land at Deer Lodge to grow winter feed for cattle, 
yet at this time Kohrs did not do so. The likely reason was that he was still confident that he 
could get all his cattle through the winter using public land. It also seems probable that he did not 
want to incur the expense of growing and harvesting hay for cattle feed when all information 
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available indicated that it was not necessary. Oddly enough, Kohrs was willing to risk “Indian 
raids” by grazing his cattle in the open country but not harvesting hay for feeding. Not setting 
aside winter feed for his cattle yet risking them in the open country indicate that, at the time, 
Kohrs was invested in the Texas system.   
The move to Sun River was a further example of how Kohrs utilized public land to fatten 
his cattle for markets inside and outside of the Territory. The move onto public lands, and the 
faith that he would not face any restrictive legislation, was reflective of emerging Montana 
politics. The previous governor, James T. Ashley, had just been removed from office amid a 
series of political issues. He was replaced with a Republican from Ohio, Benjamin Franklin 
Potts, who was a believer in Montana’s cattle industry. At a territorial fair Potts commented that 
“The cattle show I think surpassed our Ohio cattle shows, this appears almost incredible but is 
true.”6 Potts may have been playing at politics here; as incoming governor he was aware that 
cattle raisers were a political force and he may not have wanted to ruffle any feathers. He also 
would have been aware that the total value for stock in 1870 was nearly two million dollars and 
was a vital industry.7 For ranchers, having a Republican booster in their corner must have been 
reassuring after nearly having their winter range rights taken away in 1867.  
In 1870, according to Kohrs, the cattle business in Montana was not necessarily in his 
favor. In his autobiography he wrote that “Business prospects were not as favorable as they had 
been. Many cattle had been driven in from Texas as competition had become strong.”8 In this 
sense it is likely that Kohrs was not talking about the monetary aspects of cattle ranching but 
expressing his anxiety over losing access to public land. The number of cattle in Montana had 
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increased significantly but Texas cattle did not arrive in large numbers for another decade. For 
example, Kohrs noted that Dan Floweree had begun to graze his Texas herd on Sun River near 
the military reservation and Sam Hall and Warren Martin had placed their large herd on grass 
near the Missouri River. These, however, were not Texas cattle. Nevertheless, more and more 
cattle were being grazed in Montana making finding, and then controlling, unused pasture a 
concern. The census data during the 1870s underlines this significant increase in cattle and 
therefore decrease in pasture. The 1870 Montana census recorded 36,738 cattle and that number 
had increased to 140,000 by 1876.9 The only monetary concern Kohrs could have had was that 
by 1870 placer mining had significantly decreased. The lower gold yield drove miners, the most 
important market for Montana ranchers, to other parts of the country where mining was still 
profitable.  
While this scenario looked complicated for Kohrs, he was able to turn it to his advantage 
and increase his herd, a trait that would define his ability to adapt to both a changing marketplace 
and environment. In the fall of 1870 another rancher, H. Frederickson, was forced to sell off his 
land and herd. According to Kohrs the land was located at Modesty Creek and “I purchased the 
cattle, several hundred head of young cattle at $65.00 per head, and several fine mares, paying as 
high as $150.00 per head and also bought another herd near Point of Rock on the Beaver 
Head.”10 The cost of cattle at $65.00 a head was high in comparison to other years. Yet, Kohrs 
must have felt he could make a profit on the cattle.  Furthermore, the purchase of the 
Frederickson herd underlined Kohrs’ concern about access to public land. Even if the Kohrs lost 
some money on the cattle the increase in land would be beneficial to his operation in the long 
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run. The new acquisitions were sent to his brother who took them to Deer Lodge to join up with 
his existing herd. Later that fall the herd was cut in two and the animals that they did not want to 
feed over the winter were driven to Sun River to graze on free grass.11    
 As Kohrs expanded his stock and influence in Montana it is important to note that before 
the 1880s most of the cattle grazing in Montana were not Texas longhorns. The majority of the 
cattle were from Utah, where cattle ranching had diffused north from Mormon settlements. 
Another source for cattle was the Pacific Northwest where ranching had become vital for 
economics and food security during the 1840s. The common term for Utah and Pacific 
Northwest animals was “domestics” and they were somewhat more cold tolerant than their 
southern counterparts. However, they were also hard muscled and so crossing them with stock 
from the east, Durham or shorthorn for example, was important to selling their meat.12 The cross-
breeding of eastern stock with winter hardy stock was important to adapting ranching to the 
northern Great Plains and would be a common practice in both Montana and Canada. In the 
years following 1886/1887 Kohrs became one of the most celebrated cattle breeders in Montana.  
In 1871, Kohrs was in Denver where he formed a company to buy cattle in Texas and 
trail them to Montana. The formation of this company further emphasized that in the 1870s his 
concern was access to public land and not Texas cattle. In 1872 Kohrs was in Davenport, Iowa 
and while there he purchased his first herd of shorthorns to breed with his “domestic” animals. 
This purchase took advantage of the 1871 legislation encouraging the importation of breeding, or 
blooded, stock.  The herd was driven to Corrinne, Oklahoma and put into the hands of Tom 
Hooban who had recently left Sun River in order to manage the new herd. On a return trip 
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Hooban “…bought animals and machinery, such as mowing machines, rakes and wagons for the 
purpose of fitting up the ranch he had located on the west side of the Snake River below the 
mouth of Portnip River, and some distance above American Falls.”13 The area itself became 
known as Hooban’s Bottom and was, according to Kohrs’ autobiography, “a great place for 
hay.”14 The acquisition of both shorthorns and hay lands indicates that Kohrs was developing his 
sense of the environmental limitations of the Montana environment. His domestic stock were 
able to survive cold weather but eastern stock, coming from a warmer climate, were less well 
adapted. By having hay lands Kohrs was hedging his bets against putting new, less cold tolerant 
stock to fend for themselves on public land. While feeding cattle during the winter seems like a 
self-evident process the prevailing booster “wisdom” of the time suggested that it was 
unnecessary. For example, an 1869 issue of The New North-West, published in Kohrs’ home 
county Deer Lodge, reported “There are, as records show, no such extremes of temperature as 
are common in the New England and Middle States. When farmers are satisfied that instead of 
feeding cattle for six months on stores which it has cost the labor of the other six months to 
procure, they can use, in ordinary seasons, the bounteous provision which the God of Nature has 
made ready for use without labor…”15 This assertion dovetails well with the general perception 
of Montana climate. In an article from an 1869 edition of the Montana Post the climate was 
described as “…not anywhere in the United States as equal extent of surface to the settled 
portion of Montana, where there has been so mild, unchangeable and healthy weather this winter. 
Sunshine by day and glittering stars by night have become monotonous, and we hear of the 
snows and chilly blasts of the central states with a sympathetic shudder for the unfortunates of 
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that hyperborean climate.” 16  This small change in Kohrs’ ranching methods indicates that he 
was starting to shy away from the Texas system, at least with his eastern and other valuable 
stock.  
Kohrs was prepared to invest in both hay land and machinery. His desire to make these 
purchases was likely due to experience gained as a resident of Montana, which made him less 
reliant on the often inaccurate environmental descriptions published in local newspapers. How 
boosters represented the environment did not replace the wisdom gained through almost a decade 
of experience. For example, the Avant Courier noted that “The weather this past week has 
indicated an early winter…The valley is covered with snow, and snow has been falling more or 
less on the mountains every day of the week…The best ranges are already covered…”17 When 
Kohrs was discussing this early winter he noted that “On account of the lateness of the season 
the cattle had little show to improve and even with all the hay we had provided we sustained a 
loss because the winter brought a lot of snow.”18 While the 1871 winter was not disastrous to 
Kohrs or the industry generally it was a deviation from booster representations.  Experience with 
the environment is something that separated Kohrs (and Stuart of the DHS Ranch) from many of 
their contemporaries who arrived during the 1880s during the cattle boom.    
In the spring of 1873, Territorial politics were, again, playing an important role for 
Kohrs. As a consequence, he spent a great deal of time at the legislature in Virginia City. The 
question at hand was whether or not to subsidize the extension of the “Road” (narrow-gauge rail) 
from Utah into Montana at a cost of one million dollars and a charter of free taxation for a period 
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of 10 years.19 The measure was voted down, likely because of the east/west division within the 
Territory. Politicians from the eastern side of the territory tended to back mining concerns. As 
this railway would not have benefitted mining it was not worth the expense.20 The blocking of a 
rail system into Montana was a significant blow to ranchers who were anxious for access to 
markets outside Montana. Historian Earnest Staples Osgood noted that the small boom in 
Montana cattle to feed miners was playing out as those same miners left for more promising 
strikes. With no easily accessible railroad cattle had to be shipped by a lengthy drive to 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. From there cattle cars could connect with the Union Pacific main line, 
completed in 1869.21  
The presence of the Union Pacific made Cheyenne a practical solution for Montana 
ranchers, although it was an expensive and difficult cattle drive. Nevertheless in 1873, lacking 
other options, Kohrs drove his herd south but “Feeling that the drive from Montana to Cheyenne 
was a long one to make without resting the cattle, we determined to drive…as far as Snake River 
and winter them there.”22 The concern for the cattle in his Autobiography while on this drive was 
admirable.  However, it should be noted that Kohrs did not relinquish control over the pasture 
along the Snake River. He must have left a nominal herd there in order to maintain his customary 
control over another area of public land. In the spring of 1874 some cattle that had been 
purchased for $10.00 a head joined the drive increasing the herd to 2,300. Tom Hooban then 
“took them up to Bitter Root, across the range to the Big Hole, then over to Horse Prairie and on 
to Cheyanne…”an additional 2,000 head were shipped from Sun River following much the same 
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route. 23   This drive was the longest, largest, and first to a railhead. The level of organization 
required for the drive established Kohrs’ operation as one that would be able to dominate the 
Montana market. Furthermore, by leaving cattle in various places he was setting up a network for 
shipping his cattle as safely as possible. Kohrs’ cattle outfit would use this route, with some 
variations, until the railroad made its way into eastern Montana in the 1880s.  
 While this drive was a small event with respect to cattle ranching in Montana it was still 
significant. The lack of local railheads forced Montana ranchers to drive their cattle across 
country. Kohrs took the opportunity to use a cattle drive to also acquire additional public land 
and move his stock to market. Environmentally, the additional pastures helped him spread his 
cattle over a large portion of Montana. During the 1870s a widespread weather event that could 
kill cattle generally was something that ranchers did not think could happen. However, local 
events like floods or cold snaps, could lead to a loss of stock and capital. By spreading his herds 
around, Kohrs was making the likelihood of catastrophic loss less likely.          
In 1874, Kohrs’ first big shipment of cattle arrived in Chicago. Within several years his 
cattle shipments would increase into the tens of thousands. Kohrs’ success necessitated hiring a 
commission agent in Chicago to manage both money and herds at the Chicago stockyards. 
Joseph Rosenbaum’s firm provided accounting services, as well as buying and selling cattle, 
allowing Kohrs time to run his ranching operation. Rosenbaum’s market knowledge facilitated 
the sale of cattle on a national scale. The national market was important because due, to the 
waning mining industry, the Montana market had decreased and the intransigence of Montana 
politics decreased the likelihood that a railway would soon be built. Perhaps most significantly, 
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with the hiring of Rosenbaum’s firm, Kohrs had financial support and market recognition before 
the large cattle boom in the 1880s and after the disastrous winter of 1886/1887.    
At the same time Kohrs was acquiring cattle and the services of Rosenbaum, he was also 
gaining access to more of the best grazing lands in the west beyond Montana and Wyoming. In 
1877 Kohrs wrote that “In the spring of the year the herd of 1000 head gathered on the North 
Platte was driven to South Park, in the western part of Colorado, quite a park with an abundance 
of grass, and there were no cattle in it but ours.”24 Kohrs’ assertion that there were no other cattle 
there but his seems unlikely considering the cattle industry in Colorado at the time. What is more 
likely was that Kohrs used his 1,000 cattle to claim the use of the pasture and then pushed other 
cattlemen out. Nevertheless, the Colorado cattle were fattened at a low cost and then in the fall 
“were driven to Laramie City. We were unable to get cars so we drove them to Pine Bluffs, 
where there was plenty of feed and water…I sold them to Alec Swan at $48.00 a head.”25 
Considering that keeping the cattle in Colorado had only cost a total of $4,000 Kohrs made a tidy 
profit on the sale. Expanding his control over public land was becoming an important business 
tactic for Kohrs. His home ranch at Deer Lodge remained small yet well supplied with fences, 
feed and barns while his ever increasing herds grazed on public land. It was not until the 1880s 
that public land was starting to be occupied by homesteaders and railways that large land 
purchases became necessary. Grazing cattle on public land was an important strategy for Kohrs 
and one that he was uniquely situated to exploit. As an early entrant into the cattle industry, he 
was able to secure the “law of customary range” for his herds by occupying good grassland. The 
presence of his cattle was often enough to keep other rancher’s cattle away. This quasi-legal 
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arrangement among ranchers allowed Kohrs to diversify and build capital. When owning land 
became a necessity he was able to purchase what was required.  
Even with the additional cost of hard winters and distant rail connections, raising cattle 
for a profit was established by the late 1870s. The booster literature that had lured ranchers west 
appeared to be accurate furthering its appeal. In an 1877 edition of the Helena Weekly Herald a 
Chicago stock dealer was quoted “I am fully persuaded that Montana is the cattle country of 
America”26 In 1880 the most famous booster report for the American cattle industry was 
published by James S. Brisbin titled The Beef Bonanza: Or How to Get Rich on the Plains. 
Brisbin, like many others, predicted staggering profits and easy working conditions for western 
cattlemen generally. For Montana’s grazing potential he wrote that the grasses “…cure naturally 
on the ground” and “as a stock growing region Montana surpassed all other sections of the Great 
West.”27 For Kohrs, the booster material especially rang true. He had expanded his herds in both 
size and locations all over Montana, Wyoming and Colorado and had not severely suffered from 
inclement weather, quite the opposite. He and Hooban had bought hay lands and mowing 
machines but there is no evidence they had used them outside of Deer Lodge and Hooban’s 
Bottom, where the most valuable stock was kept. The majority of the 1870s was a temporary 
equilibrium for Kohrs. He had done nothing but follow booster representations of the 
environment and had not suffered for it.  However, the winter of 1881 was the first indication 
that stock raising in Montana was at the mercy of the weather.     
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Rapid Growth and the Establishment of a Multi-Faceted Ranching Practice 
In early 1880s most ranchers in Montana established a single ranching system where 
younger cattle were grazed year round with very little feeding or control until they had gained 
enough weight to be sent to market. Essentially, most Montana ranchers adopted the Texas 
system.” In North American Cattle Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiation 
geographer Terry Jordan wrote that the Texas ranching system evolved in the American south, 
likely in the Carolinas and southeastern Texas, and made its way north. The system was 
characterized by allowing cattle to, more or less, care for themselves year-round and collect them 
when it was time for sale or slaughter. The strong Hispanic influence can be identified through 
some of the terminology, “lariat” for example.28 This method of ranching was popular because it 
required very little in the way of investment in infrastructure or labor and, importantly, it was 
successful on the southern plains. Although, it should be noted that its success was dependent on 
an amiable climate and healthy animals. For Montana, the Texas system had the added attraction 
of being particularly well suited to ranching on public land. It is hardly surprising that Kohrs 
adopted the Texas ranching system as one of his two ranching methods. However, his home 
ranch in Deer Lodge was located in an intermountain valley. At Deer Lodge he was forced by 
natural limitations and frequent harsh winters to irrigate and cultivate native grasses, fence his 
crops, and supply ample winter feed for the few cattle kept there.  It was the experience in both 
styles of ranching that allowed for Kohrs to adapt to the environment and markets after the crash 
of 1886/1887.  
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While not yet the “Cattle King of Montana” by 1881 Conrad Kohrs was one of the largest 
stock raisers in the Territory. He controlled land at Sun River in western Montana, Snake River 
in Idaho, and Goose Creek in Wyoming. To this he added another grazing pasture at Flat Willow 
Creek, central Montana. The plan was for Kohrs and Bielenberg to move Oregon “domestic” 
stock to this area and breed them with shorthorns and Herefords.29 As noted before, domestics 
were better cold tolerant and keeping them on the open range over the winter was common 
practice. Shorthorns and Herefords, however, were far less hardy but were better beef stock.30 By 
breeding domestics with shorthorns or Herefords the goal was to have an animal that was cold 
tolerant and a good beef cow. The breeding plan had both business and environmental 
connotations, Kohrs wanted the best of both.   
It is important to note that Kohrs was not the only rancher moving into central Montana. 
The increase in ranchers made operating methods and business sense all the more crucial. Robert 
Fletcher notes that  
During the early eighties, central Montana, north of the Yellowstone and south of the 
Missouri, was filling with the cattle of Montana owners. The Judith Cattle 
Company…was the first in the Judith Basin…He was followed by James Fergus and his 
son, who located on Armell’s Creek…Robert Coburn and Henry Sieben both had cattle 
on Flatwillow; John Dovenspeck picked Elk Creek, and John T. Murphy, of the Montana 
Cattle Company…a famous horse ranch on the headwaters of Donald Creek…31    
It was not just cattle putting pressure on public land. Despite cattle ranching received the bulk of 
the attention from boosters raising sheep attracted similar representations for both a healthy 
environment and economic potential. In 1882 The Helena Weekly Herald wrote, “The broken, 
rugged buttes, and wide table lands, richly clad in bunch grass would seem to adapt the region to 
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sheep raising…32” Taking advantage of the excellent sheep environment, Dave Hilger 
“jeopardized his popularity by trailing sheep from near Helena, to winter them on Salt Creek in 
the Judith Basin.”33 Cattlemen were concerned about sheep raising because sheep were direct 
competition as both animals were grazed on public land. Furthermore, sheep were thought to be 
deleterious to the grass, certainly more so than cattle.34 The total number of grazers was 
becoming a concern about more than just access to public land. Ranchers like Granville Stuart 
started to be genuinely concerned about overstocking. 
  The winter of 1881 was, in comparison to the previous three winters, harsh and 
something of a cautionary tale. The first arrival of Texas cattle to Montana was in the fall of 
1881 when an English cattle company drove 5,000 head into the Tongue River area of Custer 
County. The drive was long and when the cattle arrived they were weak. The winter that year 
was early and harsh and the Texas herd was completely wiped out.35 When the event was 
reported by The Benton Weekly Record it wrote “The Yellowstone Journal says that Col. 
Groom’s36 Texas cattle on Tongue River are dying fast while ‘the American or Montana cattle 
are in fine condition and thriving.’”37 A similar story unfolded on the DHS as Stuart reported 
significant losses among his cattle that had not had the time to acclimate, while his Montana born 
stock suffered far less.38  The discrepancy drawn between local and imported cattle was 
                                                            
32 Helena Weekly Herald, January 26, 1882. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/  
33 Fletcher, Free Grass to Fences, 49. 
34 Michal P. Malone and Richard B. Roeder, “1876 in Field and Pasture,” Montana: The Magazine of Western 
History 25, no. 2 (1975): 35.  
35 Fletcher, Free Grass to Fences, 53. 
36 Colonel Groom was likely from the Matador Land and Cattle Company from the Texas Panhandle. See: Matthew 
Todd, "Now May Be Heard a Discouraging Word: The Impact of Climate Fluctuation on Texas Ranching in the 
1880s" (MA Thesis, University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, 2009). 
37 The Benton Weekly Record, January 7, 1881. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/   
38 Stuart to Hauser, February 5 and February 21, 1881, MC37, Box 20-20, Samuel Thomas Hauser Papers, Montana 
Historical Society, Helena. 
147 
 
important for Montana stock raisers. Despite the winter deaths of 5,000 cattle, Kohrs moved his 
Montana born cattle to that exact location. He was clearly confident that his Montana cattle 
would not meet the same fate as the Texas stock. 
The decision to move herds to Tongue River coincided with a good spring and summer 
and Kohrs’ cattle flourished. In his Autobiography he wrote “…I went to Tongue River and got 
that herd ready for market driving to Miles City to load them. There were over 1100 head in this 
drive. 400 four year old steers and 700 three-year-olds. They had been on a new range, had 
gotten very fat and brought big prices in Chicago.”39 The juxtaposition between Texas cattle 
dying and Montana cattle flourishing must have reinforced the idea that local stock was superior 
in inclement weather. If anything, it would have made Kohrs, and other ranchers, less cautious 
about putting their local stock on public land for the winter. Kohrs was paid $93,500.00 for the 
Tongue River herd and very likely learned nothing about the Montana environment. 40   
The success from the 1882 sale had two different results. First, it would spur another 
round of growth in both land and cattle. Second, as an additional temporary equilibrium, it 
reinforced booster representations of the Montana grasslands, ranching on public lands, the 
durability of Montana cattle and the Texas system generally. The early 1880s in Montana were 
good to the cattle industry which had an additional unfortunate side effect. Despite the deaths of 
5,000 Texas cattle, thousands of cattle were being driven into Montana to take advantage of what 
appeared to be an unlimited ranching territory. The additional stock would put pressure on public 
land, not just access to it but its quality and grass cover. 
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In 1882 Kohrs was, thanks to his success, well situated to take advantage of the 
borderlands regional market first exploited by Power and Baker. The Canadian Pacific Railway 
was coming west which meant there would be work crews, about 500 Northwest Mounted 
Police, and the Blood, Piegan, and other Indigenous peoples, were being fed to some degree, by 
the Canadian government. Kohrs was able to sell his Sun River herd which was “…the finest in 
the state…” to “Charlie Conrad and to I.G. Baker & Company” who had a contract to furnish 
beef for the Canadian Pacific. The sale was for 1500 cattle at $62.50 a head for a total of 
$94,000.41 This contract came only a year after the changes favoring ranchers were made to 
Canada’s Dominion Land Act which further emphasized Matthew Cochrane’s argument for the 
necessity of large ranches in Alberta.  
In 1883 Conrad Kohrs purchased a large stake in Granville Stuart’s DHS Ranch. The 
Daily Enterprise, published in Livingston, printed that “The heaviest transaction in cattle that has 
occurred in the territory took place this week, Mr. Conrad Kohrs…purchasing of Mr. A. J. Davis, 
the Davis, Hauser, & Co. herd of 12,000 cattle for $400,000.”42 The price Kohrs paid was, on 
average, $33 dollars per head. The transaction established Kohrs at the head of the Montana 
cattle business as he had just doubled his herd and increased his access to public land. The 
increase in stock prompted The New Northwest to be the first to call him “…the undisputed cattle 
king of Montana”43 who owned or controlled 25,000 head worth 1.5 million dollars.44 The DHS 
cattle were grazing on the Fort Maginnis range under the management of Granville Stuart.  
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The following month Kohrs was improving Deer Lodge with barns and stables 
suggesting that he was still invested in running a multi-faceted operation, concerned with 
improvement and indicating his control over public land. 45 The idea of improvement at Deer 
Lodge would not stay confined to barns and fences. In 1884, he moved many of the purebred 
cattle to Deer Lodge. By doing so, he was able more rapidly improve the quality of his Montana 
stock. It all probability this was a business move, as there had not been any environmental events 
forcing Kohrs to abandon his prolific use of public land.  The breeds specifically mentioned were 
shorthorns and Herefords. While shorthorns had been gaining in popularity as an improving 
breed Herefords were significantly less well known outside of Kansas and utilizing them moved 
Kohrs ahead of his contemporaries who were relying on other breeds.46   
By 1884, the open rangelands of Montana, especially in the east, were home to roughly 
600,000 cattle along with horses and sheep. The increase was mostly due to the number of Texas 
cattle that had been trailed into Montana since the first disastrous foray in 1881. Texas cattle 
were not really a problem for overstocking yet; however, they did bring the possibility of 
disease. All of the prominent cattlemen of Montana, and likely the smaller producers as well, 
were deeply concerned. The River Press, published in Fort Benton, ran an alarming article 
informing people that “The importation at this late day of Texas cattle, in which malignant types 
of disease are fixed…is fraught with danger to the herds of Montana, compared to which all the 
elemental fury of the severest winter is but child’s play.”47 Interestingly, the writer could not 
help but add a booster plug for the industry in “No form of disease is inherent in our native 
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stock…their immunity from all taint and physical corruption is a certificate…that will enhance 
their value in the markets from year to year.”48  The action taken by Kohrs (and Stuart) to 
combat this threat was to organize a meeting and designate a five-person committee, of which he 
was one, to watch the spread of diseased cattle.  
It would be naïve not to infer that an additional “disease” brought by imported cattle was 
additional stress on the grasslands, losing control of free grass to their competition and problems 
with interbreeding inferior Texas stock with their blooded stock. The problem of losing control 
over free grass was related to the ad-hoc approach Montana cattlemen had taken to land rights. 
Without a legislated system in place it was possible to lose your pasture with the only recourse 
being the courts or vigilantism. The question of breeding was interrelated to land-use as well. 
Montana cattlemen were using the Texas system which meant that an inferior bull, likely from 
Texas, could wander into your herd and breed. The subsequent calf would be inferior stock and 
the question of ownership would be unclear. Noting that this was going to be an important 
political issue, and wanting to support Montana ranchers, the River Press wrote “…Texas fever 
grows out of the bad air and water of the southern plains. It is less known in Colorado near the 
mountains and with us it is almost wholly unknown…Mountain streams, pure, dry air, and never 
failing pasturage Insure Montana cattle against fever.”49    
The result of the increasing noise being made by ranchers regarding southern stock being 
pushed north was political action. Granville Stuart, not content with his committee, wrote to 
Kohrs “I think the Govr. [sic] ought to get permission from the President to call an extra session 
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of the Legislature, so we could protect ourselves.”50 The purpose of the meeting was to 
strengthen the quarantine line created by Wyoming in 1884.51 In a letter from May, 1884 Stuart 
again wrote to Kohrs “I am glad you are stirring up the stock men. Keep your lick up, for we 
must have some legislation so we can protect ourselves. As it now stands we are liable to have 
some disease imported onto our ranges that would ruin us all.”52 While both men were unable to 
gain a special session of the Legislature the “stirring up” of the stock raisers by Kohrs led to 
cattlemen dominating Montana’s fourteenth assembly in 1885. On the surface the anxiety about 
disease was well founded. Texas cattle did, indeed, carry diseases that were not common in 
Montana. Therefore, keeping them out was logical. However, when your business depends on 
free grass perhaps there were other reasons as well.        
In April 1884, Kohrs attended the Wyoming Stock Growers Convention in Cheyenne. 
The Wyoming Stock Growers Association Meeting was the largest meeting of its kind ever held 
in the Territory. The Association represented 2,000,000 head of stock and $10,000,000 of 
invested capital. The local paper wrote that  
Mr. Kohrs realizes the necessity of some further legislation in relation to cattle interests 
in Montana and visits Cheyenne to learn the working laws of Wyoming and neighboring 
Territories and States, with a view to ascertaining their merits and having brought up in 
the Montana legislature next winter a bill that will be equitable and adequate to the stock 
interests in this territory.53               
Unsurprisingly, some of the Wyoming resolutions were designed to keep out Texas cattle. 
However, the only resolution from Wyoming passed by Montana stockmen was to press 
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Congress to pass any legislation protecting their industry. Kohrs, being a leader in his industry, 
was appointed to a committee to “draft a memorial to be presented to the various round-up 
association and stock owners of Montana, for the necessities and importance of holding a 
convention of stock owners to secure the necessary legislation for the protection of the stock 
interests of this Territory at the coming session of the Territorial legislature.”54 In August, Kohrs 
was named Deer Lodge and Meagher County representative and to the executive of the newly 
revived Montana Stock Growers Association.55 It is probable that the goal of Montana stockmen 
was to protect their access to public land and by acting together they could exert additional 
political pressure to do so. Montana cattle ranchers at the time liked to think of themselves as 
rugged individualists who did not require government assistance. However, where their access to 
public land or export rights were threatened they were quick to use political channels to 
influence change.       
The year 1884 was significant for the Kohrs and Bielenberg operation from an 
environmental perspective. The completed railway to Chicago allowed for easy access to those 
markets which, more or less, eliminated the need for long drives of Montana cattle. Despite this, 
Kohrs did not consolidate his cattle onto one pasture. His decision to maintain numerous pastures 
was likely based on the growing concern of overcrowding, isolated weather events and disease 
from imported stock. Having cattle spread around would prevent all his stock being hit with 
disease during an outbreak and additional pastures alleviated the risk of overcrowding. With 
respect to isolated weather events Kohrs had been hit as well. In 1881, the winter that killed 
5,000 Texas cattle created several ice dams on the Sun River and many of Kohrs cattle were 
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drowned, some died from exposure. The losses were, according to Kohrs, about 15% but were 
“…in a local rather than general sense…”56 This short quotation suggests that the subsequent 
investments made by Kohrs reflected his belief in the value of spreading his cattle on several 
pastures, an ecological and economic safety-net, because a loss on one herd could be offset by 
gains on another. He still had diverse investments in mining and stakes in water that would help 
offset his finances should cattle prices crash. Furthermore, the breeding program that had been 
launched in earnest was paying off and stock with the “CK” brand, especially shorthorns, were in 
demand all over Montana.57   Due to his long time in the business he was respected and well 
connected with bankers and stock commissioners. His seat at the cattleman’s meetings allowed 
for him to shape policy and practice throughout the territory. Ultimately, what Kohrs had 
established by 1884 was a business model with enough stability and diversity to offset 
environmental or market fluctuations. In the coming years, when Montana cattlemen would face 
both environmental and economic challenges, Kohrs would be well positioned to expand his 
operation while other men went bankrupt. 
In 1885, Kohrs was elected as part of the “Cowboy Legislature”, so called because 
“…nearly all laws on the statute books relating to the cattle industry were passed that winter.”58 
Some of the more noteworthy statutes were “No. 63, to amend section 11 of an act to suppress 
and prevent contagious diseases among domestic animals and Texas cattle” and “No. 57, for the 
better protection of the live stock interests of Montana.”59 What, exactly, was meant by “stock 
interests” was not fully explained in the resolution, although it is certain that Kohrs would have 
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considered this another “well-run” legislature. What was important for Kohrs was the resolution 
to suppress and prevent contagious disease. The risk of diseased cattle was low but just enough 
to justify the type of protectionism that further enabled his use of public land.  
While in the Montana legislature, Kohrs organized the Montana Stockgrowers 
Association meeting while the government was sitting. By setting the meeting at this time the 
Association had access to influential law makers through Kohrs. The Association’s first meeting 
was held at Miles City, April 4 1885.60 A resolution was passed to write the government in 
regard to the condition of the northern Cheyenne on the Rosebud reservation who were in a near 
starving state. The altruism of the letter, however, loses much of its shine when the proposed 
solution, selling Montana cattle to the government, is considered.61 It is noteworthy that none of 
the resolutions from that day had anything to do with the grass, water or the environment. The 
reason for the lack of environmental concern was in the years between 1882 and 1885 most 
ranchers had experienced a temporary equilibrium. As a consequence, from the perspective of 
ranchers, booster representations of the industry still rang true.  
What the cattlemen and associations knew but could not control was the massive 
numbers of cattle being imported into Montana depleting the quality of grazing land. This 
problem, as much as the possibility of disease, was the inspiration behind their attempts to keep 
southern cattle out of Montana. Kohrs estimated that the number of cattle imported in 1884 was 
75,000 in addition to the 94,000 that had been imported previous years.62 The reason for the 
massive influx of cattle is complicated, yet environmental misinformation certainly played a role. 
Up to 1885 the information available to the cattlemen of Montana regarding the cattle industry 
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had been overwhelmingly positive. On the eve of the disaster, when both Kohrs and Granville 
Stuart had serious concerns about the future of their industry, The River Press reported that the 
future of the cattle business “had diminished but still had handsome profits.”63 Part of the false 
sense of security came from a cold and snowy winter in 1884/1885 that did not cause alarming 
numbers of stock loss. Further mitigating the severity of the winter was a dry spring and good 
summer that allowed cattle to rebound quickly. In March, stockmen and allied Associations 
along the Yellowstone and Musselshell were “congratulating each other on the small percentage 
of loss among cattle…”64 Considering the coming years, had the 1884/1885 winter caused more 
stock losses Montana cattlemen may have been better prepared for the winter of 1886/1887. 
However, this was another case where Montana cattle were flourishing with no special actions 
taken by ranchers. 
 In 1885, Kohrs and Granville Stuart considered selling out to European investors but the 
deal fell through. Stuart, for one, felt that the range was depleted beyond saving, a concern he 
made clear to Kohrs in a letter from June, 1885 where he wrote “I hope the sale will go for I am 
afraid of the overstocking that is going on, if we could prevent that, I would never want to sell. It 
would be the best business in the world.”65 The reason overstocking in 1885/1886 was such as a 
concern to Stuart was that there were twelve herds grazing with their cattle on the Fort Maginnis 
range. In previous years the DHS had been the only operation there.  An additional concern for 
Stuart was that the majority of the cattle had been at Fort Maginnis for three consecutive years. 
Weak prices, free grass and a fundamentally poor understanding of the environment had led 
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ranchers to hold back cattle they normally would have sold.  Because cattle had been there for so 
many consecutive years, Kohrs claimed he leased over 200,000 acres of land in the Cypress Hills 
of Alberta with the expectation of driving their cattle across.66 If true, this showed good sense. 
Kohrs was in the financial position to provide his cattle leased land when public lands were 
becoming crowded. In an interview published September 10, 1886 when asked about moving his 
cattle to Canada he stated “I do not think over 20,000 head will be sent over…” because “Our 
range is very dry this year and the ranges are getting crowded.”67 Acquiring additional land was 
a strategy that Kohrs had used in previous years. However, he had not previously gone to the 
expense of leasing land. The cattle that were supposed to be driven across never made it because 
“The river was bad and only a few crossed and these had to be left in the Little Rockies as it was 
too late to take them across the line.”68 The lack of evidence for the Canadian lease opens this 
story to skepticism. The only explanation is that Kohrs was referring to an arrangement with an 
Alberta lease holder or that he had arranged something with the Blood or Peigan. Nevertheless, 
that Kohrs thought the measure was necessary indicated a recognition of the decreasing quality 
of the Montana grasslands.  
Despite the mounting problems, especially crowding ranges, Kohrs remained optimistic 
about the coming winter. In the same September 10 interview he mentioned that:  
Floweree thinks that we will lose about 25 per cent., if we have a hard winter, and the 
idea seems to be out that it will be a hard one. I don’t know why it is—probably because I 
never borrow much trouble out of the future—but I do not apprehend a hard winter on 
cattle. It may be cold, but it is the heavy snow storms we have to fear, and I don’t think 
we will have them. Besides, despite the dry season, our cattle are fat and strong—in 
better condition than they were last year.69  
                                                            
66 There is no evidence that he did lease this land.  
67 The New Northwest, September 10, 1886. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/ 
68 Kohrs, Autobiography, 83. 
69 The New Northwest, September 10, 1886. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/ 
157 
 
Disconcertingly, Kohrs contradicted himself in the same interview when he mentioned that 
“while the average condition of the cattle is good, there are not so many fatted as usual, and we 
only ship in that condition.”70 It is difficult to say if Kohrs actually believed his words. 
Considering he had (possibly) leased additional land in Canada it was more likely he was 
speaking as a community and industry leader and did not want to start a panic.     
 There were five interconnected forces that had prevailed in Montana prior to the winter of 
1886-1887. The first problem was increased cattle numbers, additional stock had caused an 
oversupply of beef on the Chicago markets, which lowered prices. Most ranchers were optimists 
and thought that prices would recover so they held back thousands of cattle on ranges that were 
already crowded. The second factor was that much of the new stock grazing in Montana came 
from Illinois, Michigan, Iowa and Missouri. Stock from these states were not hardy enough to 
make it through a difficult winter without feeding. The third problem was a prolonged spring and 
summer drought in Texas had prompted cattlemen there to drive their herds north in search of 
adequate grass. Texas cattle, as had been proved in 1881, were not capable of living through a 
hard winter. This was especially true when they had not had an opportunity to gain the requisite 
weight during the spring and summer.71 The fourth problem was that Montana ranchers had 
experienced several years of temporary equilibrium reinforcing booster representations.  While 
success is not traditionally a problem, the temporary equilibrium entrenched inadequate ranching 
methods and diminished the need for precautionary measures. The final problem was a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the environment. The misunderstanding of the environment 
was the cause of all the other problems, with the exception of the drought. As noted by Kohrs in 
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1881, any cattle losses during the winter tended to be “local rather than general.”72 It was 
unreasonable for cattlemen to expect the dangers of a hard winter when other hard winters had 
not decimated their stock, most recently in 1884/1885. Most importantly, the years and years of 
booster material, starting in the 1860s and culminating with Beef Bonanza had never counseled 
caution with respect to managing cattle through the winter. The optimism of Kohrs during that 
late summer interview, when considered in this light, may have been genuine. The environment 
had not given him an adequate reason to believe that anything catastrophic could happen. 
 In November 1886, the snow started in earnest and blocked roads. Snow had fallen to a 
depth of over a foot and continued to pile up through January. The Livingston Enterprise 
foreshadowed the coming weather calamity when, after a brief warming spell from a chinook, 
they wrote “The temperature has ranged above the freezing point a greater part of the time, 
which has kept the snow at a uniform depth of about one foot, and should the present condition 
of the weather be followed by a severe cold spell it might result seriously to the stock 
interests.”73 At the end of the month a blast of Artic air turned the softened snow to ice sealing 
the grass underneath, just beyond the hooves and mouths of hungry cattle and horses. In Free 
Grass to Fences Robert Fletcher described the sad situation, “Starving and helpless, the famished 
stock drifted, piled up in coulees, stumbled over cutbanks, or just froze in their tracks. It was 
awful.”74 On February 22, 1887 Kohrs received a letter from his brother letting him know that 
they could assess their losses.75     
 The DHS Ranch 
                                                            
72 Kohrs, Autobiography, 88. 
73 The Livingstone Enterprise, January 1, 1887. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/ 
74 Fletcher, Free Grass to Fences, 88.  
75 Kohrs, Autobiography, 86. 
159 
 
In the summer of 1879, on the cusp of the great cattle boom in Montana and shortly 
before large numbers Texas cattle were trailed north, Samuel Hauser, Andrew Davis, and 
Granville Stuart entered the ranching business. Stuart, a long-time resident of Montana who had 
experience working with cattle, was named superintendent and general manager. The first 
summer and fall were dedicated to purchasing herds which eventually totaled 9,000 head. 
Determined to grow the brand and improve the quality of the stock, Andrew Davis purchased 
twenty-one thoroughbred bulls in the mid-west. As noted, Kohrs had also purchased breeding 
stock. The DHS likely intended to improve their Montana stock using the same method. The 
home ranch was, after some set-backs, located at the base of the Judith Mountains in central 
Montana. Stuart considered this location “the very garden spot of Montana.”76 
 It may seem strange that Stuart, who had spent much of his youth mining and stock 
raising in the Deer Lodge Valley, would choose to raise cattle on the plains. He did so because of 
the appeal of the Texas system and public land, although the he was never fully sold on the 
Texas system. For example, he did not abandon the ranching methods from the intermountain 
valley with which he was familiar. As a result, Stuart was one of the first ranchers to voice a 
concern over the risk of overstocking. During the summer of that first year he directed the 
construction of stables, fencing around the adjacent hay lands, cabins, blacksmith shops, and 
other necessary buildings. The ranch was sitting on 800 acres that were “owned” through the 
“law of customary range”, but would eventually be acquired legally in 1880.77  At the same time 
the necessary infrastructure was being built, the DHS livestock was being driven onto the range 
to allow them to acclimate to the colder environment. This strategy, as much as winter feeding, 
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was significant as southern and eastern cattle tended to fair more poorly in the cold unless given 
time to gain weight and become accustomed to the weather. All told, the cost of the ranch by the 
fall of 1880/1881 was $152,933.51.78    
 The early summer of 1881 was spent negotiating with the military for protection from 
Indigenous people. In a letter sent to Major Dangerfield Parker, Stuart wrote, “Our experience 
during the last nine months has demonstrated that stock raising cannot be carried on if Indians 
are allowed to roam over the ranges…”79 The dissatisfaction that Stuart, and other cattlemen, had 
with the Indigenous population was an ongoing theme and resulted in their endorsement of 
legislation to restrict Indigenous people’s movement. For its part, the military was not just being 
intransigent toward Stuart. Some fault lies at his feet as well. Part of the reason that Stuart had 
located the home range at Ford’s Creek was its proximity to 800 acres of hay lands which, as 
noted before, he had started to fence in almost immediately. Stuart did not own the land but 
decided to fence it regardless. In July 1881 the military ordered Stuart to halt construction as 
they had claimed the hay lands, and the ranch, for military use. However, thanks to Hauser’s 
political influence and Stuart’s stubborn refusal to move his fences, the boundaries of the 
military land were redrawn in 1882. The new boundaries of the Fort returned land coveted by the 
DHS to the public domain, with only a small loss of meadow.80 In a subsequent letter to Hauser, 
Stuart suggested that the loss of hay lands could be offset by irrigation, and as a result he was 
willing to accept the compromise.81 These actions demonstrated that Stuart, despite running 
cattle on the open range, was not completely sold on the Texas system described by Terry 
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Jordan. He understood from his years of raising stock in the intermountain valleys around Deer 
Lodge that having available feed during the winter was necessary and that he would fight to keep 
access to those lands. 
  The first large cattle sale made by the DHS was in the summer of 1881 when 1,286 head 
of cattle were sold to Kohrs. They sold to Kohrs because he had experience in the Chicago 
market and they sellers thought he would pay a better price.82 The cattle were sold at a profit of 
$39,246 and that money was used to pay for ranch expenses and reinvested in additional stock. 
While the ranch was operational at a profit it did not post a dividend for that year. The success of 
the DHS in 1881 was the result of a “temporary equilibrium.”83 The conditions on their range 
were amiable and their cattle did well. This season was the first of several where the DHS had a 
level of relative prosperity that did not challenge them to change their ranching method. If 
anything, the success reinforced the efficacy of the Texas system making the other partners less 
inclined to listen to Stuart’s concerns about overstocking.  
 Almost from the outset of large scale ranching on the Montana plains Stuart saw 
environmental and ecological problems. His first issue was with the presence of 3,000 
Indigenous people he blamed for stealing or killing cattle and requiring additional hands which 
drove up costs. In an 1881 report he mentioned that 1,300 cattle, roughly the number that they 
sold that year, had been killed by Indigenous peoples. He had suggested filing a claim against the 
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government for the lost income but did not follow through.84 Furthermore, Stuart, almost 
immediately, saw a flaw with the Texas system. In a letter to Hauser he wrote: 
It seems easy to run a cattle business in the reckless, happy go lucky style which has 
generally prevailed in the past than he who tried to run a cattle ranch more on business 
principals and guide it successfully past the dangers of hard winters, Indian depredations, 
exhausted or overstocked ranges, and the many other lesser evils will be greatly surprised 
to find how expensive it is when he ceases trusting to luck and tries to reduce it to a 
systematic basis. In point of fact the conditions have greatly changed, and those halcyon 
days have gone never to return. Those who have been in cattle for the last ten years or so 
have had the very cream of the business, for the interior mountain valleys were much 
better adapted…They had better grass and more of it. The shape of the valleys rendered 
herding unnecessary and the abundance of game kept the Indians from taking cattle. 
Those who still continue in the business are now compelled to cut down their herds or 
leave those former ranges thus incurring heavy expense in moving out to an inferior 
range where their herds are decimated by Indians, wolves, and hard winters, and where 
their cattle if not herded ramble far from their home range on the great plains.85   
The description from Stuart was less enthusiastic than would be expected in 1881. It is possible 
that Stuart was feeling the financial pressure of the first few years of operation or he missed the 
style of ranching with which he was accustomed. An additional possibility was that Stuart 
understood the Montana climate better than his contemporaries. Whatever the reason, this letter 
reinforces the idea that Stuart never fully bought into the Texas system that was prominent 
during the early 1880s. The problem was, as the least powerful member of the DHS, how could 
he make the other partners see the danger?  
 Fortunately for the somewhat morose Stuart, the 1881/1882 winter was mild on his range 
and the cattle came through in good condition. Before the round-up started 1,528 cattle were 
added to his herd which, including new calves, had swelled by 3,143.86 When it came time for 
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the cattle to be rounded up, Stuart noticed that Kohrs, T.C. Power, Charles Belden and others 
were running stock near-by. The economically minded Stuart held a meeting where a cooperative 
round-up was established. A cooperative arrangement, he felt, would save money and increase 
efficiency.87  The round-up was a success and, as predicted, saved everyone involved both time 
and money. For Stuart and the DHS, 1882 was a good year as a dividend of $37,000 was 
posted.88 For the DHS, 1882 was a second consecutive “temporary equilibrium”, despite Stuart’s 
growing unease with ranching in Montana due to overcrowding.89    
The following year Kohrs purchased a 1/3 stake in the DHS ranch essentially merging the 
two large operations. Stuart was in Helena serving as the President of the Montana Territory 
legislature (Kohrs was sitting as well) a position that allowed him to influence the regulation of 
the cattle industry and protect Montana cattle. The Herald reported that a number of stockmen 
had met with Stuart to discuss “…what legislation is necessary to protect our interests.”90 
Stuart’s first goal was to protect Montana cattle from diseased animals trailing in from Texas by 
establishing a Commission to prevent their import. Again, Stuart was likely concerned about 
access to public land and overstocking. He was using the threat of disease to keep the overall 
numbers of cattle in Montana down. Despite the Territorial Assembly passing the order 
Governor Potts vetoed it fearing that it would put too much power in the hands of cattle 
ranchers.91 The objection by Potts against importing diseased animals for reasons of power 
reinforces that the question was about land and not cattle. Governor Potts was not hostile to the 
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cattle industry but he had to balance competing corporate and mining interests.92 Having their 
order blocked was a significant setback for Stuart. However, he was able to secure some 
successes that would make ranching more effective and, ironically, reinforce both the temporary 
equilibrium and booster representations of the industry. For example, a bounty law on predators 
and a bill to protect stock from raids by Indigenous people and Whites were passed. Both of 
these laws were effective at increasing stock numbers and thereby pressure on the grasslands.     
 In Stuart’s Forty Years on the Frontier he puts the genesis of overstocking in the year 
1883. In the fall of that year the DHS herd had roughly 13,000 head and by the following year 
that number swelled to 15,000. The total number of cattle in the Territory totaled 600,000. Part 
of the reason for the drastic increase was cattlemen holding their cattle due to a poor market. The 
additional cattle and the depleting grasslands was noticed by Stuart. Concerned, Stuart wrote of 
the deteriorating situation that “the ranges were free to all and no man could say, with authority, 
when a range was overstocked.”93 It is clear, however, that he felt as though they were. In 1885, 
Stuart’s predilection towards organization and his experience in the industry would inspire 
Korhs, Hauser, and H.P. Kennett, to name him the Superintendent and Assistant Secretary of the 
newly formed Pioneer Cattle Company.94 Again, Stuart was in the position of being responsible 
for thousands of cattle but in a weak position against the company owners. Almost all cattlemen 
were confident that the Texas system was the right mode of land use in Montana because nothing 
to that time had suggested otherwise. Sadly, Stuart’s increasing anxiety about overstocking fell 
on deaf ears. 
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 Politically, 1885 was the apex of power for stockmen in Montana. The Montana Stock 
Growers Association remained a potent force but was hard pressed to fight against the mining 
and corporate interests that had found their way into the Territorial government. After the 
elections of 1886 Stuart was concerned that the small amount of progress they had made 
protecting their industry would be reversed. He wrote to the secretary of the Stock Growers 
Association “There will be a determined effort to repeal the bit & Inspection laws at the coming 
session…every d___d thief & their sympathizers (who are legion) are very active in working up 
public opinion against us.”95 Despite Stuart’s prediction the laws were not undone. But, due to a 
dearth of representatives, the interests of cattlemen began to fall to the wayside. The loss of 
political power could not have come at a worse time. The summer and winter of 1886/1887 were 
disastrous for cattlemen in Montana and, despite the rugged individualists that they were, a voice 
in politics would have been beneficial.    
 The summer drought that started the 1886/1887 disaster extended into the fall. In a letter 
to F.C. Robinson, another rancher, Stuart wrote: 
No Rain, yet. And today the smoke has settled down so dense that one cannot see a mile, 
and can’t tell where it comes from, but think from the west. Our water is all drying up 
and we are now moving part of our cattle north, and the rest down into the bad lands on 
the Mo [sic] River, for water they must have. The outlook is fast becoming desperate. 96  
As already noted, only a small number of the cattle were ever trailed north, the rest remained on 
the DHS home range. Stuart called the home range “over-crowded” in 1881 and after several 
years of cattle increase it was considerably worse. The frustration that Stuart felt is palpable in 
his letter. He had been warning stock raisers and governments alike that the ranges were 
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overcrowded and now it was too late. According to Stuart, 50% of the cattle, all cattle, were lost 
during the 1886/1887 winter. For Stuart, this level of stock loss constituted “…the death knell of 
the range cattle business on anything like the scale it had been run on before.”97 It should be 
noted that Kohrs mentioned Stuart was less dour about his predictions until the spring round-up 
when branding numbers plummeted from 8,000 to 900, an 89% loss.98 Stuart’s prediction that 
the industry was finished was prophetic for many ranchers who could not find the capital, will or 
energy to rebuild their herds.  
The Recovery: A Lesson in Understanding Your Environment  
 The central lesson of the 1886/1887 disaster was that booster literature was wrong. 
Almost every prediction and claim they had made about the grasses, water, and climate had 
proved false. The temporary equilibrium that had reinforced those booster representations had 
laid a false trail and thousands of cattle paid the price. Kohrs, and by association, Stuart, had lost 
an estimated 2,300 head from a single herd. The total value of just those animals was 
$30,000.00.99 This was a large sum, especially when considering how depressed prices were at 
the time. However, not all the news was bad. Due to Kohrs’ maintenance of the home ranch at 
Deer Lodge in the intermountain valley, the breeding stock of shorthorns and Herefords had 
made it through the winter. Estimated total losses for Kohrs were about fifty percent on the 
public land while he lost only eight percent in Deer Lodge.100 It is impossible to tell if the early 
improvements at Deer Lodge were made due to a better understanding of the environment or 
were just for his valuable breeding stock. An interview from 1885 does suggest that Kohrs had 
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listened to Stuart with respect to depleting grasslands. When asked about the quality of the range 
he replied “It takes 20 acres on a new range to feed one cow, after the range has been grazed two 
years it will take almost 25 acres and after six years, it will take 40 acres.”101  In the years 
following 1886/1887 Kohrs grew Deer Lodge significantly indicating that despite his 
predilection for using public land he knew there were limits.   
 The winter of 1886/1887 has been subjected to speculation from historians and more than 
a little mythology from ranchers. However, there are definite facts that suggest some cattlemen 
understood the plain’s environment better despite the booster representations and years of 
temporary equilibrium. Prior to 1886 Kohrs had begun to cut grasses for hay, irrigate his lands as 
best he could, fence crops, and provide winter feed for his cattle in the intermountain region. He 
was not an advocate for stocking the plains with as many cattle as possible, unless they were his. 
Kohrs advocated for a controlled and organized system of grazing cattle on public lands. He was 
also a firm believer in raising the quality of his herd through breeding with eastern stock. While 
it is possible, even likely, that his enthusiasm for controlled importation of cattle was self-
interested, it should also be recognized that it reflected his understanding of the environment. 
By March, 1887 a grim situation was apparent all over Montana. At the spring meeting of 
the Montana Stock Growers Association in April the new president opined “had the winter 
continued twenty days longer, we would not have had much necessity of an Association.”102 For 
Granville Stuart, the years of running a cattle operation and cautioning others against the dangers 
of overstocking could not save him from being scapegoated for the losses incurred in 1886/1887. 
The other ranch owners and investors of the DHS were critical of Stuart’s methods. As an 
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additional attack they questioned his generosity to his friend Reece Anderson, who had been 
living on the DHS property for free since 1879.103 In a letter to Hauser it was observed that 
Stuart himself was considered to be “alright in his present position” but “the location of the ranch 
is wrong, it is too near the Fort…” With respect to Reece Anderson “I cannot run a ranch and 
have to hire his half breed relatives or have they [sic] and their friends around and do it 
economically…”104 From that point forward Stuart was even more powerless. It was an unfitting 
end to a great career for Stuart. He understood the environment of the Great Plains and while 
setting up the DHS operation took steps in infrastructure and hay lands that others thought 
unnecessary. He organized round-ups and through his political actions he tried to control the 
unsustainable numbers of cattle grazing on a limited grassland. However, all of his previous 
work was for naught. Thousands of cattle had either froze or starved to death and someone had to 
shoulder the blame. In the years following the hard winter Kohrs remained at the top of the cattle 
industry. By relying on his own experience, advice from Stuart and additional capital from 
investors, Kohrs would grow his herd. The success over the winter at Deer Lodge inspired Kohrs 
to add twenty thousand acres. The additional land was used to grow crops for wintering stock 
and to become a leader in cattle breeding.105  
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Chapter 6: The Cochrane, Walrond and A7  
During the 1880s environmental representations of the Alberta grasslands had been 
steeped in several decades of boosterism.  For example, an 1881 letter from Fort Macleod 
reprinted in the Helena Weekly Herald reported that “cattle have done splendidly here this 
winter. None have died from cold or snow—neither calves nor cows.”1  For this reason, much 
like Montana, the Alberta environment was thought to have unlimited potential for stock-raising 
and thousands of acres were leased to ranchers. It was into this perceived environment that the 
Cochrane, Walrond and the A7 ranches were established. Based on the positive representations 
of the Alberta environment, Cochrane, McEachran and Cross were led to believe that the Texas 
system, popular south of the border, would also be the most advantageous mode of land-use. 
However, this system was flawed resulting in numerous environmental difficulties. The 
difficulties faced by ranchers engendered a series of adaptations to land-use and a far more 
nuanced perception of the Alberta environment. As argued in the previous chapters, the difficulty 
in adapting to environmental pressures during the 1880s was what separated successful 
operations from those that were not. This chapter will bring that same analysis to the Cochrane, 
Walrond and A7 ranches by examining how they responded to environmental, economic and 
political pressures leading up to the winter of 1886/1887 and how they were able to respond in 
the years after. 
 In Cattle Kingdom, historian Edward Brado relates an apocryphal tale where John George 
(“Kootenai”) Brown met a man driving a wagon across the Canadian plains. White people being 
rare at the time Brown engaged the stranger in conversation about the viability of cattle ranching 
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in the area. The stranger felt that cattle could surely survive relatively untended in such a mild 
climate. The stranger’s logic was that an area that had once supported thousands and thousands 
of bison could support cattle. However, Brown, a longtime resident, disagreed. Reflecting on his 
own experience with the Canadian environment, Brown felt “…it was a delusion…that cattle 
could just as easily survive on the plains as the buffalo once did. Unlike cattle, buffalo ate the 
grass right down to the roots, and then moved onto a new range…”2 Brown also told the stranger 
that cattle, unlike bison, turn their backs on a cold wind and simply wander until they pile up 
against an obstruction. Lastly, Brown added that cattlemen would have to cut hay for feed during 
the winter because while chinooks were relatively common they could not be relied upon to 
expose grass often enough to keep cattle fed. Essentially, John George (“Kootenai”) Brown told 
the stranger that the Texas system would not work on the Canadian plains. At the end of the 
story Brado reveals that the stranger was Matthew Cochrane and “…in the following years…he 
had many occasions to consider Brown’s sound advice and to calculate the cost of disregarding 
it.”3 
 In June, 1881 the Benton Weekly Record reported that the Cochrane cattle herd, 
purchased from Conrad Kohrs, was “…now on their way up the river to Benton…”4 where it 
would be met by James Walker. In the same edition it was noted that the Cochrane Ranche alone 
intended “to put in 8,000 to 10,000 head this year, with 150 imported pure bred Hereford and 
Polled Angus bulls.”5 The herd numbered between six and seven thousand head in total and was 
entrusted to the I.G. Baker Company for the final stage of transportation across the border. The 
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drive would not get under way until August, which left a scarce amount of time to both get the 
cattle to their pasture and let them acclimate to their surroundings before winter set in. 6 Frank 
Strong, of the I.G. Baker Company, divided the herd between steers and cows and calves order to 
increase the speed with which the cattle were driven. L.V. Kelly, author of The Range Men, 
referred to the drive as “…the criterion for hard driving, as no such great numbers of cattle have 
ever since been moved so rapidly by trail. The poor animals were “tin-canned” and “slickered” 
from morning until night…and so weary when darkness came that they preferred resting to 
eating.”7 The second herd of cows and calves fared even worse due to their smaller size and 
lower endurance. Wagons followed behind to pick up what calves could be loaded up but when 
the wagons were full, the calves were either traded by cowboys along the trail or left to die. Both 
Kelly and Brado note that hundreds of calves died this way.8 The cost to the Cochrane Ranche 
was significant and the cattle had not yet been branded. 
 The cattle, foot sore and weak, arrived at the Cochrane range area where they were first 
counted by Walker and then sent to get their bearings on their new pasture.  By all accounts, the 
cattle were not in great shape after the drive. Compounding that problem was that winter in 
1881/1882 was early. As a consequence, the cattle could not recover their strength and “hundreds 
died before they could locate shelter and water…”9 The death of these drive-weakened cattle in 
Canada in 1881/1882 are strikingly similar to the deaths of 5,000 Texas cattle in Montana that 
same winter. It was a stark difference between the experience of Stuart and Korhs in Montana, 
whose early temporary equilibrium was important to reinforcing booster representations of the 
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environment and the Texas system. However, even without the early success, and in fact quite 
the opposite, Cochrane stood steadfast with booster representations and took this loss as being an 
isolated event and not indicative of the Alberta grassland’s ability to support cattle.   
Cochrane’s woes were exacerbated by extensive prairie fires and Indigenous peoples 
killing his already depleted herds. On January, 18 the Helena Weekly Herald noted that “…the 
Indians have been killing large numbers of the Cochrane Ranch Company’s cattle…”10 An arrest 
was made at Blackfoot crossing but the accused was released after the NWMP were surrounded 
and forced to surrender their prisoner.11  Only a week later The Benton Weekly Record reported, 
“…extensive prairie fires are burning in the Bow River country and that the range of the 
Cochrane Ranch Company has been largely burned over.”12  In February, 1882 The Benton 
Weekly Record summed up the first year for the Cochrane Ranch by writing “It has been reported 
in Ottawa that the Cochrane Ranch Company…has lost 2000 head of cattle…Their herd has been 
badly scattered and a portion of the range burned over…”13 The rocky start for the Cochrane 
Ranche was directly related to the relative inexperience they had working in the Alberta 
environment. The booster material available at the time had suggested that winters were mild, 
which engendered a fundamental misunderstanding of the environment. The only problem to 
which Cochrane could have been aware were prairie fires. What remained to be seen was if the 
ranch managers learned from their stock losses. 
 The first drive and winter was not a total loss, despite how dire the events were. What 
was impressed on the operators and cowmen running the animals was the relative endurance and 
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durability of different breeds. According to Kelly “The black Polled Angus beasts stood up best 
of any, the Herefords rated second, and the Shorthorns suffered most of all.”14 This assessment 
fits within the Montana experience as well. The shorthorns that Kohrs imported from the eastern 
United States were sent to Deer Lodge or Hooban’s Bottom where they were fed through the 
winter. The operators of the ranch took notice of this discrepancy and decided to improve their 
herd by ordering one hundred and thirty six Hereford and Polled Angus pure bred bulls from 
England15. The following week, on February 9, advertisements were placed in numerous 
newspapers calling for any stock raisers who wished to import pure bred cattle from England to 
contact James Walker.16 The recognition that some breeds are more durable that others was 
significant for the adaptive process and one that was prevalent on both sides of the border.  
 In the spring of 1882, the cattle that had been scattered needed to be rounded up and 
properly branded. In newspapers going back to January, the Cochrane ranch had been 
promulgating the appearance of their brand, a common practice in country where fences were 
rare and cattle common. Duncan McEachran wrote to James Walker that he was to round up 
every cow on their range and put the Cochrane brand on its shoulder. When the round up began 
several locals came to assist and make some extra money. However, their enthusiasm waned 
considerably when the Cochrane employees gathered up all the animals, including some that did 
not belong to them.17 The actions of the Cochrane during this round-up generated a significant 
amount of protest, but Walker was determined to follow McEachran’s orders to the letter. The 
whole debacle resulted in the locals abandoning the round-up. Adding to the injury the locals 
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gathered up their cattle and likely some that were not theirs. The incident here was indicative of 
McEachran being a difficult manager who was focused on the bottom line, something that he 
would carry to the Walrond Ranch after 1883. However, disregarding the local ranchers was a 
missed opportunity. Local stock raisers knew where to find cattle that had drifted while the 
Cochrane staff, new to the range as they were, did not. Ultimately, what the first round-up 
engendered was a feeling of animosity toward the Cochrane operation and a missed opportunity 
to learn about their environment.18  
Cattle Raising Starting in Earnest 
 In spring 1882, the Cochrane was in the business of growing its herd. In the May 4, 1882 
edition of The Benton Weekly Record it was reported “Major James H. Walker, manager of the 
Cochrane Ranch Company, of Bow River, is at the Choteau House, having lately returned from 
Dillon where he has been interviewing stock-men with cattle to sell.”19 The problem for Walker 
was that McEachran insisted on micromanaging the arrangements for cattle purchases. As a 
consequence, when Walker arranged a deal with Poindexter and Orr, two of the largest cattlemen 
in Montana, he was called back to Fort Benton by wire before the deal was finalized. McEachran 
went behind Walker’s back and made a deal to have I.G. Baker’s firm purchase the stock for 
both organizations, thinking that by making a larger purchase they could secure a better deal.  
The deal struck by McEachran, however, went sour. As a consequence, Walker was forced to 
return to Poindexter and Orr and repurchase the original herd. Unfortunately, the price of cattle 
had increased significantly over those few weeks and the herd now cost an additional $25,000. 
The River Press reported that “…they paid $25 a head, or in the aggregate, $150,000.”20  The 
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incident resulted in Walker tendering his resignation, effective as soon as a replacement could be 
found.21  
 This series of events had cost the Cochrane operation dearly. First, the loss of Walker 
was unfortunate. By all reckoning he was qualified for the work and, as can be inferred from the 
round-up and Montana incidents, dedicated to the Cochrane operation and following the desires 
of his employers. His resignation would become official in September of that year.22 Secondly, 
the additional $25,000 for cattle was damaging to the bottom line. The ranch was certainly well 
financed but this expense was unnecessary and born out of poor, absentee management. Lastly, 
the time wasted buying the herd in Montana would have been better served getting the cattle to 
Canada and acclimating them to their new range. Considering the previous winter it is surprising 
that timing was not at the absolute forefront of any cattle purchasing decisions.   
 The fall and winter of 1882/1883 was another trying time for the Cochrane Ranche. Yet, 
oddly enough, the smaller ranches surrounding Calgary did not suffer to the same extent as the 
large Cochrane herd. The Poindexter and Orr stock left Montana in August and were therefore 
slightly late getting across the border. At Fish Creek, about twelve miles from the Cochrane 
range, “…they struck a severe snow storm, and were delayed some eight days.”23 Orr told the 
River Express that the drive, to that point, had been relatively easy24; however, the animals were 
still weak and tired. The storm had buried the trails, effectively blocking the cattle from their 
destination. Poindexter was an experienced cattleman and suggested that the animals needed to 
be rested for a month before they could proceed any further. Walker disagreed and forced the 
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drive to continue despite the weather and condition of the stock. The push here was an odd 
move, especially for an experienced cattleman like Walker and the previous years’ losses. It is 
likely that Walker was following orders to get the cattle to the Cochrane against his own good 
sense.  The drive continued for the final few miles until they had reached the Cochrane range, 
where Poindexter said to Walker “Here they are. I have carried out my contract and delivered 
them at the Big Hill. Count’em now, because half of them will be dead tomorrow!”25 
Poindexter’s parting words for Walker proved prophetic. 
 The time when the cattle arrived on the Cochrane range was as bad as it could be. It was 
far too late to set aside winter feed (this was not a common practice at the time) so the animals 
would have to fend for themselves. A snowstorm lasted until October 15 and was followed by a 
mild thaw that only softened the snow allowing for a hard crust to form on the surface.26 With 
respect to the weather, the winter of 1882/1883 was strikingly similar to that of 1886/1887. 
Making matters worse was a change in range managers. Frank White was called to replace 
Walker. White was an experienced railroad-man, but had little experience in the cattle industry 
so W.D. Kerfoot, who had experience in Montana, came north to advise him. A poor range 
combined with an inexperienced manager set the stage for a costly winter. The problems of the 
first two winters on the Cochrane Ranch were as much managerial as they were environmental. 
Changing management after two hard winters meant that the lessons that should have been 
learned were not. As a consequence, the Cochrane was slow to make any changes to the Texas 
system. 
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The condition of the Cochrane range and cattle was telegraphed to the managers. The 
absent managers told White to hold the cattle where they were despite good grass being available 
at Blackfoot Crossing and the Little Bow. As a consequence, the work that should have went 
toward moving cattle to where they could find food was wasted keeping them where they were. 
According to L.V. Kelly “The work of keeping the stock on the Cochrane range was a gigantic 
one, and White found it necessary to establish camps of cowboys at Calgary…their only duties 
being to turn back the Cochrane stock…the number of suffering animals dwindling visibly.”27 
The suffering of the Cochrane cattle, especially when observed against the other ranches 
managing to winter their animals successfully, was a well-known travesty. In January “A 
representative of the Oxley Cattle Company, now at Fort Benton, reports severe weather in the 
vicinity of Fort McLeod….it is believed that the entire band of cattle purchased by the Cochrane 
Cattle Company…last fall will be lost…”28  Eventually it was reported that the Cochrane herd 
was “obliged to drive their cattle southward from Calgary district to Fort McLeod, where, owing 
to the Pacific coast breeze, the climate is milder.”29   
By the end of February reports of cattle deaths were common in newspapers all over 
Montana but the focus was on the Cochrane Ranche, likely due to its size and prominence. The 
River Press reported that cattle around Fort McLeod had fared well. However, the news from the 
Bow River country was much more discouraging, the losses “are not only confirmed, but in fact 
magnified.”30 Specifically, they reported that “…nearly all the stock in the vicinity of Fort 
Calgary is dead, both cattle and horses, and that out of 11,000 head, the Cochrane Ranch 
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company will not have to exceed 4,000 in the spring.”31 An extensive and expensive winter loss 
was not unheard of on the Montana and Alberta grasslands. In 1881, 5,000 cattle died along the 
Tongue River in Montana. However, what made this disaster so striking and suggestive that the 
culprit was a fundamental misunderstanding of the environment was that other ranches in the 
area did not have exceptional losses. For example, the cattle and horses owned by the Oxley 
Ranch are said to “have wintered well, as has most stock in that vicinity.”32 The slow start for the 
Cochrane reaching a temporary equilibrium was directly connected to their use of the Texas 
system. The winter losses were not as bad as reported, yet they were clearly an unnecessary 
result of misunderstanding the environment.  
   In March, reports began to filter in suggesting that the losses for the Cochrane cattle 
were not nearly as severe as had been believed. For example, The River Press reported that 
“Parties from the north say that the cattle losses in that country are not as heavy as reported; that 
the Cochrane company have lost about a thousand head out of their herd of some fifteen 
thousand, and this mostly from the Poindexter and Orr band which were driven in last fall.”33 
The significance of this event, therefore, was not how many cattle were killed during the winter 
but where they were located on the vast Cochrane range. These losses, and the lack of losses felt 
by ranches south of Cochrane, indicated that in order to better adapt to the Alberta climate cattle 
had to move south. Ironically, the severity of the losses put the Cochrane ahead of the curve 
when it came to learning about their environment. After the managerial problems were solved 
they seem to have taken stock of their losses and decided to change.  
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A Sheep in Cow’s Clothing 
The fact that the thousands of cattle lost were all localized on a northern part of the range 
suggested to Cochrane that he should diversify his stock in order to get the best land-use 
possible. In March he wrote to the Minister of the Interior:  
On behalf of the Cochrane Ranche Company (Limited) I have the honor to request your 
consent in writing to the said company being permitted to graze sheep within the track of 
land now held by them under lease from you for grazing purposes. The experience gained 
by the company during the last year shows that the said track is too far north for the safe 
and profitable grazing of cattle and that it is better adapted for a hardier animal like the 
sheep. The objections which have hitherto been raised to sheep occupying cattle grazing 
lands do not hold good for it has been found in Montana where large flocks of sheep 
graze in cattle lands, that the damage anticipated by your department does not occur. The 
manner of herding known as “close herding” enables the sheep to be kept within proper 
bounds.34 
The acting Minister of the Interior responded “It is certain that cattle and sheep crossover range 
often, the same ground without great detriment to cattle.” Furthermore, he wrote that “I would 
therefore respectfully suggest that permission be given to those who hold leases of grazing lands 
laying west of the 5th Principal Meridian and north of the 51st Parallel to stock their ranges with 
sheep. I believe relaxation of the 7th condition of the grazing lease as far as it is applicable to the 
District Referenced to and to some other Sections which might be extended would be for that 
favorable advantage.”35 The shift to sheep raising as an environmental strategy made sense as 
they are better suited to cold weather than cattle. Matthew Cochrane was already experienced in 
sheep raising and it was common to see advertisements for his pure bred sheep in Montana 
newspapers. The lease system also favored sheep in Alberta, more so than in Montana. Montana 
cattle ranchers were hostile to sheep because the public land system put both grazers on the same 
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pasture. For Cochrane, the lease was his and he could put whatever grazer he chose on the grass. 
The addition of sheep on the northern range indicated that the Cochrane operation had gained a 
better understanding of its limitations. Cochrane’s conversation with “Kootenai” Brown would 
likely go much differently in 1883.  
 The shift to sheep for the northern range was a significant move for Cochrane; however, 
he had not given up on cattle. The problem was Cochrane needed more land in Southern Alberta. 
To do so, Cochrane had to again get around the regulation limiting cattle grazers to 100,000 
acres. Edward Brooks, an acquaintance of Cochrane, applied for and received a 33,000 acre lease 
in southern Alberta in 1882. The lease was granted to the Eastern Townships Ranche Company. 
Adjoining this lease was the Rocky Mountain Cattle Company belonging to Charles Colby. In 
March 1883, the leases held by Colby and Brooks were assigned to Cochrane. A third lease, held 
by Gagne, Pratt and Company, was assigned to James Cochrane. As a result, the Cochrane 
Ranche controlled roughly 170,000 acres of land, with extensive grazing land near Fort 
MacLeod, the Peigan reserve, and the Waterton and Belly rivers.36 With the government 
stipulating that a lease had to have one cow per 10 acres, Cochrane could import thousands of 
additional cattle. 
The move to control more land in the south fits with the changing perception of the 
Alberta environment. In The River Press an article from the Fort MacLeod Gazette was reprinted 
stating:  
What we have always upheld and the past winter has proved, is that the choice winter 
range for cattle is limited to about 70 miles all around MacLeod. Reports from the 
Cochrane ranch on Bow River tell of severe losses, and throughout the northern country 
stock has suffered to a great extent. What do we see on all the ranges about this section? 
Comparatively little loss, and now cattle, after being out all winter, are in splendid 
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condition, and little or no snow here all winter, when it has been two or three feet deep in 
other sections.37     
The move by Cochrane and the newspaper articles singling out the southern part of Alberta as 
being the only area suitable for cattle are significant to how the Cochrane ranch would adapt to 
their environment. From 1883 forward, the ranch would be split north and south, essentially 
along climate lines. 
The Split Operation 
 Organizing a stock operation split north and south required Cochrane to divide his 
managers. W.D. Kerfoot, who had joined the ranch when Walker left, was to remain at Big Hill 
to manage the sheep ranches’ affairs. White was moved south to run the cattle operation and was 
assisted by foreman Jim Dunlap. Considering the ample room that the Cochrane ranch now had 
their herd of roughly 12,000 cattle was divided in half at Big Hill and sent south to graze.38 From 
a carrying capacity perspective Cochrane was well under what the government recommended. 
Cochrane’s decision to move his cattle was noteworthy enough to be mentioned in The Benton 
Weekly Record. In the short blurb they noted “We understand that the Cochrane ranch company 
are moving their winter range south on account of the severity of the weather.”39 The following 
two winters were relatively mild and the cattle did well. The temporary equilibrium using the 
Texas system that had eluded Cochrane was finally reached on the new range.   
While the cattle in the south were set to do well for the first time since the ranch began, 
the transition to sheep on the northern ranges still needed to be enacted. In May, 1883 Cochrane 
sent a letter to the Minister of the Interior explaining:  
                                                            
37 The River Press, April 11, 1883. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/ 
38 Brado, Cattle Kingdom, 74. 
39 The Benton Weekly Record, May 26, 1883. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/ 
182 
 
The past winter has been a particularly severe one on our cattle and the losses sustained 
by the company at this cause have been so enormous that if they were to become actually 
known to the public a very serious blow would be dealt to stock raising in the north west 
and much injury would result to the western country generally…in the north west…cattle 
ranching has so far been a heavy loss to us. It is respectfully submitted that this company 
having complied with all government regulations and gone to enormous expenditures in 
stocking their lands, the government should deal with it more liberally than with the 
companies which having obtained similar leases, have merely paid the annual rates and 
waited to ascertain the experience of others before stocking their lands. The operations of 
the company are much restricted and hampered by reason of the delay and consequent 
uncertainty in the grant being made and I would again most respectfully urge that the 
grant be made forthwith.40  
 What Cochrane’s letter is referring to is the right to graze sheep on a lease that was restricted to 
cattle and that it was a lack of experience with the environment that led to their stock losses. 
There was far too much money invested to simply abandon the land and Cochrane was 
convinced that sheep were the stock to turn a profit. Ironically, the lands being restricted to cattle 
exclusively were partly the result of lobbying done by Cochrane in the years leading up to the 
establishment of his ranch. Considering this fact Cochrane’s conversion was significant. In less 
than two years Cochrane gained a far more nuanced understanding of the Alberta grasslands and 
was doing all in his power to adapt his ranching methods.  
 Cochrane was also looking for additional ways to diversify his company to off-set some 
of the losses over the last two winters. In October 1883, The River Press reported, “We learn 
from J.B. Smith that J.J. Healy and party’s claims are in the Castle Mountains. They claim to 
have ledges seventy and eighty feet wide, carrying copper-stained rock which they think will 
assay from 50-200 ounces in silver.  The Cochrane ranche company has recently purchased a 
three-eighths interest in McLaughlin’s three claims, in that region for $3,600. They are reported 
to be very rich in silver and copper…From all reports it would seem that the Healy party have for 
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a verity struck it rich.”41 The claim was a relatively small investment, especially when put 
against the investments of Conrad Kohrs; however, it indicated that Cochrane was a savvy 
businessman who wanted to maintain his balance sheet against the uncertainty of stock raising. 
Other ranchers in Alberta, especially Alfred Cross, would follow this example.   
 In 1884 the question of stocking sheep north of the Bow River had gained notoriety. The 
opposition to Cochrane’s plan was strong from other ranchers in the area and from the Southern 
Stock Growers Association. A petition was sent to maintain the existing ban. The Southern Stock 
Growers petition, from September 29, 1884, argued that “sheep not be allowed to graze within a 
certain defined section of the North West Territories” and “another petition signed by 124 
residents and settlers on Sheep Creek and High River, against any order prohibiting the 
importation of sheep or other stock in the Electoral District of Calgary and the country lying 
East, West, and North of it.”42 The order-in-council, despite containing two different petitions 
calling for a ban on sheep, was significant in that it defined the northern limits for cattle at High 
River. As a result, “The Minister therefore recommends that an Order of his Excellency in 
Council be made defining the District in which sheep shall not be allowed to graze.”43 A 
subsequent Order defined the area where sheep were allowed to graze as “…that Section of the 
North West Territories, bounded as follows: on the south by the International Boundary Line, on 
the West by the Summit of the Rocky Mountains, on the North by the High River and its North 
Fork to the Bow River, thence along the Bow River to the Eastern boundary of the Provisional 
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District of Alberta and on the East by said Eastern boundary.”44 The petition banning sheep in 
the south made sense. While there was no question of public land, sheep and cattle would be 
grazing the same area, something that cattle ranchers would not have wanted. However, from 
Cochrane’s perspective, thousands of his cattle had died on his northern lease and he needed a 
grazer that could survive a cold winter.  
 
 
Figure 4. Order in Council 1884-1904, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-1-a 
The Order in Council was an important victory for the Cochrane ranch as their northern territory 
along the Bow River was within the area set aside for sheep. Furthermore, this Order in Council, 
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whether the government admitted it or not, was evidence that the booster literature for cattle 
ranching in Alberta was fundamentally misleading. 
 In February 1884, the Cochrane directors met to consider transferring the Bow River 
lease to a new company so as to remain within the 100,000 acre limit set by the Canadian 
government. To that end the Bow River lease was sold, with all improvements, to the British 
American Ranche Company for $55,000.45 Cochrane was not left out of the new company as he 
held 300 of the 2000 shares. The 1885 report for the Deputy Minister of the Interior showed that 
the Cochrane Ranch Co. imported 7000 sheep, more than all other ranchers combined.46 The 
River Press noted that Cochrane “…has purchased 8,000 sheep in Montana for his ranches, and I 
trust that his example will be followed by others, for the more I see of the country, the more I am 
convinced that it is admirably adapted for sheep raising.”47 The sheep destined for the Bow River 
range were driven from Montana slowly and despite arriving during a blizzard were said to have 
been in fine condition. The winter of 1884/1885 was a good one for sheep and all the stock 
pulled through the weather well.48 However, that spring there was a late storm that resulted in 
many sheep escaping their pens and drowning in a nearby swamp. During the summer, a prairie 
fire trapped and killed an additional four hundred.49 Adding insult to injury was a low price for 
wool due to Australian producers flooding the market. For Cochrane specifically “Owing to 
some of the sheep having been singed in an incendiary fire…the average weight of fleeces will 
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only come up to 6 or 6 ½ pounds, although the majority are up to 7 pounds.”50 The setbacks were 
costly for the British American Ranche Company, but importantly, they were not due to a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the environment. A more nuanced understanding of the 
environment would not have been much comfort for investors. It was, however, significant that 
Cochrane understood some of the limitations of his environment and adapted by switching to 
sheep on the northern part of his range.  
Despite the unfortunate spring drownings and summer fires it seemed that Cochrane was 
correct in judging that sheep were better suited to his northwest range. Furthermore, the article 
from The River Post and the evolving orders-in-council allowing for sheep suggest that the 
overall impression of the northwest was becoming increasingly nuanced. Alberta was on the cusp 
of both a drought and harsh winter in 1886/1887 and understanding the limitations of the range 
was essential to pulling through. 
The Cochrane Ranche on the Cusp of the “Hard Winter” 
Winter in 1884/1885 was described by the MacLeod Gazette as “many times more severe 
than last winter, in fact it would be difficult to imagine a more severe one in this country.” 
However, “Far from any serious results, we gather from all quarters that cattle are about in as 
good a fix as they usually are this season of the year, and in some cases better. Among pilgrim 
cattle and cows with big calves, the loss will be most marked, as it is every winter, but not 
enough to distinguish it from any other.”51 In this respect the 1884/1885 winter in Alberta was 
identical as in Montana. Both were severe yet cattle pulled through well. However, there was one 
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key difference; the article goes on to mention “If cattle will live through such a winter as we 
have been experiencing, without the cow business being paralyzed, cattlemen can feel pretty 
secure in their investments for the stock will stand any winter that is likely to come. This winter 
paints a moral. Plenty of hay should be put up, so that poor and weak can be cared for through 
such weather.”52 Prior to this point neither the newspapers nor had the Cochrane managers 
specifically mentioned the need for hay during the winter. However, based on the newspaper 
information, it seems that ranches located in the southern portion of Alberta were setting aside 
feed for the winter. Furthermore, the losses reported in the MacLeod Gazette for the Cochrane 
ranch were “…about thirty calves and five cows. In a band of several thousand cattle, this is 
really not worth mentioning, except as an instance of the present satisfactory condition of the 
cattle.”53 Considering the losses suffered in previous years the Cochrane ranch had learned from 
their experience and had a far more accurate understanding of their environment. To this end, on 
February 25, 1885 the Cochrane ranch released their annual statement showing sales of 
“$154,000, paying a dividend for the year of 10 per cent ($80,000) to stock holders.”54 
In the summer of 1885 the Cochrane ranch erected a wire fence around their entire range. 
The reason for the fence was a noticeable deterioration in cattle due to uncontrolled breeding. 
This was especially costly as the Cochrane had imported several high quality breeding bulls at 
the start of their operation. Therefore, the fence was less about keeping the Cochrane cattle in 
and more about keeping the neighboring cattle out.55 This was an early recognition of one of the 
massive failures of the Texas system. When cattle are left to their own devices it was impossible 
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to control breeding. Cochrane’s goal in 1881 was to create a breed that was well suited to Alberta 
and having his herd deteriorate in this way must have been a frustrating learning experience. The 
River Press wrote that “They [the Cochrane Ranche] have also during the last 12 months erected 
and paid for over 100 miles of wire fence” in their short article dealing with the profits made that 
year.56 The Cochrane ranch was actively improving the infrastructure on their range for the 
purpose of maintaining their herd’s quality against the poor quality of the neighbour’s stock. A 
cow or steer’s quality maintained by a  fence will bring a good price, but based on the winter of 
1881 it was also a significant factor in the animal’s ability to survive inclement weather. 
However, as L.V. Kelly put it “…this Cochrane fence experienced a hard though brief existence, 
lasting about as long as a snowbank would remain on the streets of Honolulu…”57 Every cowboy 
with the tools at hand would cut the wire if they were close enough. It was not long before the 
fence was utterly useless; however, “The fence posts made splendid fuel in the timberless [sic] 
land.”58  
The two good winters experienced by the Cochrane Ranche came to an end in 1885/1886, 
despite having moved their herds south. The season started off poorly when, in November, 
prairie fires had engulfed the grasslands around Fort MacLeod and “…were threatening the 
winter ranges of both the Walrond and Cochrane ranch companies.”59 The problem was not the 
grazing areas generally, good grass could still be found. However, the Kootenay range where the 
cattle were wintering saw far more snow than anywhere else. When the snow piled up the cattle 
could not find any grass and the drifts were preventing them from moving to where they could 
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find food. What is perhaps most unfortunate was that the Cochrane cowboys did not have any 
winter feed, likely due to the prairie fires late in the season. The situation was dire and it seemed 
as though all of the gains from previous year were going to be wiped out.60 As chance would 
have it Frank Strong, an employee of the I.G. Baker firm, was able to drive five hundred horses 
“…urged by whip and spur and vociferation…”61 through the drifts to the Cochrane cattle. As a 
result of the horse’s effort, a path was cut through the snow allowing the stock to find a clear 
pasture on which to graze. For his effort Strong was paid one thousand dollars.62 Despite the 
flirtation with disaster the Cochrane herd made through that winter.  
Duncan McEachran Grows the Walrond Ranch 
 Despite having received only 3,125 cattle from Montana in 1883, McEachran was 
pleased enough with the sale to return in 1884 to order to purchase additional stock. The Daily 
Enterprise and the River Press wrote that:  
Mr.  C.E.  Conrad returned Wednesday from Chestnut, where he had been on business 
connected with the transfer and delivery of the Swett herd of cattle to the Walrond 
Ranche Company…the cattle are now on this side of the river and on their way to the 
ranch of the Walrond Company near Fort Macleod. Contrary to the usual order in such 
transactions, the herd overran Mr. Swett’s estimate, there being in his band 3,267 head. 
The Walrond Company also purchased the herd of Mr.  A.J. Samuel, of this city, on the 
same range, which numbered 380 head—making the total number received by the 
Walrond Company, 3,467. The Canadian company had to give up something like 
$120,000 clean cash for these cattle.63  
This stock, along with thirty-six horses, crossed the Canadian border and were reported to the 
Minister of the Interior on August 20, 1884.64 The timing of the delivery was important to 
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McEachran because, due to his experience with the Cochrane Ranch in 1883, he was well aware 
of the risks of not getting cattle onto their pasture early in the season.  
Two experienced range managers who had trailed up with the first cattle delivery in 
1883, William Bell and Jim Patterson, were on hand to take possession of the herds. It was likely 
that Patterson came to the ranch at the recommendation of T.C. Power. Patterson was a resident 
of Waco, Texas before he was the Walrond’s first foremen. Bell was roped into handling the 
Walrond books, making him responsible for reporting the financial gains and losses to 
McEachran, who resided most of the year in Montreal. A final member was George W. Frields 
(Doc) from Fort Benton. Frields, a well-known cattleman who raised cattle in Montana while 
working for the Walrond, was the first on-site general manager.65 With respect to how the ranch 
was run the addition of these men was significant. They were all accustomed to the Texas 
system, especially Patterson who was a veteran of the Chisholm Trail.  
 In 1884, the Walrond was a lean operation. The vast majority of the cattle had to fend for 
themselves on the open grasslands; this also entailed a branding operation so that the Walrond 
cattle could be identified and then sold or used in a beef contract. The need to brand cattle 
required rudimentary infrastructure consisting of corrals, chutes, housing, and squeezes, all of 
which were constructed in earliest years of the ranch. For McEachran, more advanced 
infrastructure was not considered necessary at the time and the Walrond cattle were turned out to 
grass in the late summer.  
The autumn that year was uneventful; however, in the winter of 1884 the Macleod 
Gazette noted that McEachran came out to the Walrond during, “one of the most severe spells of 
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cold weather ever experienced in the district.”66 The cattle seem to have gotten through the 
winter well as there was no report of loss of stock. However, the article also noted an 
environmental problem that would become increasingly evident, predators. The 1884 Gazette 
article was one of the earliest reports of “Coyotes and wolves literally swarming on some of the 
ranges.”67 From an environmental perspective, cattle dying from natural causes, the year was a 
success and the Walrond was able to secure government contracts for the following year. For 
McEachran, who was already an enthusiastic for the prospects of the range cattle industry, this 
reinforced the booster representations and further buoyed his confidence in the Canadian beef 
trade.  
 After importing roughly 10,000 cattle from Montana, McEachran and Cochrane began 
agitating for the establishment of a Canadian quarantine line for American cattle to stop the 
spread of pleuro-pneumonia, despite the fact there was no outbreak. In an August interview with 
the Montreal Gazette McEachran stated, “How then comes it that pleuro-pnumonia has been 
allowed to make its slow but certain progress westward? Simply this—gigantic railroads have at 
an enormous cost in money covered the United States as an iron network, and in many instances 
the bulk of their earning is derived from the livestock trade.”68 McEachran went on to note that 
American stock raisers had been unable to control the shipping of stock, possibly diseased, and 
that “…when the west get awakened to a sense of their danger they will bring such influence to 
bear that no government can stand in opposition to their wishes.”69 It has been noted that 
Montana stock raisers were engaged in a similar fight with Texas cattle and overstocking, as 
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much as disease, was the likely motive. For McEachran, the motives were likely the same, with 
the additional anxiety over securing government contracts and protecting the privileged place for 
Canadian cattle with Britain.   
The fact that McEachran had just spend over $200,000 stocking his range with Montana 
cattle and was now fighting to close the border was not lost on Montana residents. McEachran 
was accused of having an ulterior motive. The River Press, published in Fort Benton, argued 
that:  
About a month ago he (McEachran) did not seem the least bit worried about “the 
introduction of diseased cattle from the United States into the Northwest Territory” but 
now that his 4000 head of fine Montana stock are on the other side of the line the doctor 
seems to be possessed of a holy dread of pleuro-pneumonia and the various ills to which 
the cow is heir! This passage is strange. The Doctor knows as well as anybody on earth 
that the cattle from Montana are free from diseases of all kinds, and have always been so, 
while the introduction of contagious diseases is as remote as possible.  Can it be that Dr. 
McEachran, having secured for his company about ten thousand head of Montana cattle, 
wants to keep others from swelling their herds, so that the ranges will not soon be 
overstocked, and the sale of American beef cattle in the northwest territories will be 
prevented? There is some motive behind all of this that is not purely patriotic or in the 
interest of the endangered (?) cattle kings north of the line?70   
The problem for Montana ranchers was McEachran’s hypocrisy and that the borderland 
economic region between Montana and Alberta would be threatened. However, the Order in 
Council secured by McEachran in September 1884, only banned the importation of breeding 
stock from Illinois.71 When the order was fully published The River Press wrote “This is all the 
concession that Montana cattlemen require, and the shipment of stock by the northern and 
popular route can go on just the same as before.”72 Ultimately, the whole incident came to 
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nothing. Canadian ranchers, like McEachran and Cochrane, were not importing their breeding 
bulls from Illinois and the entire order-in-council was cancelled in 1887. In fact, in 1885, 
McEachran declared a herd of Montana cattle in Maple Creek to be “…sound as a dollar.”73 The 
idea for a quarantine echoes Stuart and Kohrs’ concerns about overstocking. It was not until after 
a few successful seasons where a “temporary equilibrium” was reached that ranchers fully 
bought into the booster representations for limitless growth. It seems as though McEachran did 
not want to lose any of that opportunity through something as preventable as disease. 
 In 1885 railway infrastructure had made its way to Lethbridge, Alberta and three cars of  
“mares and bulls for the Walrond Ranch” were the first shipment of stock.74 The type of bull was 
not recorded by either the local paper or in the Walrond records but it is likely that they were 
shorthorns, polled Angus or Herefords as those were the breeds McEachran, Cochrane and 
Cross, favored above all others. Furthermore, having the bulls arrive in Lethbridge by rail fits 
with the Order in Council from 1884 banning the importation of breeding stock from south of the 
border. An additional concern for the Walrond, along with the stagnant price of beef, was the 
poor natural increase of their herds, a factor that likely influenced the purchase of quality bulls. 
Booster representations had all but guaranteed that cattle numbers would swell to rival the bison 
with little to no effort on the part of the rancher. However, for the Walrond this was not the case. 
Patterson’s annual count of calves had been a disappointment as it showed a decrease between 
2,407 in 1884 to 2,253 in 1886. The fact that the decrease in calves forcing McEachran to use 
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Montana cattle to swell his herds may have also played a factor in the quarantine line being 
restricted to Illinois bulls.75  
  The explanation for the decrease in calves was a combination of economics, 
environmental conditions and ranching methods. It should be noted that the environmental and 
methodological causes were discounted by McEachran until 1898. The Department of 
Agriculture’s records for 1883/1884 and the letters exchanged between McEachran and Power 
regarding the Judith Cattle Co. herd show very few calves and an abundance of older stock.76 
The herd demographic, therefore, depressed the number of calves that could be born from that 
first large purchase. Never one to miss an opportunity, McEachran used the older cattle to fill a 
beef contract for the Department of Indian Affairs. Ranch accountant Bell wrote that “…one of 
the chief benefits the company would derive from the contract [with Indian Affairs] would be to 
turn them [old cattle] into money and get the herd cleaned up.”77  It was common for cattle 
ranchers at the time to meet their obligations for Indigenous beef contracts with the absolute 
worst stock.   
  The environmental and methodological problem with decreasing calf numbers was also 
tied to uncontrolled breeding and predation. Modern ranchers utilize fencing to control the 
interaction of their animals so that calves are born in the spring. A spring birth allows two full 
seasons to gain strength before the winter. However, ranchers in Alberta, including the Walrond, 
had imported the open range system from Texas and no such control over breeding could be 
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exerted. For example, the Cochrane experience indicated that barbwire fencing was vulnerable to 
anyone with wire cutters. The lack of controlled breeding on the Walrond indicated three 
possibilities. First, that Patterson did not think it was necessary because of his experience with 
the Texas system. Second, booster representations defending the concept of natural increase 
instilled faith in McEachran that it would, eventually, take place. Third, the loss of those calves 
was just part of doing business on the open plains and the Walrond would have to accept it.  An 
additional problem for the calf count was predators. An October edition of the Helena Weekly 
Herald ran an article stating “They [wolves] have been on the increase for three or four years 
past…The cattle and especially the calves are the food on which the pests thrive, and it is 
becoming quite a serious detriment to cattle interests.”78 That winter it was reported that some 
ranchers were losing up to four percent of their total stock, mostly in calves and young cattle.79 
Prior to the hard winter of 1886/1887 all of these concerns, for the most part, were ignored. 
Avoiding questions of breeding and predation indicate either a lack of will to succeed, total 
apathy to the well-being of the animals or, mostly likely, an ignorance of the environment based 
on years of booster representations reinforced by several years of temporary equilibrium. 
However, the following winter would challenge even the most ardent booster.  
Alfred Cross Grows on the Eve of a Disaster 
In the spring of 1885 Cross wrote a letter to his father about the quality of the grasses 
located in the area around Mosquito Creek. He wrote that “…the grass was green from one to 
three inches in length it seems to grow from the root all winter and wherever the snow disappears 
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the roots are green as in the middle of summer.”80 The significance of this letter was not Cross’ 
eye for grass, he had been working for Cochrane since 1884 and was familiar with the area.  
What was important was that Cross was already cognizant of the Alberta environment before he 
had even started out on his own. On the third page of his letter, Cross wrote that he consulted 
Reverend McDougall, a long-time resident of the area, who told him that his Mosquito Creek 
range was “…where you could always find buffalo in the winter time when the snow was 
deep…”81 Asking McDougall indicates Cross knew to draw on the knowledge of longtime 
residents and that winter on the Alberta prairies was unpredictable.  
Cross established a homestead on 160 acres of land near the Mosquito Creek which he 
then designated as his ranch headquarters. He then leased 22,000 acres of grassland for his 424 
shorthorns at the price of two cents per acre, per year. The number of cattle on the Cross range 
was well under the requisite one cow for every ten acres, something that should have set up him 
for short and long term success, or having his lease cancelled. The first spring and summer were 
dedicated to constructing a sod house and a barn and the cattle were left to graze. Cross was also 
able to plow up five acres of native grass for crops and cut some hay for winter feed.82 Despite 
the promising start and having the foresight to construct some infrastructure and collect hay for 
winter feed, the 1886/1887 winter was devastating and Cross lost numerous cattle.  
Spring, Summer, and Winter 1886/1887         
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Despite the poor winters, long drives, and loss of stock cattle ranching on the plains of 
Alberta had made great strides from its inauspicious beginnings about a decade earlier. In a 
government report William Pearce wrote that “there were 104,000 head of cattle, 11,000 horses 
and 24,000 sheep on the ranches of the province south of, and including, Bow valley.”83 In 1886 
the number of cattle would increase by 34,000 along with a significant number of other grazers 
like sheep and horses. Furthermore, Pearce had not included stock belonging to the ever 
increasing number of homesteaders, so it is safe to assume the total number was higher than 
reported. The scenario on the plains of Alberta in 1886 was strikingly similar to Montana. Both 
had large numbers of stock, the vast majority of which was imported from more amiable 
climates, and both had ranches that were lacking in basic infrastructure, barns and hay that would 
have essential during a particularly bad winter.          
  The spring and summer of 1886 was dry and hot all over the Canadian and American 
prairies. By mid-May reports were filtering in from Texas that “The drought still continues. 
Three thousand head of cattle have already perished…”84 In true booster tradition the following 
day the Helena Weekly Herald wrote “With all the eulogies of interested writers upon the 
superiority of Texas, California, and the corn growing States further north for raising cattle, 
Montana can show a better ten or twenty year record than them…and the losses by northers and 
droughts are greater than by the severe cold of our winters.”85 However, as spring and summer 
progressed the drought would extend north causing problems in both Montana and Alberta. 
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 In June, 1886 the Helena Weekly Herald was reporting on the crop losses caused by the 
drought in Minnesota, the Dakotas, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Nebraska.86 The drought reached 
Montana mid-summer leading to reports stating “It is too late to give us a hay crop and there will 
be less to put up this year than ever before in Montana.”87 The ranchers on the Canadian prairies 
must have been following the progress of the drought with great interest for several reasons. 
First, a drought in the south would result in greater demand and higher prices for their cattle. 
Second, they would have been concerned that Montana ranchers would move their cattle north 
and stress Alberta grasslands. Last, a drought in Montana would very likely extend into Alberta.  
 By July the first suggestions of drought could be found in Alberta newspapers. The 
Lethbridge News reported that “W. Cochrane of the Cochrane ranche, has been appointed prairie 
fire guardian for this district. He can compel any one to turn out to a prairie fire within five miles 
of home, and a heavy penalty can be inflicted on any one refusing to do so.”88 In the same issue 
under the “Town and Country” section the first entry was “Rain is badly needed.”89 One of the 
results of the lack of rain was a small hay crop, something that drew enough attention that it was 
reported “Hay is beginning to come into town. Although the crop is poor and has to be hauled 
quite a distance, the hay brought in so far seems to be of good quality.”90 The conditions on the 
range must have been starting to alarm stockmen and locals alike as the Lethbridge News ran a 
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short article noting “An old time cowman says in 1868 no rain fell until the last of July. When it 
began it rained through August and September, turned off warm and dry, curing the grass, 
making an abundance of food, and cowmen cut hay up in November.”91 The drought had now 
extended far enough into the summer that conditions for a very difficult winter, even with 
cooperative weather, were established. 
 The newspapers in August were, oddly enough considering the further deteriorating 
conditions, quiet about the drought. In the August 6 edition of the Lethbridge News the only 
mention of grass, rain, cattle, or crops was a sentence noting that Fort Macleod would be hosting 
the first Agricultural Fair to be held in Southern Alberta.92 The following week a booster article 
was printed where it was noted “Our great Northwest is the finest track of land open anywhere 
to-day to settlers from the old world…We need have no fear of the climate once settlement really 
begins.”93 Considering that the Agricultural Fair was coming and that Southern Alberta 
newspapers were unabashed booster for the cattle industry the lack of information is somewhat 
telling in itself.   
By September the dry weather had become so significant that the number of American 
cattle, which had been allowed into Alberta duty free that year due to the poor conditions on the 
American side, had begun to alarm local ranchers. The River Press reported that “…Canadians 
have become alarmed lest their big country should soon be overstocked, and there is not much 
                                                            
91 The Lethbridge News, July 31, 1886. 
http://digitallibrary.uleth.ca/cdm/search/collection/sanews/searchterm/lethbridge%20news/field/title/mode/all/
conn/and/order/date/ad/asc/cosuppress/1 
92 The Lethbridge News, August 6, 1886. 
http://digitallibrary.uleth.ca/cdm/search/collection/sanews/searchterm/lethbridge%20news/field/title/mode/all/
conn/and/order/date/ad/asc/cosuppress/1  
93 The Lethbridge News, August 11, 1886. 
http://digitallibrary.uleth.ca/cdm/search/collection/sanews/searchterm/lethbridge%20news/field/title/mode/all/
conn/and/order/date/ad/asc/cosuppress/1 
200 
 
danger that cattle will be admitted free again.”94 The reason for the alarm was, American cattle 
were usually stocked in the Milk River country and it “…has been burnt over and most of the 
streams in the vicinity are dry, necessitating a drive in some instances of at least fifty miles 
without water.”95 While there was often a sense of optimism in newspapers of the time, even 
they stopped printing booster material after September.  
The dominant news subject for the month of October was the Agricultural Fair to be held 
over four days at Fort Macleod. The starting day of the fair, October 12 1886, coincided with the 
first heavy frost of the season where “the thermometer went down to 7 below zero.”96 Despite 
that early frost L.V. Kelly noted that an old time rancher in the area had a different opinion about 
how the weather was going to unfold after such a dry and hot summer. In the Macleod Gazette 
the prognostication was “Old-time cowmen foretell a mild winter. A dry summer is always 
followed by a good winter. Even at that a stack of hay will not be amiss.”97 This weather 
prediction was strikingly similar in form to the one printed by the Lethbridge News in August. 
Both were based on the reports of an “old-time” resident and both naively optimistic. The only 
prescient aspect to the prediction was that having hay on hand may not be a bad idea.  
 In early December 1886, it must have seemed as though the prediction from the Macleod 
Gazette was coming true because the temperatures reported in the area were all above freezing 
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for the week ending December 22.98 Conditions were still quite dry, however, as a prairie fire 
broke out mid-December near Medicine Hat, something that was unusual so far into the winter.99 
The following week winter seized the prairies when “A heavy snowstorm visited the town on 
Monday night” and it would not let go for several months. In the “Town and Country” section of 
the January Lethbridge News the first three entries were: “snow everywhere”, “The roads are 
pretty heavy for wheeling at the moment”, and “The cry of every stockman just at present is for a 
chinook.”100 The most significant entry, however, reported that:  
The heaviest snow storm of the season struck here on Friday night last. Snow began to 
fall in the evening and continued steadily until morning. It was about 18 inches deep on 
the level. Sunday a chinook sprang up and took away a little of it, and on Monday, 
although no wind was blowing, the weather was mild and the water was dripping from 
the roofs. Monday night the wind veered around to the east and it began to freeze forming 
a thick crust on the snow. This will make it hard on cattle as the prairie is pretty well 
covered with snow and the crust on the snow prevents them from getting at the grass. We 
hope, however, to feel a good strong chinook blowing before they will begin to feel any 
ill effects from this change.101 
The following week the entire area was hit with another severe storm that dropped enough snow 
to almost completely suspend all rail traffic in Alberta and force the shutdown of the local 
mining operations.102 A snowfall followed by a small melt and then freeze was about as bad as it 
could get for cattle. But, as it had not happened in recent memory, ranchers were not sure how 
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long it would last. Furthermore, weather events such as these were always ignored by boosters 
which, along with the recent arrival of most stockmen, engendered a dearth of accurate 
information that resulted in a general disaster.  
In the week immediately following the storms “The stockman say that the cattle are 
getting through the winter admirably and if the weather does not get any worse than at present 
for a couple of weeks the loss for this cause will be small.”103 While these reports may sound 
naïve, cattle had been turned out to grass in the area for over a decade without a general loss so it 
stands to reason that stockmen in 1886 would not have thought it possible.  The weather did not 
improve in January; it got worse. Another snow storm followed by a small melt was reported the 
following week. Compounding the problem of the crusted snow was the wind had increased and 
all of the loose snow was beginning to form large drifts wherever it could pile up.104 What was 
happening in Alberta was almost exactly as in Montana. It was not that the winter was bitterly 
cold for long stretches of time but that the snow would fall, melt and then freeze, making it 
impossible for the cattle to “muzzle” for food. The inability for cattle to push through a crust of 
snow was a key difference between cattle and bison foraging abilities.105 As a consequence, what 
would have been a hard year for bison was a brutal one for cattle. Compounding the problem was 
that the poor spring and summer had decreased the hay crop significantly just when it was 
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needed most. As a result, when the cold temperatures and storms arrived late in the season the 
cattle were ill equipped to survive.   
In February, cattle already weakened from the difficulty of finding food, were subjected 
to severe cold and another round of storms. The combination of weather engendered the first 
general die-off in the history of Alberta stock-raising. 106 In the February 2, 1887 edition of the 
Lethbridge News it was reported that the temperature had plummeted to 43 below zero. Shortly 
after “Another snow storm stuck here on Saturday evening last and continued all day Sunday. 
Monday and Tuesday was very cold with a slight wind blowing and the thermometer at 31 below 
zero. Today is still very cold but clear and calm. The off set this weather will have on the cattle 
will be very serious as numbers of them have already succumbed to the cold and hunger.”107 
L.V. Kelly noted that cattle all over Alberta were succumbing to the weather in one way or 
another. Stock all over Alberta huddled together due to the cold, were unable to find food 
because of the snow, and unable to move because of the drifts. The degree of the die-off was 
such that by February 9 the report on cattle mortality was a succinct “Cattle are dying pretty fast 
in this vicinity at present.”108 
For Cochrane, McEachran and Cross, along with every other rancher on the Alberta 
prairies, the winter of 1886/1887 was significant. It was the first general loss of cattle in the area 
and was certainly a demarcation point for ranching operations generally. From this point 
forward, much as in Montana, hay and infrastructure were essential facets of any ranching 
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operation. For Cochrane it more or less spelled the end of his long term ranching aspirations. 
Despite having access to capital and thousands of acres of grass his inexperience with the 
environment coupled with some poor luck made staying in business more trouble than it was 
worth. Cross and McEachran, however, would be forced to come to terms with the limitations of 
the environment and the fundamental inaccuracies of booster representations of the environment. 
An important distinction between Cross and McEachran was that Alfred Cross was the owner of 
his ranch, McEachran was beholden to investors and was steeped further in the unrealistic 
aspirations of cattle raising in Alberta.  
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Chapter 7: Adapting After the Hard Winter 
The winter of 1886/1887 was a demarcation point for the range cattle industry on the 
Alberta and Montana grasslands. From an environmental perspective the large scale die-off of 
cattle, in some areas up to 70%1, undermined dominant booster representations of Montana and 
Alberta. The idea that there could be a series environmental events that could negatively affect 
such a large geographical area was considered impossible, or rare, but never mentioned before 
1886/1887. Even when 5,000 Texas cattle froze to death on the Sun River range in 1881, Conrad 
Kohrs felt that it was a localized incident. As a consequence, when such a disaster did happen, 
the attitude regarding stock raising changed. The change was best summed up by Granville 
Stuart’s claim “a business that had been fascinating to me before, suddenly became distasteful. I 
wanted no more of it. I never wanted to own again an animal that I could not feed and shelter.”2 
The atmosphere engendered by this disaster emphasized recovery and adaptation. The need to 
adapt was not lost on the newspapers of the time. The Great Falls Tribune, wrote in March 
following the disaster, “It is well that the cattle business of the western ranges must soon be 
adjusted to new and more civilized conditions. At present it is barbarous to the last degree, and 
whole herds will continue to die of cold and starvation until the filling up of the country makes it 
unprofitable to waste land and live stock in the present fashion.”3 Adaptation methods varied 
from ranch to ranch. Some downsized to a manageable herd to avoid putting too much stress on 
the grass. Others increased herd size but also set aside feed and shelter for winter, especially the 
kind of winter they now knew could happen. Many sought to improve their stock through 
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breeding programs. Some decided, the decision to mitigate all risks and became land sellers. 
There was no single way to adapt to the north-western plains and ranchers in Montana and 
Alberta would each pursue their own path. The only universal was the years following the “hard 
winter” were pivotal to stock raising and for the emergence of a far more nuanced perception of 
the environment. 
   The plains where so many cattle had died must have been a grim sight when cattlemen 
could finally get a chance to inspect their herds in February or March. Newspaper reports began 
to filter in that painted a sad picture for those who could not venture onto the plains. For 
example, the Butte Semi-Weekly Miner wrote that railroad workers saw “…a bunch of cattle 
frozen to death standing and still remaining in that position.”4 Just a few days later the Bozeman 
Weekly Chronicle published an editorial estimating the scope of the disaster and its causes. The 
scope was, to say the least, massive. The writer estimated that  “…loss upon the ranges in many 
instances will exceed seventy percent, in others fifty, and in favorable localities, where feed 
shelter and water is abundant, only twenty-five percent will die, making…a loss throughout 
Montana of at least thirty-five percent…”5 With respect to the cause the writer indicated that the 
winter of 1886/1887 was an environmental disaster due to “Large incoming herds and rapid 
increase, supplemented by an unusually dry summer season, rendered the ranges dry and bare. 
Then came a winter of unusual severity, deep snows and howling blizzards.”6 These reports 
suggest that, even to Montana residents, the cause was predominantly environmental with 
overstocking exacerbating an already bad situation. Furthermore, it would be incumbent on those 
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who decided to continue in the industry to adapt. Conrad Kohrs would heed this advice in the 
coming months and years.  
 In his autobiography Conrad Kohrs wrote that he learned about the break in the weather 
in a letter from his brother who told him a chinook had come through. Kohrs had been away 
suffering from ill health. When he was able to return and informed of the losses replied “…I 
have my health again, and that is worth more than all the cattle.”7 However, when Stuart 
informed him that the branding had dropped from 3,000 to 900 he began to realize the financial 
severity. Kohrs, however, had no interest in getting out of the cattle industry altogether. His first 
task was to replace the stock he had lost.  
 Conrad Kohrs was successful due to his diversification of assets. His investments in 
mining, water, and land mitigated the financial losses he experienced during the winter of 
1886/1887. However, an additional asset to his large business empire was that it allowed him 
access to capital. As he noted in his autobiography “One of the bright spots in the heavy losses of 
this season was the kindness of Mr. A.J. Davis of Butte. Hearing about my losses, he sent for me 
and offered me $100,000.00 without any security…except the notes of Kohrs and Bielenberg”8 
The following year he took advantage of the offer. While the lending of money without security 
seems like a poor business decision, Davis was not the only wealthy individual to make such an 
offer. Joseph Rosenbaum, the wealthy stock commissioner from Chicago whom Kohrs had hired 
in the 1870s and had made a fortune from Montana cattle, offered one million dollars to help 
stock raisers get their herd sizes back up and start shipping cattle out of Chicago. The money 
offered by Rosenbaum was also accepted by Kohrs for the purpose of rebuilding his herds,9 but 
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certainly not all cattlemen were as fortunate in their friends as Kohrs. However, that should not 
detract from the actions he took in the wake of the hard winter to establish a ranch that was more 
in line with Montana’s environment. 
 In the spring of 1888 Kohrs began restocking in earnest. He started out in Boise, Idaho 
where he hired Dick Williams, who was well versed in the cattle industry, to assist him. Their 
travels included the Boise Valley, Payette, Ontario and then back to Idaho where animals were 
purchased along the way. The restocking included all ages of stock and numbered around 
9,000.10 In the same year Duncan McEachran would also restock with older cattle from Ontario. 
The animals themselves were spread between the ranges located near Fort Benton and some were 
sent to the Pioneer Cattle Company further south, near Bowdoin. Despite all of the difficulty 
facing the Montana cattle industry that year Kohrs was still able to ship roughly 1,000 head from 
Chicago.  
Among the animals purchased in 1888 were shorthorn breeding bulls. The Great Falls 
Tribune wrote that “Conrad Kohrs, of Deer Lodge, the heaviest shorthorn breeder in the territory, 
has on his hands several bulls for which he paid $1,000 per head.11 The purchase reflected 
Kohrs’ determination to improve his stock as a way to adapt to the plains environment. In order 
to do so he purchased Texas cattle12, known for the heartiness but not their cold tolerance, and 
bred them with shorthorns that were a better eating cow and more suited to a cooler climate. In 
later years Kohrs would make the switch from shorthorns to Hereford. The practice of breeding 
better animals, especially in the wake of the 1886/1887 winter, also shows long term planning 
for improvement as the new stock could not have been shipped for at least three years. 
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Furthermore, with respect to having stock better suited to Montana’s climate, in June of 1888 
Kohrs imported 5,000 animals from Oregon. Kohrs had identified the importance of having 
imported animals acclimated, as Oregon cattle were.13 Prior to 1886/1887 the information 
available indicated that all of the precautions now being taken by Kohrs were unnecessary. 
While it is true that as a long-time resident of Montana Kohrs knew better than most what 
Mother Nature could bring, he had never lived through such a wide-spread disaster. Therefore, 
the efforts exerted after 1887 to have acclimated stock indicate a far more nuanced understanding 
of the environment, an understanding that directly challenged the booster representations that 
had dominated the media for almost three decades. 
Perhaps the only bright spot resulting from the cattle losses in 1887 was that the range 
was allowed time to recover from the drought without pressure from grazers. Kohrs noted that 
the winters of 1888 to 1890 were mild with little precipitation, even in the spring. He also wrote 
that “There was an abundance of grass on the prairie for the cattle as the range was not 
overstocked.”14 This was a drastic departure from the previous years when up to twelve herds 
were all grazing together. The fact that the range seemed to be recovering was likely part of the 
justification behind Kohrs making a significant land purchase for his Deer Lodge operation. In 
total he added nearly 8,000 acres to his home ranch along with numerous improvements.15 The 
Deer Lodge range was located in the foot hills and therefore had better shelter from inclement 
weather. Protection from inclement weather at Deer Lodge was something Kohrs had noticed 
before 1886/1887, adding land here indicated an understanding of environmental fluctuation in 
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Montana. Furthermore, the improvements themselves suggest a more controlled ranching method 
as opposed to the Texas system that was previously popular. The Helena Independent wrote:  
The property surrounding the residence comprises 800 acres. This is divided into 12 
fields and pastures for different graded stock. A new stable with 18 box stalls has recently 
been completed…Just beyond the farm Mr. Kohrs has 2,500 acres of grazing land fenced 
in and owns 2,500 acres down in the valley…where he keeps his shorthorns and raises 
hay, oats, and vegetables. Messrs. Kohrs and Bielenberg are among the cattle kings of 
Montana and find a profitable business in raising thoroughbred cattle and horses.16   
The infrastructure to the home range at Deer Lodge indicate significant faith in the cattle 
industry as a whole; but also that the future for ranching in Montana was going to be tied to 
improved stock.  
 At the same time improvements were being made to the Deer Lodge operation, Kohrs 
was investing in mining companies. The Helena Independent included a special article in their 
September 20, 1890 edition which mentioned that Conrad Kohrs was a principal investor in the 
Champion Mining Company and the Lion Mining company.17 While cattle prices were generally 
steady and profits were available, it was not surprising that Kohrs would invest in mining as a 
way to hedge against the unpredictability of the cattle business. Furthermore, by 1890 Kohrs had 
become concerned about the presence of agricultural settlers siphoning off river water leaving 
less for cattle. In an interview he stated “…Montana needs a great deal more water now than it 
did several years ago. The many mountain valleys in which cattle roamed are now occupied by 
farmers, who appropriate the water for agricultural purposes.”18 Despite mentioning that the 
cattle industry was strong in the same interview, it made sense for Kohrs to invest outside of 
cattle if he was concerned about pressure from farmers, especially in the river valleys. 
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 The year 1891 proved to be a profitable year for Kohrs suggesting that either the industry 
as a whole was turning around or that he was making the right type of changes, or both. There 
was still an abundance of grass despite the number of cattle in Montana actually having 
increased beyond what it was in 1886. Cattle numbers went from 633,716 in 1886 to 932,697 in 
1891.19 The prosperity of 1891 was due to “…an abundance of grass…owing to the shortage of 
corn fed cattle…” What he was referring to was the increasing practice of sending cattle out of 
Montana to fatten on corn, something that Kohrs did not do. The stock that was shipped averaged 
1585 pounds which realized a total profit of $290,000.00. 20  
The success found in the spring, however, was tempered by a poor fall market and a 
severe winter that year. Kohrs wrote that the market was so bad during the fall they had received 
more for their cattle sold in the spring, without the benefit of a season fattening. The winter took 
its toll as well. Kohrs, as was usual for the business, had acquired new stock that year but “…of 
the yearlings shipped in we lost fifty percent.”21 The aggregate loss of the stock would total 
33%.22 Losing more yearlings to a severe winter suggests that perhaps even more needed to be 
done. The New Northwest reported that Kohrs (and others) advised newcomers shipping Texas 
cattle to Montana in the fall of 1892 to “…stop their drive on the Little Missouri…” instead of 
pushing them the additional two hundred miles to their destination. The reason for stopping them 
early was to give them a chance to recover some weight and, significantly, to acclimate to the 
Montana environment. The advice was not heeded however, and the cattle, thin, tired, and not 
acclimated, were caught by “an early and hard winter and over 65 percent of them lost…”23 That 
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winter Kohrs wrote “experience has taught me to be careful as hard winters hardly run farther 
apart than five years…”24 
The loss of stock in 1892/1893 and Kohrs’ mild reaction to it suggests that, despite 
making changes, he had accepted that the climate was not within his control and occasional 
heavy losses were a cost of doing business. However, what he could control, he did. At the Deer 
Lodge range where he had five Hereford bulls and Shorthorn bulls he began, inadvertently, to 
cross breed.25 The interbreeding occurred because by the 1890s the individual herds at Deer 
Lodge had grown too large and the only solution was to mix the herds together; what resulted 
was a happy accident. Herefords, recognized by their white face, were especially efficient at 
adding weight as they had been initially bred as draft animals. Furthermore, they were especially 
tolerant to inclement weather and were “…an early maturing animal” that was prized for “Its 
ability to forage in the most hostile environments, out wintering in the foothills of the 
Rockies…” Lastly, despite their hardiness and size Herefords were quite docile.26 The resulting 
cross bred animals were large, hardy, and relatively easy to handle. While this was an accident, 
the premise that improvement of stock was important was still significant and indicated a 
concerted effort to tailor Montana cattle to Montana weather.  
Despite the losses and the expense of restocking, Kohrs continued to ship cattle both in 
and out of Montana. However, as in 1887, he was forced to rely on outside capital. The money 
was lent to him on the expectation of cattle sales. In Bankers and Cattlemen, Greene Gressley 
argued that the 1890s was a period of borrowed capital for the range cattle industry that was 
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frustrating for cattlemen who were waiting for another boom.27 An aspect of the frustration 
ignored by Greesley was that rancher’s expectations were tied to booster representations and 
could never really be achieved. Kohrs, however, was successful in the 1890s despite occasionally 
relying on borrowed money. Kohrs’ acceptance that hard winters were a part of doing business 
and that he would have to adapt to them altered his expectations. The hard-winter and the poor 
years at the start of the 1890s did not stop Kohrs from supplying the Chicago stockyards.  
By the mid-1890s booster representations, especially for northern Montana, had 
completely changed their tone and level of expectation for returns, effort and environment. 
Printed in the Anaconda Standard was an 1894 interview with Editor McLaughlin, a “recognized 
authority” on the subject of cattle ranching in northern Montana. He stated that “Under the most 
favorable circumstances the results are not in proportion to the money invested and the labor 
performed. About every fourth year a hard winter reduces the herds almost to the point of 
obliterating the natural increase of the other three seasons. Drouthy [sic] seasons and prairie fires 
often place the herds in peril of starvation. Wolves claim their tribute to the extent of 25 per cent 
annually of the calves branded.”28 While this quotation does its utmost to refute any and all 
booster representations of the environment for some the main culprit was still overcrowding. 
McLaughlin noted that:  
But perhaps the greatest menace to the cattle industry arises from overcrowding the 
range. This, it is needless to say, is brought about chiefly by outside owners driving in 
from other ranges with which they have become dissatisfied. To stigmatize such a course 
as shortsighted is not sufficiently denunciatory. While it is true that the to the general 
range remains in the government, it has always been recognized among cattle owners, as 
a matter of courtesy and moral right, that after a range has become fairly well stocked, it 
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belongs to the first occupants, who have invested their means and established their 
homes.29     
This quotation could not be further from those just a decade earlier that spoke of limitless free 
grass and unlimited potential for natural increase of the herds. It is hardly surprising then, that 
Kohrs would have recognized the environmental reality of Montana and altered his ranching 
methods from the Texas system to something more suited to the climate.   
An aspect of Kohrs’ continued success, along with having established good credit with 
bankers, was that he never gave up control of his company. This stands in contrast with several 
other large cattle operations that, because of their financial insecurity, were forced to give up 
control to commission firms. Commission firms specified the age of the cattle and the price was 
determined by the market; however, as Kohrs had control he was able to determine the type of 
cattle he wished to graze on either his land or on the public domain. Gene Gressley notes that 
most cattle ranches “were not run as business,” the fact that Kohrs was an accomplished 
businessman was certainly an advantage.30 The matter of control may seem small; however, the 
winters of 1886/1887 and 1892/1893 had demonstrated that certain cattle were better adapted to 
the environment than others.  As a consequence, Kohrs concentrated his efforts on the breeds 
that he, through years of experience, knew were better suited to Montana’s climate.  
By the mid-1880s the idea of the feeder system, a precursor to modern feed lots, came to 
dominate the industry.31 As Kohrs had noticed, this was the partially the reason that public land 
was not as crowded. In the feeder system, worked where steers were shipped to mid-western feed 
lots in the fall, fattened on corn all winter, then sold to stockyards for slaughter or shipping. 
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William Cronon argued that through this system cattle became an interstate commodity.  They 
were born in one place, grew in another, fattened in a final place and then shipped all over the 
country.32 Due to Kohrs maintaining control over his operation he was not forced into this 
ranching methodology as it was detrimental to him. Cattle entering the feeder system were sold 
before they were at their heaviest. Had Kohrs been forced to participate in this system he would 
have lost money with every animal. It was far more economical for him to maintain his herds 
through the winter as best he could and then ship his animals. Again, this seems a small matter, 
but in an industry that had been dealt several heavy blows, his decision to adapt his practice to 
the environment, and not sell into the feeder system, showed that he had learned from the hard 
winter(s).  
By the 1890s Kohrs, through several years of trial and error, had become one of the finest 
breeders of cattle in Montana.  In 1897 the number of Hereford calves he sold increased 
dramatically. The increase indicated that Kohrs was adapting his ranching practice to sell more 
cows and calves and fewer steers. The reason for this transition was simply a recognition of a 
changing industry within an environment that was clearly not as hospitable as once believed and 
that Herefords were a cold tolerant animal. The switch to selling more cows and calves coincided 
with several large land purchases around Deer Lodge and indicated a better understanding of the 
Montana environment. Kohrs could avoid the dangers of winter kill on both animals and 
predation by wolves on calves. Furthermore, by increasing the size of his Deer Lodge operation, 
which was in an intermountain valley and small enough to easily feed and shelter animals from 
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inclement weather, Kohrs saw that certain animals were better grazed at home then left to their 
own devices on public land. 
 Further reinforcing Kohrs recognition of the environment and his waning reliance on 
public land was the increased supervision of livestock at Deer Lodge and the cultivation of non-
native crops. Starting in 1893, one year after the second hard winter, Kohrs’ operation ordered a 
ton of Timothy seed.33 This grass species was common in northern Europe but not common in 
Montana. With respect to cattle feed, Timothy grass is high in fiber and protein and is actually 
better when cut late in the season.34 In addition to the Timothy seed, Kohrs purchased 10 tons of 
bran, shorts and clover seed.35 Coming so quickly on the heels of the 1892 winter this shift to 
growing ample crops and selling cows and calves indicated a far more nuanced understanding of 
the Montana environment and the cattle industry. While never explicitly saying so, many of these 
changes, costly as they were, tacitly suggest that for the most part Korhs was no longer 
influenced by booster representations common in previous decades.  
 The recognition of the importance of Deer Lodge and having a more balanced ranching 
methodology coincided with depleting free grass and open water on the north and eastern ranges. 
This made the Texas system even less attractive to Kohrs. In 1899, Kohrs voiced this problem to 
a longtime friend and investor stating “…our range are getting to be in such shape that you can 
count from 20 to 25 percent on loss…”36  This admission, coming in March as opposed to later 
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in the summer, indicates the old ranching methods were not going to work as they had before the 
boom. In order to solve this problem Kohrs, once again, bought land so he would not have to rely 
on the public domain. Fortunately, the N-N Ranch, owned by William and Frederick 
Neidringhaus, was up for sale. Along with that land Kohrs acquired 14,000 acres of land through 
scrip.37 The scrip land was controlled by the Forest Service and was intended to be set aside for 
homesteaders. However, Kohrs took advantage of this system by getting the land directly from 
homesteaders who saw an opportunity to make some fast money. Buying so much land, in both 
Deer Lodge and northeastern Montana, was a recognition that controlled breeding and keeping 
cattle fed, watered was no longer possible on public lands alone.  
 Historians of Montana have often regarded the hard winter of 1886/1887 as the end of the 
open range and for many ranchers this was true. The catastrophic losses of that winter combined 
with increasing predation made turning cattle loose on the plains a risky, if not foolhardy, 
endeavor. However, for Kohrs it was just the start of his empire. He clearly learned that the 
booster representations were the stuff of fantasy and that by relying on the Texas system 
imported from the south he was doomed to failure. His actions after 1886/1887 and then 
1892/1893 indicate a far more nuanced understanding of the environment, especially its 
limitations. In that sense the significance of the hard winter is more the creation of historians 
who focused their analysis on the decline and not on the adaptation. 
After the Die-Off in Canada 
      North of the 49th parallel significant changes were taking place in the wake of the winter 
of 1886/1887 as well. Despite suffering large losses and the subsequent selling of numerous 
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assets, the Cochrane Ranche was not immediately abandoning the cattle industry. In an 1888 
edition of The River Press it was reported that “The contracts for Indian supplies have been 
awarded to Hull, Trounce & Co., I.G. Baker & Co., Cochrane Ranche Co., Robert Scott and the 
Walrond Ranch Co.”38 The caveat was that the stock had to come from Canada, something that 
caused Montana newspapers to speculate that Cochrane had used his political influence to secure 
the contract.39 In September of that year W.J. Buchanan, general manager for the Bank of 
Montreal, engaged a tour of southern Alberta. While there, he noted that the cattle at the 
Cochrane Ranche “…look splendid; they have an excellent calf crop and the prospects are very 
good.”40 The winter of 1888/1889 was a mild one however, the actions taken by the Cochrane 
Ranche suggest that they were, like all other wise stock-raisers in Alberta, taking steps to 
mitigate another hard winter. In an interview with the Great Falls Leader Cochrane noted “That 
the company put up last summer 500 tons of hay, but owing to the mild winter little of the same 
has been used for feeding stock, except to a number of weened [sic] calves.”41 The success of the 
year was indicated in the stock that was issued to the Blood Indian agency weighing roughly 900 
pounds dressed.42 The simple act of putting up hay, especially a significant amount, was a strong 
indicator that the Cochrane Ranche was addressing the shortcomings that had been identified by 
the 1886/1887 winter. Furthermore, as in the developments south of the border, the act of setting 
aside winter feed indicates a far more nuanced interpretation of the environment that ran counter 
to booster material. 
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With the success of 1889 behind them and the additional experience gained from the 
winter of 1886/1887 the Cochrane Ranche began to increase their herds, despite being able to 
reduce them based on changes to lease regulations in 1888. In an 1890 edition of the Great Falls 
Semi-Weekly Tribune it was reported that the Cochrane Ranche had purchased 6,000 cattle from 
John Conrad.43 The number of cattle suggests that the Cochrane Ranche intended to continue 
with the cattle business. Furthermore, in 1888 Mormons from Utah settled at Lee’s Creek, just 
south of Calgary.44 While part of their lease contained a provision for grazing land they were, at 
the time, mostly raising crops. Cochrane used this to his advantage and contracted them to cut 
hay for his ranch.45 That December Cochrane was in Ottawa meeting with the Interior 
Department to discuss ranching interests in the North West.46 With a new herd and a steady 
supply of hay on hand the, Cochrane Ranche would take the next step in adapting to the cattle 
business, shipping dressed meat in refrigerated rail cars.   
In the spring of 1892 a late storm came through southern Alberta likely causing a great 
deal of concern for stock raisers. However, according the Lethbridge News, the losses on the 
Cochrane were nil. The explanation was “the Cochrane Ranche cattle…are favorably situated.”47 
While there is no direct evidence that the Cochrane Ranche had moved their cattle to an area 
with better protection from storms, it seems they have done so with the general knowledge of 
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ranchers in the area. Another bit of good news came that fall when the Lethbridge News 
reprinted a letter from the Drover’s Journal out of Chicago that stated “There is every 
probability that Canadians will go into the dead meat trade next season…The Cochrane Ranche 
Company have already commenced operations with this end in view. The company will build 
large abattoirs at Calgary, and the beef will be shipped to Montreal in refrigerator cars.”48 The 
idea of shipping frozen meat was not new, T.C. Power had done so in the 1880s. However, that 
was for one shipment to fill a contract, this was an interesting adaptation to an emerging 
technology.  
In November 1892, it was reported that Matthew Cochrane was in Ottawa arranging for 
the trade in dressed beef between Calgary and eastern Canada, a reinvestment similar to that of 
Kohrs’ in Montana. 49 The winter of 1886/1887 must have caused a significant loss in capital 
which explains the selling of assets. However, by 1892 the Cochrane Ranche seems to have 
recovered financially and with the setting aside of hay and keeping their cattle in more protected 
areas suggests a recognition that the environment necessitated adaptation. 
While the Cochrane Ranche had secured several shorthorn breeding bulls in the past, the 
subject of breeding better stock was not often discussed in their day-to-day correspondence or in 
the newspapers. However, in 1893 it was reported that “Most of the cattle are of the shorthorn 
type, good animals for the trade in every way. There are still a good many of the old kind, all 
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legs and horns, but the ranchers are getting out of them as fast as they can…”50 While the 
gentleman in question was talking about cattle in a general sense, he had just purchased 1,500 
animals from the Cochrane Ranche so it is safe to say that Cochrane stock had been improved. 
Furthermore, the stock now being wintered at Lee’s Creek, where the Mormons had been 
contracted to cut hay, had done well enough through the winter that it was possible to sell them 
in the spring. From an adaptation standpoint having adequate hay on hand was significant. It was 
also notable enough that an editorial remarked “Here is an item for smaller ranchers to consider. 
If this company can make money by feeding their beeves and selling for the spring market, why 
cannot other ranchers do likewise? The future will doubtless see a reformation in this part of 
Alberta in the ranching business.”51 
With an improved stock, access to hay, and an advantageous position in the newly 
emerging “dead meat” trade, the Cochrane Ranche had successfully adapted much of its practice 
to the Alberta prairies. Furthermore, they were still engaged in shipping live cattle. In August 
1894, the ranch shipped four trainloads, roughly 1,000 cattle, followed by 500 in September.52 In 
the same year the Cochrane Ranche management began looking into irrigating a large tract of 
their land on the Belly River. In a nod to boosterism the Lethbridge News noted that “This is a 
wise move on the part of the company, for with such backing irrigation can soon be proved to be 
the great key for unlocking the treasure houses of mother earth in this locality, and then once 
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unlocked we will need no immigration agents to invite people to come and enrich themselves.”53 
In 1895 an Order in Council to grant permission for the construction of irrigation ditches was 
recommended.54  
The Cochrane Ranche would continue operating as a successful cattle enterprise for the 
next decade, while continuously working on improving its stock and land and attaining 
government beef contracts. For example, in May 1894 the ranch took possession of fifty 
shorthorn breeding bulls and the following year they were awarded the Blood agency beef 
contract.55 Over the next decade they would continue developing their land and shipping cattle 
east. However, between 1894 and 1905 Alberta was opening up to settlement thereby increasing 
the value of the Cochrane Ranche’s land while simultaneously putting pressure on the day-to-day 
operations. The result was that the Cochrane Ranche would have to continue to adapt; although, 
the majority of these adaptations were to a changing population and not a misunderstood 
environment. In 1905 the Winnipeg Free Press reported that the Cochrane Ranche, at the time 
down to 65,000 acres from its original 100,000, was sold to an American capitalist for six dollars 
an acre.56 The new purpose for the land was colonization by Mormon settlers. For all of the 
environmental hardships faced by the Cochrane Ranche they were, ultimately, successful at 
adapting their ranching methods in those crucial years after the winter of 1886/1887. 
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Significantly, they were able to remain a large operation and, through the process of trial and 
error, tailor their operation to fit (as well as possible) within the confines of the environment.  
The Walrond Ranch 
In the fall, before the hard winter of 1886/1887, the Walrond Ranch was awarded the 
contract to supply the Peigan and lower Blood camp with beef. These contracts were based on 
the weight of dressed, that is gutted and cleaned, beef and not a specific number of cattle. As has 
been noted, for the Cochrane ranch the winter was disastrous with respect to stock losses and 
those few cattle who survived were depleted. For the Walrond the stock loss was devastating. 
Additionally, they had the extra burden of having to use more cattle to fill their contract than 
they would have expected. Steers that had been raised on grass were ready for sale when they 
were roughly 1,500 pounds making their dressed weight nearly a ton. This meant that to fill an 
order the number of cattle required was about 20-25. However, as the cattle that came through 
the hard winter were considerably lighter it required more animals to fill the order, a substantial 
loss to the Walrond.57 
Further compounding the problem of weakened stock was that McEachran and Bell were 
slow to see the limitation of the Walrond grazing areas and continued to run more cattle than was 
optimal. It would be logical to think that the winter would have warned McEachran and Bell, but 
they were holding fast to the booster representations of the previous years. In order to square this 
circle, Bell argued that the problem was still the composition of their herd. To him, there were 
many old stock that were not capable of surviving, even in better circumstances. Other herds, 
like the Cochrane, had had their herds “cleaned up” in 1882/1883 and this winter was just the 
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Walrond herd ridding itself of inferior animals. For McEachran, the problem was not with the 
number of cattle or the grasslands, but with the neighbours. He argued that “There is no doubt 
that one half at least of our losses are referable to cattle from the north of us on to our range 
during the winter.”58 McEachran’s inability to abandon booster representations of the 
environment was problematic. He continued to primarily rely on the Texas system of open range 
ranching that was unsuitable for the northern plains. This mode of ranching meant that 
infrastructure was not built, feed was not sufficiently harvested and too many cattle were kept. It 
has been argued that McEachran’s obstinance was related to his blind ambition to make money 
and utilizing the Texas system had by far the least amount of overhead.59 However, this 
argument falls flat considering that by refusing to abandon his flawed system he put the Walrond 
in dire straits financially. It is far more likely that the experiences with a temporary equilibrium 
in combination with the abundance of misleading booster representations made McEachran 
reluctant to see the truth and take all necessary steps. 
An important aspect of the greed argument was McEachran’s tendency to declare 
dividends without actually knowing the number of cattle and calves from year to year. Elofson 
argues that he calculated his numbers optimistically which allowed him to declare an increase of 
5% annually, even when losses were clearly higher than average. An alternative explanation for 
McEachran’s unrealistic valuations were his equally unrealistic expectations of the environment, 
which also explain why he was so slow to see the truth. McEachran was far from the only 
rancher who was reluctant to see the environment for what it was. Simon Evans noted that the 
range manager of the Seven U argued that if he “could get through the winter on whisky then his 
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stock could survive on snow.”60 While many operations had management who, like McEachran 
and the Seven U manager, clung to booster representations, many did not. For example, the Bar 
U began feeding calves and by 1888 were keeping this vulnerable stock in a yard and feeding 
them all winter. In total the company fed 700 calves and their winter losses were essentially nil.61 
These small changes are important because they indicate that those ranchers who did not make 
them still had fundamental misunderstanding of the environment.  
Overall, the 1888 winter on the Alberta plains was good. The cattle and calves came 
through with very little winter loss. On June 18, 1888 Ottawa awarded the contracts for Indian 
supplies to “Hull, Trounce & Co., I.G. Baker & Co., Cochrane Ranch Co., Robert Scott and the 
Walrond Ranch Co.” it was also stipulated that all the beef used to fill the contract be raised in 
Canada.62 The lowest bid for the contract actually came from T.C. Power but as he did not have 
any cattle in Alberta he was disqualified.63 The Walrond, despite the losses of the previous 
winter, was able to meet the needs of the contract. At the same time, the Walrond was 
restructuring by adding additional investors due to the need for capital. However, there was not 
to be much new capital as they were only able to attract two additional investors. An additional 
important change was to McEachran’s shareholder agreement. Where his previous shares were 
worth £500 and he had 10, they were now worth £10 and he had 500. He was also made vice-
president and managing director. The new agreement allowed McEachran’s shares to increase in 
number and, hopefully, value over time. Furthermore, he was now earning a salary of $3,000 
annually. Considering the financial trouble resulting from the 1886/1887 winter and that 
                                                            
60 Evans, The Bar U, 91. 
61 Evans, The Bar U, 110.  
62 The River Press, July 11, 1888. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/ 
63 The River Press, July 11, 1888. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/  
226 
 
McEachran’s financial stake was tied to the growth of the ranch, his decision to take a salary 
may be early evidence that he was unsure of the Alberta ranching industry’s potential.  
Modern range management techniques require a supply of winter feed, shelter, water and 
fencing. In short, modern methods reflect an understanding of environmental limitations that 
were slow to come to the Walrond.64 The Walrond range was in some of the best grassed and 
watered areas of Alberta and seeing limitless potential was understandable. Following that, 
putting far too many stock and following the Texas system of ranching was also reasonable. 
However, what this system had engendered, even after 1886/1887, was a depleted range. A large 
part of this problem came from cattle’s grazing habits and tendency to stay close to a water 
supply. As a consequence, the riparian areas around water where good grass was plentiful were 
noticeably damaged. For the Walrond this meant a substantial increase in feeding, perhaps the 
first and best indicator that McEachran had started to recognize his misunderstanding of the 
range.  
Historians tend to look at the weather as being the main reason for stock loss but it was 
far from the only one. A further recognition of the problems with the environment was related to 
predation by wolves, a problem in Montana as well. After the extirpation of the bison, wolf 
numbers declined precipitously to the extent that they are rarely, if ever, mention by ranchers in 
the early years of the boom. However, when a food source, especially one that was far more 
docile than bison, was reintroduced their numbers recovered quickly. By the mid-1890s wolves 
had become an expensive pest for ranchers of beef and sheep alike.  In 1894 W.D. Warnock 
wrote to McEachran that in “a few nights they killed ten head of yearling colts…cattle and 
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calves…”65 A few months later The Weekly Tribune from Great Falls, Montana printed a letter 
from W.D. Warnock where he noted that the use of Wyeth strychnine tablets had been successful 
in ridding wolves from his section as he was able to collect a bounty on over 400.66 Predation, 
much like the weather, continued to be a problem and was considered to be a part of the annual 
losses. However, poisoning wolves, as problematic as that seems, is not appreciably different 
than setting aside feed for cattle. Both are a recognition of a natural problems and demonstrate 
that ranchers were learning to deal with their environment. 
McEachran and Bell were making some operational changes in the years following 
1886/1887, but they were insufficient. The losses engendered the cutting of hay and the 
construction of limited shelter, although, only enough was set aside for the most delicate 
animals. These half-measures reflect both McEachran and Bell’s belief that the winter kill had 
only been of their weakest animals and significant investments were not necessary. 
Unfortunately, their small efforts were hampered by “An extensive prairie fire…on the Blood 
reserve…” which necessitated additional hay to compensate for the loss of grass.67 In this 
instance, McEachran was making some changes which indicate that he had learned from the 
winter of 1886/1887, but that fact that they were done insufficiently suggest that he had not 
completely abandoned the booster representations which he had used to drum up money from 
investors. It could also be argued that he was reluctant to bear the additional costs of getting his 
range improved with fences, shelter, feed and water to the extent that winter losses would be no 
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more than average.  While it is tempting to argue for the power of greed it does not make as 
much sense as environmental ignorance.  
The largest cost was for hay, which was both contracted out, in a similar vein as the 
Cochrane Ranch, and harvested from the property.68 However, the amount of hay required was 
never put aside. There are two possible reasons why the Walrond was never able to set aside 
enough hay to feed their thousands of stock. First, the cost was immense and going to the 
shareholders and admitting that he was wrong about the Alberta environment was not something 
that McEachran was willing to do. Second, it is also possible that McEachran actually thought 
they were setting aside enough winter feed because he was still convinced of the Walrond’s 
natural potential. There is no correspondence where he mentions one way or the other, all that 
can be known definitively was that there was not enough feed. Lack of feeding resulted in a 
consistent drop in weight for the Walrond stock and therefore profit. 
In order to offset some of the loss of calves from both winter and predation McEachran 
imported “2,000 head of stockers” from Ontario. An advantage for these cattle is that they were 
older than calves and are able to forage for themselves through the winter.69 The cattle would 
arrive via train in the spring and hopefully gain enough weight to survive and be sold a few years 
later. In an ideal situation these stockers were purchased for $10 to $15 and then sold a few years 
later for $45 to $50 with most of that being profit. On the surface buying stockers seemed like a 
good idea as it solved the problem of calves being killed by cold or predators; however, it also 
reflected McEachran’s ongoing difficulty facing the reality of the environment. Ultimately, the 
answer to declining numbers was not more stock to make up the difference but less stock that 
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could be better cared for.  When the stockers were slaughtered a few years later they did not 
bring in the yields that McEachran had hoped for. The projected price was $45 to $50 dollars yet, 
due to their low weight, McEachran only got $29.88.70 McEachran came to recognize the limits 
of his environment with respect to winter kill of calves; but his solution to add stockers indicated 
that he was still holding on the booster representations for his range. It is hard to see an 
attempted adaptation, like adding stockers, as recognition of the limits of your environment and 
an attempt to operate within it but, by every metric except success, this was. It is worth 
illustrating again that adaptation is a process that most ranchers, farmers and settlers got wrong 
as often as they got right. McEachran, for all his faults, seems to have been trying to find the best 
way to run a successful ranch.  
Warren Elofson argues that what McEachran should have done in response to the 
declining carcass weights was to pare costs by eliminating the dividend and then dramatically cut 
the size of the herd. The costs, most of which could be laid at the McEachran’s feet, could then 
have been covered over time with a slow increase in yield from better fattened cattle. This is 
good advice. However, the problem for McEachran, and as a consequence the Walrond, was that 
he struggled seeing these solutions because he misunderstood the problem. Years of booster 
representations of the environment, coupled with an early temporary equilibrium, allowed 
McEachran to see this as a weather problem but not one that required a drastic downsizing of his 
operation. To do so would have flown in the face of everything he had been saying for nearly 20 
years.  
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Environmental and economic problems would continue for the Walrond in the latter half 
of the 1890s ultimately resulting in the creation of an entirely new ranching outfit, the New 
Walrond Ranch in 1898. In an interview from Winnipeg that same year McEachran mentioned 
that “It is possible that in the course of two or three years our company will withdraw from the 
business altogether, the expectations of the shareholders as to profits, not having been realized. 
There is not much reason to grumble, as this is the only ranch in Canada which has continued to 
pay a small dividend ever since its commencement.”71 Soon after this announcement it was 
reported that the Walrond’s investors were pulling out. According to McEachran it would take 
about four years to dissolve the company completely.72    
After the dissolution of the Walrond ranch, McEachran reorganized the operation into the 
New Walrond Ranche Company Limited with himself as president. This final iteration of the 
Walrond was the period where the most significant environmental adaptations took place. The 
operation would persist to varying levels of success until 1946 when the last of the land was sold. 
In 1906 an exceptionally hard winter made the cattle operation no longer profitable and the 
Walrond stock were sold to Pat Burns in 190873. However, prior to that year McEachran and 
Warnock continued to work at adapting the operation in a slow but steady recognition of 
environmental limitations. For example, in 1901 there was a cold snap in March that could have 
been costly; however, more cattle than ever were now being fed. As a result, only 16 of the cattle 
being fed died of exposure. Along with supplementary feeding, steps were taken to ensure, as 
much as possible, that calves were born in the spring. Lastly, and most importantly, stock 
numbers were reduced. 
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73 Brado, Cattle Kingdom, 135. 
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By the 1890s feeding was taken more seriously on the Walrond ranch. Winter feeding for 
cattle is an elastic cost due to the varying needs of cattle and the unpredictable prairie climate. 
However, considering the sheer number of cattle the Walrond owned the cost was considerable. 
Hay that could not be harvested on Walrond land had to be purchased from homesteaders at a 
cost that was relatively high. In 1893 Warnock wrote to McEachran that “417 tons of hay put up 
by contract at 3.75 per ton.” Some of that was hauled by ranch workers with the rest being 
moved by contract. Considering that the contractors charged a haulage fee of $2.50 and the ranch 
workers had to be paid the cost of hay per ton was about $5.00, or about the same as a ton of 
coal.74 Additionally, some stock was contracted out, often to the Blood Reserve, for feeding at a 
cost of $3.00 per head, per large animal, with the price decreasing proportionally with size and 
feed requirements.75 What is important here is that McEachran and Warnock were setting aside 
additional feed by the 1890s, indicating that their environmental experience with the climate and 
the economic experience of selling underweight animals was coming together. 
During the 1890s and early 1900s the Walrond also began to monitor and control 
breeding on their range. In practice, this had always been a difficult task on the open range. It 
was possible to keep the bulls you owned penned up in order to better organize breeding but, if 
your neighbour let theirs roam free all your efforts were wasted. It was also possible to build 
fences but unless the fence is monitored it could be knocked down or cut. Nevertheless, the 
Walrond pulled its bulls from the herd and as a result fewer calves were born out of season.76 
Calves born in the spring was an important environmental adjustment for two reasons. First, 
                                                            
74 Letter, Warnock to McEachran, November 13, 1893, M8688, New Walrond Ranch Papers 1883-1957, Glenbow 
Museum and Archive, Calgary AB; Lethbridge News, November 23, 1892, http://digitallibrary.uleth.ca/; Cardston 
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75 Letter, Warnock to McEachran, December 7, 1901, M8688, New Walrond Ranch ltd Papers 1883-1957, Glenbow 
Museum and Archive, Calgary AB. 
76 Elofson, Somebody Else’s Money, 192. 
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calves were the most likely to die of exposure. Second, calves and cows who had recently given 
birth were the most likely to be preyed upon by wolves or coyotes. While controlled breeding 
seems like a small change it represents a departure from the Texas system where cattle were 
allowed to mix and fend for themselves. Furthermore, it also challenged the booster message of 
natural increase. For McEachran, managing the breeding cycle and knowing the reasons for 
doing so indicated an understanding of the limitations of Alberta’s grasslands. 
  The final adjustment, decreasing herd size, was made during the 1890s and early 1900s. 
The decrease in overall cattle numbers was in recognition of the Walrond’s depleted grasslands 
or perhaps as a way to depress feeding costs. In 1885, the Walrond was running almost 12,000 
cattle spread across roughly 260,000 acres.77  This was almost precisely one cow for every 20 
acres as stipulated by the Dominion Government in order to protect a lease from cancellation.78 
Based on the experience of the Walrond ranch having this number of cattle was useful for 
protecting your lease but problematic for protecting your grasslands. By the 1890s McEachran 
seems to have figured that out. The herd was decreased by not renewing beef contracts and 
decreasing the number of stocker cattle brought in from Ontario. In 1895 the Walrond imported 
2,000 stocker cattle and by 1901 that number was cut in half.79 For the overall ranch the number 
of cattle would be almost halved as well, from 12,000 in 1885 to 7,842 in 1901.80 The decrease 
in herd size was the final significant change made to the Walrond ranching methods and was, 
perhaps for this argument, the most significant. By reducing the herd McEachran had recognized 
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that the ranching in Alberta had limitations and that booster representations, many of which he 
was responsible for, were inaccurate.  
The decrease in herd size was certainly not the end of the ecological difficulties for the 
Walrond ranch. Poor weather, predators, and a still overstocked range continued to temper 
McEachran’s optimism with disappointment. However, what truly ended the Walrond ranch was 
settlement. By the 1900s, the Walrond’s range cattle were competing with smaller herds 
belonging to settlers and fences were going up all over the district, especially to enclose access to 
water. In 1901 several ranchers signed a letter asking that “the lake…be removed from 
settlement for stock watering purposes.” The concern was that the “…party to whom the lease 
had been granted intends to fence the lake all around, and then drain it with the object of growing 
hay.” The letter also requests that the “spring…be reserved from settlement for stock.”81 This 
letter accurately reflected the anxiety that ranchers were feeling with respect to loss of their land 
and access to water. Despite making numerous adaptations, some more effective than others, the 
Walrond ran into another hard winter in 1907. The 1907 winter was similar to the 1886/1887 
disaster in that it was a combination of cold and crusted over snow that caused the greatest 
problems. The losses felt by the Walrond were significant but with them was the realization that 
settlement was replacing stock raising as the dominant mode of land use in southern Alberta. As 
a consequence, in 1908 the Walrond ranch sold all of its cattle to Pat Burns of Calgary thereby 
ending their stock growing operation.      
 
                                                            
81 Letter to Dominion Land Office, Calgary Alberta, February 9, 1901, M3799, David Breen’s Library and Archives 
Ranching Collection 1880-1926, Glenbow Museum and Archive, Calgary AB. 
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The A7 Ranch 
The 1886/1887 winter for Alfred Cross was especially ill timed as it was his first while in 
business for himself. As noted, Cross was not one to give up and began to restock almost 
immediately.  Cross was different from many of his peers due to his business acumen. Cochrane, 
McEachran, Kohrs and Stuart were all skilled at the cattle trade; however, Cross was far more 
apt to see an opportunity to both make and save money. In 1889 he wrote a letter to his brother in 
Montreal suggesting that they import “…1,000 steers one year past in age first quality delivery 
on the boundary line duty paid also all quarantine expenses at $20 a head each. I will look after 
them until they are marketed and will undertake to deliver them at the shipping point on the 
C.P.R…” Cross was certain that importing these cattle would be as success based on his 
experience over the winter of 1886/1887. He had noticed among his cattle that “…steers do not 
die.” Furthermore, “the great beauty is that it does not tie one down to the business forever as 
would be the case with a mixed bunch of cattle.”82 There is no evidence to suggest this plan was 
enacted; with respect to adapting to the environment on the Alberta prairies it shows that Cross 
was aware of the risks in becoming overly invested in stock that may not survive a severe winter.     
According to historian Henry Klassen between 1888 and 1890 Cross had begun to cut 
hay to hand feed his cattle through the winter if required and was simultaneously grazing his 
cattle on his open pasture as well as adjacent unclaimed land.83 In those same years, in order to 
protect his interests and the interests of the industry, Cross joined numerous stock raising 
associations. The Lethbridge News named him as attending the 1888 Alberta Stock Growers 
Association meeting representing himself and several other producers as a proxy. While in 
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attendance Cross was instrumental in organizing a spring round-up to take place at High River.84 
While this may not be a direct adaptation to the environment, many of the concerns raised by 
stock raisers, were, in fact, environmental. As a consequence, Cross’ desire to be involved at an 
organizational level suggests a nuanced understanding of his industry and the environment.  
In 1893 Cross, along with Cochrane and several other producers, set a five hundred dollar 
reward to “Any party giving information that will lead to a conviction of any person or persons 
killing, branding or otherwise illegally handling cattle…”85 This type of advertisement, along 
with Cross’s involvement with stock raising organizations, was an important adaptation strategy 
for a smaller producer. By 1896 Cross had become an important enough organizer that he helped 
to found the Western Stock Growers Association that held its first meeting in Fort Macleod in 
1897.86 For Cross, even more so than for Cochrane and Walrond, part of adapting his practice to 
the Alberta environment was to form organizations that ensured access to water, controlled 
disease outbreaks, regulated branding consistency, and ensured access to markets.87  
Complimentary to Cross’s cattle business was his interest in brewing. However, Cross 
did not have the actual skills to make beer so he spent the winter of 1891/1892 at the Montreal 
Brewing Co. where he learned how to make ale. When prohibition ended in Alberta in 1892, 
Cross took advantage and started a brewery as a means of diversifying and mitigating his 
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financial risk. In order to start a brewery Cross convinced two of his British friends, W.R. Hull 
and William E. Cochrane, to start the Calgary Brewing and Malting Co.; Cross had the 
controlling interest.88 The beer business was not easy and despite being the only brewer in 
Calgary Cross was still forced to learn through trial and error, much like the cattle business. 
Ultimately, he was successful at his enterprise and, much like mining for Conrad Kohrs in 
Montana, Cross had an additional revenue generating business that he would use to replace stock 
and to offset any lost revenue from a fluctuating beef market.  
 An important aspect to Cross’ success in ranching was that he reinvested much of his 
earnings back into the ranch, allowing his herd to grow from 581 in 1888 to over 1,000 by 
1897.89 Even at 1,000 cattle, Cross was running relatively few animals for the amount of land he 
leased or controlled. In the pivotal years between 1888 and 1897 Cross, despite moving to 
Calgary and running a successful brewery, remained active in the operations of his ranch. 
Largely due to his long time presence on the Alberta grasslands Cross was keenly aware of the 
need to irrigate near his ranch house to ensure a reliable hay crop. To facilitate a reliable hay 
crop, Cross made sure that ditches were dug channeling water from the creeks on his property. 
His background in veterinary science also gave in him an understanding of breed improvement. 
During the winter of 1886/1887 his herd was comprised solely of shorthorns; however, when 
they did not fare as well as he wanted he decided to breed better stock. He learned, much like 
Kohrs, that combining Herefords with Shorthorns resulted in a hardier animal that was still 
tractable.90        
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  Alfred Cross, perhaps more so than any of the other ranchers mentioned, was successful 
at adapting to the environment because he was a medium-sized producer and was educated in 
veterinary science. His adaptive measures were put to the test in 1906/1907 in another winter 
punctuated by severe storms and heavy snowfall. The cattle that were grazing in his fenced range 
and had access to shelter and water held up well, while he, like the Walrond, lost stock that were 
grazing on the open plains. The lesson was clear and influenced his next purchase of land. In 
1909 Cross purchased an adjacent tract of land from the Federal Government, that gave him 
strategic control over water. Ultimately, what Cross had come to understand was that the 
additional land would allow for “…extensive improvements…and make the whole ranch as near 
a model one as possible.”91 
 A great deal of blame has been assigned to stock raisers for engendering the 1886/1887 
disaster through overstocking; however, that is an oversimplification. The abundance of booster 
representations, the only environmental information available, suggested that no such disaster 
could take place. Several early examples of temporary equilibrium in both Montana and Alberta 
reinforced booster representations making any stock loss to weather or predation seem, initially, 
as an aberration. Boosters had convinced ranchers that the plains of Alberta and Montana could 
not be overstocked and the climate was such that fences, hay, and controlled breeding were 
unnecessary. Obviously, boosters were wrong. The 1886/1887 disaster was born out of poor 
information and a particularly unfortunate series of environmental events. The significance of 
this event, therefore, was not the disaster itself but in how ranchers responded to it. Based on the 
Kohrs, Cochrane, Walrond and Cross ranches there was not one right way to try to adapt to the 
plains, although there were several wrong ones. Nevertheless, what was important was that 
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ranchers learned from their mistakes and slowly gained a better understanding of their 
environment.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 There is a tendency in environmental historiography to find fault for environmental 
mistakes as opposed to an explanation for them. This has engendered a preponderance of 
negative histories that end on an environmental low-point. The unintended consequence is that 
students of environmental history are constantly reading about humanity’s missteps with nature 
and not the times where they tried to get it right. The story of cattle ranching on the Montana and 
Alberta borderlands is well positioned to explain the catastrophic failure leading up to the winter 
of 1886/1887, as well as the far less exciting attempts by ranchers at understanding the 
limitations of the environment and trying to adapt to it. It is worth remembering that cattlemen 
were human and subject to all humanity’s failings. Expecting ranchers to come to Alberta and 
Montana, armed only with misleading yet completely believable  information, and then operate a 
holistic ranch that balanced cattle, grasses and water evenly is expecting from the past what we 
do not from the present. 
The complementary concepts of booster representations of the environment coupled with 
several temporary, accidental even, periods of equilibrium are central to understanding why 
ranchers understood their environment so poorly. The Baker and Power firms’ financial success 
operating within a borderlands regional economy made it seem as though anything was possible. 
When Conrad Kohrs and Granville Stuart started their ranches they were met with resounding 
successes that reflected booster predictions for cattle raising almost exactly. The first indication 
that the climate was less amiable was when 5,000 Texas cattle froze to death in the winter of 
1881. Despite this loss of someone else’s stock, Kohrs and Stuart both felt that this was a 
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localized problem and not something that would ever affect the entire state. The winter of 
1886/1887 changed their minds.  
In the wake of the 1886/1887 hard winter Stuart left the cattle business altogether because 
he never again wanted to own an animal he could not shelter or feed. Kohrs was less dramatic 
and instead embarked on a mission to rebuild and improve his herds, adapt his ranching methods 
to better suit the Montana climate and decrease his dependence on public land. By every measure 
Kohrs was a resounding success. With respect to gaining a better understanding of the Montana 
environment what Kohrs did best was to expand his breeding operation at Deer Lodge and start 
growing feeding crops, like Timothy grass. He used his connections to continue to ship cattle to 
Chicago and used those profits to purchase as much land as he could because he recognized that 
the public domain was depleted from overstocking. It is challenging to see Kohrs as someone 
other than a wealthy businessman who used his connections to stay rich. Yet, his actions after 
1886/1887 indicate a far more nuanced understanding of the limitations of the Montana 
environment than he had previously to the environmental challenges of the hard winter.      
The Cochrane ranch began its operation in Alberta with high hopes but without the initial 
successes had by others in Montana. The immediate set back was not enough to deter several 
additional large stock purchases from Montana, illustrating the importance of the borderlands 
regional economy. However, the second setback in as many years led Cochrane to question the 
wisdom of running cattle in his northern ranges showing the first of his many attempts to come 
to terms with the limits of his environment. Cochrane started a mixed operation that included 
sheep, cutting hay for winter feed and keeping his stock as far south as he was able. By making 
several other moves regarding shipping and breeding, shorthorns mostly, Cochrane was able to 
find a near balance between running a successful cattle operation and the limitations of the 
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environment. Ultimately, what ended the Cochrane ranch was the goal of the Dominion 
government when he originally signed his lease, settlement. By 1905 the land the Cochrane was 
occupying was more valuable to settlers and so it was sold. While this seems anti-climactic it 
was fortunate as the winter of 1906/1907 was severe. 
The Walrond ranch is perhaps the best example of all the case studies of how to not adapt 
to the Alberta grasslands. What is most important is understanding why so many mistakes were 
made and small changes, like setting aside enough winter feed, were not made sooner. A great 
deal of the problem was ranch manager and then vice-president Duncan McEachran. McEachran 
more than any of the other ranchers here held onto booster representations the longest. Unlike the 
others, he relied on the potential described by boosters to sell the idea of a ranch to investors and 
was a booster himself. When the hard winter hit, he saw disaster resulting from neighbour cattle 
encroaching on his grass. When his cattle were consistently decreasing in weight he decided to 
purchase additional cattle to make up the difference, as opposed to having fewer cattle and 
therefore more grass. When he endeavored to put up hay for wintering his vulnerable stock he 
did not set aside enough. Considering that other ranchers did more, McEachran was, even more 
than others, painted as rapacious and greedy.1 It was true that he benefitted greatly from the 
Walrond but he would have benefitted far more had he run a leaner operation. As a consequence, 
despite making significant changes in the late 1890s and early 1900s, it seems more likely that 
McEachran was an optimist who was slow abandon the booster representations that lured him to 
Alberta in the first place. 
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Alfred Cross of the A7 is the anomaly here and was included in order to show that 
smaller ranchers did not fare better during the 1886/1887 winter as had been argued by other 
historians. Cross started his operation with the same level of optimism and booster 
misinformation as Cochran and McEachran and, like them, lost nearly all of his stock in 
1886/1887. What made Cross better able to adjust was the relative size of his operation and his 
business acumen. Historians have often made the argument that because the large ranches were 
forced to scale down smaller ranches must have been better equipped to handle inclement 
weather, winter feeding, shelter and breeding.2 The numerous changes made by Cross to his 
ranching methods, which were similar if not identical to large ranchers, indicated that the size of 
the ranch did not matter when the rancher had a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
environment. Cross and the A7 Ranch challenge the old and flawed argument that it was only the 
large ranchers who suffered.3         
It is easy to see rancher’s attempts at adapting their practice as a series of mistakes where 
they were trying to do the least they had to in order to be successful, but this is unfair. Ranchers 
in Alberta and Montana displayed great resilience in their ongoing innovations to the 
environment. What drove both was a misperception of the environment due to the plethora of 
booster material that characterized potential as reality. As a result, cattle were often brought onto 
the plains with little or no thought as to how they would survive because all of the information 
available suggested that they would be fine grazing on their own. As a consequence, the Texas 
system of letting cattle loose on the grass with little to no supervision was brought to both 
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Montana and Alberta. Perhaps the best solution for ranchers was one that was the least likely to 
occur to them. If experience with the environment was the best way to understand it, consulting 
with the Indigenous population, many of who worked for the ranchers, would have been 
beneficial. However, the disdain with which Indigenous people on the plains were treated 
precluded any possibility that their advice would be ask for.   
Previous scholarship by Osgood, Brado, White, Jordan, Elofson, and Breen treated 
overstocking as the central problem with ranching during the 1880s. This is hardly surprising 
considering in 1887, The Rocky Mountain Husbandman wrote “The fact that we now have to 
face is that the range of the past is gone; that of the present is of little worth and cannot be relied 
on in the future. Range husbandry is over, is ruined, destroyed, it may have been by the 
insatiable greed of its followers.”4   An example of the contemporary collective argument can be 
found in historian Richard White’s western history textbook: “The combination of overstocked 
ranges and the new fences were instrumental in the ecological disaster that cattlemen produced 
on the plains between 1885 and 1887.”5 Considering that this argument has evolved very little 
over the last 100 years, this study has addressed a disconnection in the historiography for 
environmental history on the north-western plains generally and ranching history specifically. 
This study does not challenge that ranchers had overstocked their ranges beyond their ability to 
care for them using the ranching methods of the day. However, what it does explain is why they 
were overstocked and the lessons learned from their missteps. It also repaints ranchers as people 
who made mistakes, but were not necessarily the rapacious capitalists as they have often been 
portrayed. With respect to contemporary anxieties regarding climate change, access to resources 
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and environmental degradation looking at history for lessons on how to successfully adapt is as 
important as looking for lessons of failure.  
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